STATE OF MICHIGAN

FRANK J. KELLEY, ATTORNEY GENERAL

Opinion No. 5211

August 16, 1977

ELECTIONS:

Campaign financing act

STATE:

Preemption of a city charter provision

Although pursuant to its charter a city may enact an ordinance establishing campaign contribution reporting requirements for candidates for a city office, the state campaign financing act provides that such an ordinance may not establish more restrictive reporting requirements than the provisions contained in the act.

A city may not enact an ordinance which establishes campaign expenditure limitations for candidates for a city office.

Honorable Michael O'Brien

State Senator

The Capitol

Lansing, Michigan

You have requested my opinion on the following question:

Section 2-106 of the Detroit City Charter provides in relevant part:

Although Sec. 2-106 of the Detroit City Charter requires all candidates for election to city offices to disclose all campaign contributions, the Act provides less restrictive disclosure requirements. The Act applies to all candidates for elective office. Section 3 of the Act. Under the Act the names of all contributors donating $20.01 or more must be disclosed. Sections 26 and 29 of the Act. In addition, the total amount of contributions received from persons who contributed $20.00 or less must be disclosed, but the Act does not require the disclosure of the names of contributors of $20.00 or less.

Section 56 of the Act which restricts the power of local units of government to enact campaign financing ordinances or resolutions provides:

It is a general rule of law that ordinances or charters of home-rule cities may not be in conflict with the general law of the State, e.g., City of Grand Haven v Grocer's Cooperative Dairy Company, 330 Mich 694; 48 NW2d 362 (1951). Thus, an ordinance enacted by the City of Detroit which imposes more restrictive campaign contributions disclosure requirements is invalid because the ordinance would be in violation of section 56 of the Act. It is therefore my opinion that the City of Detroit may enact an ordinance which parallels the campaign disclosure requirements of the Act by requiring the disclosure of the names of campaign contributors who contribute in excess of a specified minimum amount which is greater than the $20.01 amount set forth in sections 26 and 29 of the Act. However, the ordinance may not require the disclosure of the names of campaign contributors who contribute less than $20.01.

It is also my opinion that the City of Detroit may not enact an ordinance which establishes campaign expenditure limitations for candidates for a city office. Although section 67 of the Act establishes campaign expenditure limitations, these limitations apply only to candidates who apply for monies from the State Campaign Fund. Section 62 of the Act. Only candidates for the Office of Governor or Lieutenant Governor are eligible for public financing. Section 3 of the Act.

Thus, the Act ties campaign expenditure limitations to public financing of elections. This tie-in is required if the campaign expenditure limitations are to be upheld. In Buckley v Valeo, 424 US 1; 96 S Ct 612; 46 L Ed 2d 659 (1976), the United States Supreme Court declared that the campaign expenditure limitations in the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 18 USC 608 were unconstitutional on the ground that limitations on expenditures made for the purpose of securing the election or the defeat of a candidate impose substantial and direct restraints on the First Amendment rights of both candidates and citizens to political expression and association. However, the Supreme Court held that adherence to expenditure ceilings could be imposed as a precondition for the receipt of public financing, Buckley v Valeo, 424 US at 57, footnote 65. See also the Advisory Opinion on Constitutionality of 1975 PA 227 (questions 2-10), 396 Mich 465; 242 NW2d 3 (1976).

It is therefore my opinion that, although the City of Detroit may enact an ordinance establishing campaign contribution reporting requirements for candidates for a city office, the ordinance may not establish more restrictive reporting requirements than those set forth in the Act. In addition, the ordinance may not establish campaign expenditure limitations because expenditure limitations are constitutional only when they are imposed as a pre-condition for the acceptance of public campaign financing.

Frank J. Kelley