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The following opinion is presented on-line for informational use only and does not replace the official version. (Mich Dept of Attorney General Web Site - www.ag.state.mi.us)



STATE OF MICHIGAN

FRANK J. KELLEY, ATTORNEY GENERAL


Opinion No. 5903

May 15, 1981

ADOPTION:

Termination of parental rights

CHILDREN AND MINORS:

Visitation by grandparents of adopted children

The grandparents of deceased parent's children may petition a court of competent jurisdiction for visitation rights, even though the children have been adopted by a stepparent where the rights of the deceased parent were not terminated voluntarily or by order of the court in the lifetime of the parent.

Honorable Charles H. Varnum

State Representative

The Capitol

Lansing, Michigan

You have inquired about grandparents' visitation rights. Specifically, you question whether 1980 PA 161, which amended the Child Custody Act of 1970, 1970 PA 91; MCLA 722.21 et seq; MSA 25.312(1) et seq; amending 1970 PA 91, supra, Sec. 7 and repealing 1970 PA 91, supra, Sec. 7a, addresses the following circumstances:

1. Where there are children of a marriage where either parent (being a son or daughter of the children's grandparents) is deceased;

2. Where the surviving spouse has remarried with the new wife or husband adopting the children; and

3. Where the parents of the deceased spouse (i.e., the grandparents) seek visitation.

A common law, there were no rights of grandparents to visitation. In the Child Custody Act of 1970, 1970 PA 91, supra, amendatory 1971 PA 80 added section 7a so as to provide for 'grandparent visitation.' As added by 1971 PA 80, Sec. 7a of the Act, supra, provided:

'If either the father or mother of an unmarried child is deceased, a parent of the deceased person may commence an action, by complaint or complaint and motion for an order to show cause, in the circuit court of the county in which the child resides for visitation of the child during its minority. If the court finds that such visitation would be in the best interest of the child, it may provide for visitation of the child by general or specific terms and conditions.'

The meaning of this section was addressed by the Michigan Court of Appeals in the case of Bikos v Nobliski, 88 Mich App 157; 276 NW2d 541 (1979). Bikos addressed a similar factual situation with the exception that your question contemplates an impending adoption by the stepparent, whereas in Bikos, adoption of the children by the stepparent had already been accomplished. The Court of Appeals held:

'A reading of the grandparent-visitation statute in conjunction with the effect-adoption-statute leads us to conclude that once the step-parent adopts the child, the grandparent-visitation statute ceases to apply. The legislature did not have to expressly exempt adoption situations, as the lower court concluded, if it did not want the visitation statute to apply to cases such as the one at bar. The interplay of the Michigan Adoption and Visitation Statutes already accomplishes this.

'Under the visitation statute a grandparent may request visitation where the grandchild's parent (the grandparent's child) is deceased. But once a child is adopted, the child has a parent. The adopting parent becomes the natural parent of the child 'in law, in all respects.' Hence, the condition of the visitation statute that the child's parent be deceased is not present as a matter of law, and the natural grandparent has no standing under the statute.' 88 Mich App 157, 163. [Emphasis supplied.]

The holding of the Court in Bikos, supra, was premised on its reading of the grandparent-visitation statute, being section 7a of the Child Custody Act of 1970, supra, in conjunction with the effect-of-adoption statute, 1939 PA 388, ch 10, Sec. 60, as added by 1974 PA 296; MCLA 710.60; MSA 27.3178(555.60), which provided:

'(1) After the entry of the order of adoption, the adoptee shall, in case of a change of name, be known and called by the new name. The person or persons adopting the adoptee shall thereafter stand in the place of a parent or parents to the adoptee in law in all respects as though the adopted person had been born to the adopting parents and shall thereafter be liable for all the duties and entitled to all the rights of parents.

'(2) After entry of the order of adoption there shall not be any distinction between the rights and duties of natural progeny and adopted persons, and the adopted person shall become an heir at law of the adopting parent or parents, and an heir at law of the lineal and collateral kindred of the adopting parent or parents. After entry of the order of adoption, the adopted person shall no longer be an heir at law of his or her natural parents, except that a right, title, or interest vesting before entry of the final order of adoption shall not be divested by that order.' [Emphasis supplied.]

As noted by the Court in the case of In re Adolphson Estate, 403 Mich 490, 592; 271 NW2d 511 (1978), prior to the enactment of amendatory 1974 PA 296, supra, the former statute, 1939 PA 388, ch 10, Sec. 9; MCLA 710.9; MSA 27.3178(549),

'provided that an adopted child was equal to, in rights and duties, a natural child, and it also provided that the adopting parents stood in the place of natural parents. Thus, upon a second adoption, the first adoptive parents and the natural parents were included in the phrase 'natural parents' in this proviso:

"Provided, That nothing herein shall affect his right to inherit from or through his natural parents."

Similar to inheritance statutes, adoption statutes in effect at the time of adoption are controlling. Eg, In re Miner Estate, 359 Mich 579; 103 NW2d 498 (1960).

Subsequent to the decision in Bikos, supra, the Legislature amended the grandparent-visitation statute and the effect-of-adoption statute upon which the Court grounded its decision. First, the effect-of-adoption statute, 1939 PA 388, ch 10, Sec. 60, supra, was amended by 1980 PA 116. While subsection (1) of section 60 was not amended, section 60(2) was amended to provide:

'(2) After entry of the order of adoption there shall not be any distinction between the rights and duties of natural progeny and adopted persons, and the adopted person shall become an heir at law of the adopting parent or parents, and an heir at law of the lineal and collateral kindred of the adopting parent or parents. After entry of the order of adoption, the adopted person shall no longer be an heir at law of a parent whose rights have been terminated or the lineal or collateral kindred of that parent, except that a right, title, or interest vesting before entry of the final order of adoption shall not be divested by that order.' [Amendatory language underscored.]

The underscored new language added by amendatory 1980 PA 116, supra, replaced language which formerly referred to the adopted person's 'natural parents.' Significantly, the change made by 1980 PA 116, supra, now speaks of 'a parent whose rights have been terminated' and the lineal and collateral kindred of a parent whose rights have been terminated. In employing the word 'terminated' in the context of terminations of parental rights, section 60(2), supra, refers to voluntary or court-ordered termination of parental rights over a child. See 1939 PA 388, ch 10, supra, Sec. 29(6), as last amended by 1976 PA 382 (voluntary release) and Sec. 51(1)-(2), as last amended by 1980 PA 509 (court-ordered termination).

While in the general sense the death of a parent terminates that parent's rights (although clearly not for inheritance purposes) the usage of the word 'terminated' in Sec. 60(2), supra, has reference to voluntary or court-ordered termination of parental rights over a child when the provisions of 1939 PA 388, ch 10, supra, are considered as a whole. Van Antwerp v State, 334 Mich 593; 55 NW2d 108 (1952). Therefore, under Sec. 60(2), as amended by 1980 PA 116, a child is an heir at law of his or her parents, and the parents lineal or collateral kindred, until such parental rights have been voluntarily or judicially terminated.

The second amendment made by the Legislature is to 1980 PA 161 which amended the grandparent-visitation statute, being the Child Custody Act of 1970, 1970 PA 91, supra, in two respects. First, 1980 PA 161 added references to visitation by maternal or paternal grandparents in 1970 PA 191, supra, Sec. 7(b), and added new subsection (g) to section 7, to provide that a court, based on the best interests of the child, may

'(g) Upon petition consider the reasonable visitation of maternal or paternal grandparents and, if denied, shall make a record of such denial.'

Secondly, amendatory 1980 PA 161, supra, Sec. 2, repealed 1970 PA 91, Sec. 7a, supra. (1)

By virtue of the fact that 1980 PA 161, supra, amended section 7(b) and added subsection (g) to section 7 of 1970 PA 191, supra, the Legislature contemplated that a court, based on the best interests of the child, may provide for, or grant upon petition, visitation rights by the grandparents of the child's mother or father.

The Legislature is presumed to have knowledge of existing laws upon the same subject, and the statutory construction given those laws by the courts. Michigan Gas Storage Co v Gregory, 341 Mich 34; 67 NW2d 219 (19550; People v Rosecrants, 88 Mich App 667; 278 NW2d 713 (1979); Ray v Transamerica Insurance Co, 46 Mich App 647; 208 NW2d 610 (1973); Alexander v Michigan Liquor Control Comm, 35 Mich App 686; 192 NW2d 505 (1971).

Amendments to the grandparent-visitation statute (by 1980 PA 161 (2)), and the effect-of-adoption statute (by 1980 PA 116) indicate that the Legislature intended to change the statutes upon which the Court in Bikos, supra, grounded its decision to the effect that 'once the stepparent adopts the child, the grandparent-visitation statute ceases to apply.' 88 Mich App 157, 163, supra. Thus, in view of the interaction of the grandparent-visitation statute (as amended by 1980 PA 161) and the effect-of-adoption statute (as amended by 1980 PA 116), as did the Court in Bikos, supra, it is apparent that a court may, for the best interests of a child, grant visitation rights to the child's maternal or paternal grandparents. 1970 PA 91, Sec. 7(b) and Sec. 7(g), as amended by 1980 PA 161, supra.

However, consistent with the reasoning of Bikos, supra, such visitation rights of maternal or paternal grandparents are terminated by voluntary or court-ordered termination of the rights of a parent (i.e., the son or daughter of the grandparents), since such termination severs all rights (including the right to be an heir at law) of such parent and the lineal or collateral kindred of that parent, with the exception of a previously vested right, title, or interest. 1939 PA 388, ch 10, Sec. 60(b), as amended by 1980 PA 116, supra. In case of a child whose parent is dead, (parental rights not having been terminated voluntarily or by court order in the lifetime of the parent), such child after entry of the order of adoption remains an heir at law of that parent and of his or her lineal or collateral kindred. (3)

With respect to the type of petition for visitation rights which may be filed by maternal or paternal grandparents under 1970 PA 91, Sec. 7(g), as amended by 1980 PA 161, supra, it is noted that section 7 thereof states:

'If a child custody dispute has been submitted to a circuit court as an original action under this act or has arisen incidentally from another action in a circuit court or another or judgment of a circuit court, for the best interest of the child the court may [take certain action]: . . ..'

This language provides for either an original action or appropriate pleadings in another action such as custody action pending before a court.

CONCLUSION

It is my opinion, therefore, that where:

(1) there are children of a marriage where either parent is deceased and where such parent's rights have not been voluntarily or judicially terminated in the lifetime of the parent; and

(2) the surviving spouse has remarried and the new wife or husband having adopted the children,

the grandparents of the deceased parent's children may seek grandparental visitation rights. Such visitation rights must be granted or denied on the basis of the best interests of the child, and if such visitation rights are denied, the court shall make a record of such denial.

Frank J. Kelley

Attorney General

(1) 1980 PA 161, Section 2, supra, provides:

'Section 7a of Act No. 91 of the Public Acts of 1970, being section 722.27a of the Compiled Laws of 1970, is repealed.'

There is no 'section 7a' of 1970 PA 91, supra, since section 7a was added to that statute by amendatory 1971 PA 80, supra. Also, the Compiled Laws of 1970 do not contain section 722.27a. V Michigan Compiled Laws, 1970.

Thus, the Legislature's attempt to expressly repeal section 7a, supra, is defective. While repeals by implication are generally not favored, such implied repeal may transpire where a clear showing of legislative intent to repeal exists. Gauthier v Campbell, Wyant & Cannon Foundry Co, 360 Mich 510; 104 NW2d 182 (1960). Further, the presumption against implied repeal does not apply in the case where a later act contains provisions repugnant to an earlier act. Locke v Macomb County, 31 Mich App 22; 187 NW2d 500 (1971), aff'd 387 Mich 634; 199 NW2d 166 (1972). Where a provision of a later act covers the whole subject matter of an earlier provision, there is repeal by implication as the last expression must control. People v Daily, 178 Mich 354; 144 NW 890 (1914); Southward v Wabash RR Co, 331 Mich 138; 21 NW2d 159 (1946); OAG, 1979-1980, No 5793, p 468 (October 2, 1982).

Since section 7(g), supra, as added by 1980 PA 161 effectively supplants 1970 PA 91, Sec. 7a, as added by 1971 PA 80, supra, it must be concluded that amendatory 1980 PA 161 repeals by implication section 7a, supra, particularly in view of the attempted (but defective) express repeal contained in Section 2 of 1980 PA 161.

(2) The bill analysis of HB 4597 (which was enacted as 1980 PA 161) by the House Legislative Analysis Section on February 28, 1980, specifically refers to the decision in Bikos, supra, as follows:

'BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

The so-called 'grandparent visitation statute' (actually section 7a of the Child Custody Act, 722.27a MCLA) provides that if the father or mother of an unmarried child is deceased, the parent of the deceased person may commence an action in circuit court for the right to visit the child. If the court finds that such visitation is in the best interests of the child, it may provide for such visitation.

However, a recent ruling by the Court of Appeals, in the case of Bikos v Nobliski, (1979) 88 Mich App 157, held that if the child has been adopted (for example, in situations where the remaining parent remarries and the new spouse adopts the child), the adopting parent becomes in law the natural parent of the child and the child's legal relationship with the family of the deceased parent is severed. Thus, in such cases the child's natural grandparents (the parents of the child's deceased parent) have no legal recourse through the grandparent visitation statute.

'ARGUMENTS:

FOR:

If a child's nuclear family has been disrupted by divorce or the death of a parent, it is essential to the child's wellbeing to maintain as much stability as possible in the child's life. Grandparents can often provide that stability as well as the love and affection that a child in such circumstances often desperately needs. However, under current law a grandparent has almost no way to ensure continued access to a grandchild if the child's parents refuse to allow such visits. Many persons believe that the law should consider the rights of children as well as those of adults, and argue that a child has a right to the love and affection provided by grandparents.

FOR:

The bill does not attempt to wrest control of a child's life away from his parents. Grandparents are not seeking to obtain custody of their grandchildren, merely to be given the right to visit them periodically and to keep in touch with them as they grow up.

FOR:

The bill ensures that the best interests of the child will be paramount in any decision to grant visitation rights. A court would have to weigh the merits of grandparental visitation according to the same criteria it uses to consider visitation by the other parties in a child custody dispute.

AGAINST:

Some persons believe that the bill will do very little to solve the problems of grandparents who have been denied access to their grandchildren, and may only be holding out false hope to these people. In the Court of Appeals ruling referred to above, the court noted that if the relationship between the child's parents and the grandparents is so acrimonious that they must look to the court to settle the question of visitation, the benefits of visitation will only rarely outweigh the damage caused by the divisiveness among the adults. This bill will not change this situation. A court must consider the best interests of the child and it will not often be in the child's interest to place him in a position where his loyalties are divided between conflicting adults, no matter how much the grandparents care for the child.'

(3) It is noted that under 1939 PA 388, ch 10, supra, Sec. 9; MCLA 710.9; MSA 27.3178(555.9), prior to its repeal by 1974 PA 296, Sec. 2, an adopted child inherited through his natural parents (even where the natural parents, in the first instance, were adoptive). 1974 PA 296, supra, Sec. 60, replaced and substantially altered the provisions of former Sec. 9 to provide that after entry of an order of adoption, the person adopted was no longer an heir at law of his or her natural parents. See In re Adolphson Estate, supra. However, as amended by 1980 PA 116, supra, 1939 PA 388, ch 10 Sec. 60(b), an adopted child again inherits through his natural parents unless the rights of the parents have been voluntarily or judicially terminated.

 


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