The following opinion is presented on-line for informational use only and does not replace the official version. (Mich Dept of Attorney General Web Site - www.ag.state.mi.us)



STATE OF MICHIGAN

FRANK J. KELLEY, ATTORNEY GENERAL


Opinion No. 5440

February 8, 1979

CHILD PROTECTION LAW:

Limitation of privilege of confidentiality with respect to certain professionals

PHYSICIANS ASSISTANTS:

Limitation of privilege of confidentiality by Child Protection Law

PSYCHOLOGISTS:

Limitation of privilege of confidentiality by Child Protection Law

SOCIAL WORKERS:

Limitation of privilege of confidentiality by Child Protection Law

WITNESSES:

Abrogation of privilege of confidentiality pursuant to Child Protection Law

STATUTES:

Retroactivity

Privileged communications to certain professionals, except that between attorney and client, is abrogated in cases involving a civil child protective proceeding. The abrogation of the privileged communication is not retroactive and applies only with respect to privileged communications made on or after the effective date of the Act, which was October 1, 1975.

Honorable H. Lynn Jondahl

State Representative

House of Representatives

The Capitol

Lansing, Michigan 48909

You have requested my opinion on the following questions concerning Sec. 11 of the Child Protection Law, 1975 PA 238; MCLA 722.631; MSA 25.248(11), which abrogates certain privileged communications:

1. What rights do psychotherapists, social workers, psychologists, mental health interventionists and para-professionals have in court regarding confidentiality with their clients? Is there law available to protect their confidentiality with the clients?

2. What is the time period covered by the law? If one were asked today about a case seen prior to enactment, would that professional individual be required to release information about a person in question?

1975 PA 238, Sec. 11 supra, provides:

'Any legally recognized privileged communication except that between attorney and client is abrogated and shall neither constitute grounds for excusing a report otherwise required to to made nor for excluding evidence in a civil child protective proceeding resulting from a report made pursuant to this act.'

Addressing your first question, OAG, 1977-1978, No 5406, p ___ (December 15, 1978) concluded that the legislature intended to abrogate the physicianpatient privilege with respect to a civil child protective proceeding and that such limitation on a statutory privilege is constitutional.

Inasmuch as the other privileges referred to in your second question are also of statutory origin (1), it is my opinion that such privileges are also abrogated in respect to communications offered as evidence in a civil child protective proceedings.

Responding to your second question, it is a well-established rule of law that statutes are prospective in operation unless 'the contrary clearly appears from the context of the statute itself.' Briggs v Campbell, Wyant & Cannon Foundry Co 379 Mich 160, 164; 150 NW2d 752 (1967). Since nothing in 1975 PA 238, Sec. 11; MCLA 722.631; MSA 25.248(11) provides for retrospective operation of the statute, it is my opinion that the provisions thereof are operative only with respect to privileged communications made on or after the effective date of the act which was October 1, 1975.

Frank J. Kelley

Attorney General

(1) See, e.g., MCLA 600.2157; MSA 27A.2157 regarding physicians; MCLA 338.1968; MSA 14.718(28) pertaining to physicians' assistants; MCLA 338.1018; MSA 14.677(18) regarding psychologists; and MCLA 338.1764; MSA 18.365(14) covering licensed social workers.