'AN ACT to provide for the licensing and rights of any person to engage in business as a residential builder or residential maintenance and alteration contractor or salesman; to prescribe the duties and powers of the corporation and securities commission relative thereto; to fix the standards of qualifications and eligibility for the practice thereof; to create a state residential builders' and maintenance and alteration contractors' board; to authorize the collection and expenditure of fees; to provide penalties for the violation of this act; and to repeal certain acts and parts of acts.' (emphasis supplied)

'In order to safeguard and protect home owners and persons undertaking to become home owners, it shall be unlawful on and after September 1, 1966, for any person to engage in the business of or to act in the capacity of a residential builder or a residential maintenance and alteration contractor and/or salesman in this state without having a license therefor, unless such person is particularly exempted as provided in this act.'

'Sec. 2. As used in this act:

' (c) 'Residential builder' means any of the following:

'(i) A person engaged in the construction of residential structures or a combination of residential and commercial structures who, for a fixed sum, price, fee, percentage, valuable consideration, or other compensation, other than wages for that person's personal labor only, undertakes with another or offers to undertake or purports to have the capacity to undertake with another for the erection, construction, replacement, repair, alteration, or an addition to, subtraction from, improvement, movement of, wrecking of, or demolition of, a residential structure or combination residential and commercial structure.

'(ii) A person who manufactures, assembles, constructs, deals in, or distributes a residential or combination residential and commercial structure which is prefabricated, preassembled, precut, packaged, or shell housing.

'(iii) A person who erects a residential structure or combination residential and commercial structure except for that person's own use and occupancy on property of that person.

'(d) 'Residential maintenance and alteration contractor' means a person who, for a fixed sum, price, fee, percentage, valuable consideration, or other compensation, other than wages for that person's personal labor only, undertakes with another for the repair, alteration, or an addition to, subtraction from, improvement of, movement of, wrecking of, or demolition of a residential structure or combination residential and commercial structure, or building of a garage, or laying of concrete on residential property; or who engages in purchase, substantial rehabilitation or improvement, and resale of residential structures, engaging in all the foregoing on the same structures more than twice in 1 calendar year, except (i) for that person's own use or occupancy, (ii) the rehabilitation or improvement work as to residential type property and structures as may be contracted for, with or hired entirely to be done and performed for the owner by a licensed residential builder or licensed residential maintenance and alteration contractor as provided in this act, or (iii) work performed by a licensed construction tradesperson employed by the owner to perform work for which the tradesperson is licensed by the state. Licensure as a residential builder shall qualify a person within the terms of this subsection. This act shall not prevent a duly licensed residential maintenance and alteration contractor from constructing an addition to an existing residential structure, or other structure accessory to an existing residential structure.'

'The commission, upon application, may issue a residential maintenance and alteration contractor's license to an applicant who, upon written examination, shall qualify for the license, which shall authorize the licensee according to the licensee's qualifications, crafts, and trades to engage in the activities of a residential maintenance and alteration contractor. Licenses shall include the following crafts and trades: carpentry, concrete work, electrical work, swimming pools, waterproofing basements, excavation, heating, air conditioning installation, insulation work, lathing, masonry work, painting and decorating, plastering, plumbing work, roofing, siding, screens and storm sash installation, sheet metal work, tile and marble work, house moving and raising, and house wrecking. Each craft or trade examination shall test only the knowledge required to competently perform that craft or trade. . . .' (emphasis supplied)

'. . . that ordinances regulating subjects, matters, and things upon which there is a general law of the state must be in harmony with that state law, and in any conflict between an ordinance and a statute the latter must prevail, unless under the statutes or law of the state the ordinance plainly and specifically is given predominance in a particular instance or as to the subject matter. The conformity with the law of the state required of an ordinance is a positive conformity and not a mere negative obligation not to run counter to the law.' 5 McQuillan, Municipal Corporations, (3d Ed), Sec. 15.20, p. 81-83.

'A municipality is precluded from enacting an ordinance if 1) the ordinance is in direct conflict with the state statutory scheme, or 2) if the state statutory scheme pre-empts the ordinance by occupying the field of regulation which the municipality seeks to enter, to the exclusion of the ordinance, even where there is no direct conflict between the two schemes of regulation.

'First, where the state law expressly provides that the state's authority to regulate in a specified area of the law is to be exclusive, there is no doubt that municipal regulation is pre-empted. Noey v Saginaw, 271 Mich 595; 261 NW 88 (1935).

'Second, pre-emption of a field of regulation may be implied upon an examination of legislative history. Walsh v River Rouge, 385 Mich 623; 189 NW2d 318 (1971).

'Third, the pervasiveness of the state regulatory scheme may support a finding of pre-emption. Grand Haven v Grocer's Cooperative Dairy Co, 330 Mich 694, 702; 48 NW2d 362 (1951); In re Lane, 58 Cal 2d 99; 22 Cal Rptr 857; 372 P2d 897 (1962); Montgomery County Council v Montgomery Ass'n, Inc, 274 Md 52; 325 A2d 112, 333 A2d 596 (1975). While the pervasiveness of the state regulatory scheme is not generally sufficient by itself to infer pre-emption, it is a factor which should be considered as evidence of pre-emption.

'Fourth, the nature of the regulated subject matter may demand exclusive state regulation to achieve the uniformity necessary to serve the state's purpose or interest.

'As to this last point, examination of relevant Michigan cases indicates that where the nature of the regulated subject matter calls for regulation adapted to local conditions, and the local regulation does not interfere with the state regulatory scheme, supplementary local regulation has generally been upheld.

'However, where the Court has found that the nature of the subject matter regulated called for a uniform state regulatory scheme, supplementary local regulation has been held pre-empted. Especially pertinent to the instant case in this regard is Walsh v River Rouge, supra, where this Court held pre-empted a municipal ordinance granting certain emergency powers to the mayor. The subject matter of the ordinance in Walsh involved the potential restriction of important civil liberties of the people, as does the case before us. The Court apparently concluded that the protection of these important civil liberties demanded that the state retain sole control of the circumstances under which the emergency powers would be exercised. 385 Mich 623, 639.

'See also Noey v Saginaw, supra (the state was held to have exclusive authority to control alcoholic beverage traffic, with specific reference to the need for uniformity); Grand Haven v Grocer's Cooperative Dairy Co, 330 Mich 694; 48 NW2d 362 (1951) (the state was held to have exclusive control over the pasteurization of milk).'

'Cities and villages may not, where the state has by statute occupied the field of regulation, set up their own regulations because by the enactment of the statutes cities and villages are precluded from legislating on the same subject matter. Especially is this so when the regulation adopted by the city or village is different from the state law occupying the field.

People v McDaniel, 303 Mich. 90.

Grand Haven v Dairy Company, 330 Mich. 694.

Richards v City of Pontiac, 305 Mich. 666.'