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The following opinion is presented on-line for informational use only and does not replace the official version. (Mich Dept of Attorney General Web Site - www.ag.state.mi.us)



STATE OF MICHIGAN

FRANK J. KELLEY, ATTORNEY GENERAL


Opinion No. 5959

August 14, 1981

COMPREHENSIVE TRANSPORTATION FUND:

Priority of expenditure from fund

The Legislature has acquired that the first appropriation from moneys deposited within the comprehensive transportation fund must be expended to meet principal and interest on outstanding comprehensive transportation fund bonds or notes to become due within the particular fiscal year and the remaining moneys in the fund are to be distributed in full for each next descending priority of moneys in the fund.

Honorable Robert A. Welborn

State Representative

The Capitol

Lansing, Michigan

You have requested my opinion as to whether the Legislature, in specifying the order of priority for the expenditure of moneys within the comprehensive transportation fund for comprehensive transportation purposes in 1951 PA 51, Sec. 10e(1); MCLA 247.660(e); MSA 9.1097(10f), intended that each expenditure be funded to its full fiscal requirement in the exact order stated in the statute. 1951 PA 51, Sec. 10b(2), supra, established the comprehensive transportation fund as follows:

'A fund to be known as the comprehensive transportation fund is established and shall be set up and maintained in the state treasury as a separate fund. . . .'

1951 PA 51, Sec. 10c(8), supra, defines comprehensive transportation as follows:

"Public transportation,' 'comprehensive transportation,' 'public transportation service,' 'comprehensive transportation service,' 'public transportation purpose,' or 'comprehensive transportation purpose' means the movement of people and goods by publicly or privately owned water vehicle, bus, railroad car, rapid transit vehicle, taxicab, aircraft, or other conveyance which provides general or other special service to the public, but not including school buses or charter or sightseeing service. Public transportation, public transportation services, or public transportation purposes; and comprehensive transportation, comprehensive transportation services, or comprehensive transportation purposes as defined in this subdivision are declared by law to be transportation purposes within the meaning of section 9 of article 9 of the state constitution of 1963.' (Emphasis added.)

1951 PA 51, Sec. 10e(1), supra, in part, provides:

'The comprehensive transportation fund shall be expended in the following order of priority: . . . (Emphasis added.)

This language is followed by subsections (a) through (i) that set out various categories of expenditures for comprehensive transportation programs. The first category of expenditure appears in subsection (a) and provides for the payment of principal and interest on any outstanding bonds and notes issued for comprehensive transportation purposes. The next priority appears in subsection (b) and requires that the state trunkline fund be reimbursed for a previous fiscal year loan that was made to the comprehensive transportation fund. The priority following appears in subsection (c) and provides for the payment of the costs of the administration of the comprehensive transportation fund. Subsection (d) provides for the payment of eligible operating expense for comprehensive transportation purposes.

The final category of expenditures in the order of priority appears in subsection (i), which provides:

'The unencumbered balance of public transportation distributions remaining in the fund in each year after meeting the purposes described in subdivisions (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), and (h) shall be distributed . . ..' (Emphasis added.)

Language employed in a statute is to be given its commonly understood meaning unless the Legislature clearly indicates otherwise. Bingham v American Screw Products, 398 Mich 546; 248 NW2d 537 (1976.) In Township of Southfield v Drainage Board for Twelve Towns Relief Drains, 357 Mich 59, 76; 97 NW2d 821 (1959), the Court said:

'The use of the word 'shall' is mandatory and imperative and, when used in a command to a public official, it excludes the idea of discretion . . ..'

See also, People v De La Mater, 213 Mich 167, 182 NW 57 (1921); Ladies of the Maccabees v Commissioner of Insurance, 235 Mich 459; 209 NW 581 (1926).

The term 'priority' has been defined to mean the quality of being before; the first in precedence of time; order of importance; preferred. The word itself implies that there is a second or a third and requires that whatever has priority comes first. Lincoln National Bank & Trust Co of Central New York v Colgan, 337 NYS2d 412 (1972). In Smith v Allied Exterminators, Inc., 379 NC 583; 184 SE2d 296 (1971), the Court, in dealing with the distribution of certain death benefits under a statute that required the determination of the 'order of priority,' concluded that it means that a person in one category takes in preference to the others.

It is significant that 1951 PA 51, Sec. 10e(1)(i), supra, provides that the expenditure for the purposes of that section of the statute may be met only out of what remains in the fund after all other categories of expenditures for comprehensive transportation purposes, listed in 1951 PA 51, Sec. 10e(1)(a-h), have been funded. In construing a statute, legislative intent may often be ascertained from the provisions in all of the sections that have immediate connection. In re Corby's Estate, 154 Mich 353; 117 NW 906 (1908). Thus, meaning may be given to the phrase 'order of priority,' as used in 1951 PA 51, Sec. 10e(1), supra, as requiring that the expenditures provided for in subsections (a) through (i) will be funded sequentially.

The Court recognized the order or priority of expenditures for comprehensive transportation projects as set forth in 1951 PA, Sec. 10e(1), supra, in Advisory Opinion on Constitutionality of 1976 PA 295, 1976 PA 297, 401 Mich 686, 259 NW2d 129 (1977), when it upheld the constitutionality of the statutes, stating at page 709:

'Section 10e of 1976 PA 297, MCLA 247.660e; MSA 9.1097(10f), provides for priorities in the use of the General Transportation Fund. The first priority is the payment of debt service on the notes and bonds sold by the state, eligible governmental agencies for public transportation purposes. . . .'

It is noted that the metropolitan authorities act of 1967 PA 204, Sec. 16a; MCLA 124.416a; MSA 5.3475(116a), as last amended by 1980 PA 89, established a fund exclusively for the Southeastern Michigan Transportation Authority public transportation programs separate and apart from the comprehensive transportation fund established under 1951 PA 51, Sec. 10b(2), supra, and thus, is not subject to the order or priority delineated in 1951 PA 51, Sec. 10e(1), supra. In Southeastern Michigan Transportation Authority v Secretary of State, ---- Mich App ----; ---- NW2d ----, Docket #52719, decided March 5, 1981, the Court held that 1967 PA 204, Sec. 16a, supra, in establishing a fund exclusively for SEMTA public transportation programs separate from the comprehensive transportation fund with specific taxes that are restricted as to use under Const 1963, art 9, Sec. 9, and paid into such separate fund, is constitutional.

The priority of funding commanded by the Legislature in 1951 PA 51, Sec. 10e(1), supra, applies only to the distribution of funds actually deposited in the comprehensive transportation fund. Southeastern Michigan Transportation Authority v Secretary of State, supra. It does not apply to all Const 1963, art 9, Sec. 9 restricted funds. However, all moneys deposited in the comprehensive transportation fund must be distributed in accordance with 1951 PA 51, Sec. 10e(1), supra.

It is my opinion, therefore, that the Legislature intended that the first priority, as set forth in 1951 PA 51, Sec. 10e(1), supra, shall be funded to meet principal and interest on outstanding comprehensive transportation fund bonds or notes to become due during the particular fiscal year before funds may be appropriated to the succeeding priorities, and then the remaining moneys in the fund are to be distributed in full for each next descending priority to the extent of moneys in the fund in the exact order of sequence in which they appear in 1951 PA 51, Sec. 10e(1)(a-i), supra.

Frank J. Kelley

Attorney General


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