"Under the Charter of Muskegon and under the Home Rule Act, does the City have the right to determine that a petition question is 'legislative or administrative in nature?' Also, if the City has the right to do so, can the City deny a petition because of such nature of the petition language?"

"The City's reason for denial is that the language on the petition is 'administrative in nature' as opposed to being 'legislative in nature.' The City Attorney ... advised the City that only 'legislative in nature questions' on petitions should be accepted."

(6) For the initiative and referendum on all matters within the scope of its powers...."

"Initiatory petition; signatures required. Any proposed ordinance may be submitted to the Commission by petition signed by electors of the City equal in number to fifteen per cent of the highest vote cast in the City for commissioner at the last preceding general election. The petition shall contain a request that the ordinance be submitted to a vote of the people if not passed by the Commission and the ordinance shall either be contained in the petition or shall accompany it.

"Same; commission determination required. Within thirty days after such petition is presented to the Commission, the Commission shall either pass the proposed ordinance without alterations or it shall amend the ordinance if it deems advisable, retaining, however, the general purpose thereof, or it shall submit the same without amendment to the vote of the electors of the City."

"The circuit court, hearing the matter on petition for declaratory judgment, held generally that provisions for initiation of municipal ordinances are applicable only to acts 'which are legislative in character.' See annotation, 'Character or subject matter of ordinance within operation of initiative and referendum provisions.' 122 ALR 769. It was held accordingly that the mentioned ordinance was not of legislative character and so was not an appropriate subject of initiatory proceedings....

"The parties concede that the stated question is one of first impression--in Michigan. In our view the quoted general rule cannot be applied to the case before us since the present language of section 4i of the home-rule act, likewise that of the applicable charter provision of the defendant city, unequivocally and unitedly authorize initiation of any kind or type of ordinance....

"The understandable objection to an unlimited power of local initiation is that such power can be employed to interfere with the necessary administration of municipal affairs and that it vests with disgruntled or otherwise misguided minorities the power to impede the efficiency which is necessary to the due execution of local government.

"There is an answer to all this. It is found in the foregoing quotations of the home-rule act and the charter of the defendant city. The home-rule act authorizes, but does not require, charter provisions authorizing the initiatory power 'on all matters within the scope of its [the city's] powers.' The defendant city's charter, proceeding as it does in accordance with such permission, provides for the adoption, amendment, or repeal of any ordinance by initiatory proceedings."

"We hold that the words 'initiative' and 'referendum' are themselves an implicit limitation on the matters that may properly be the subject of an initiative or referendum, and that the Legislature did not in 1909 intend to confer on the electors of home-rule cities the power to vote on questions not truly legislative in character.

"The unlimited sweep of McKinley would authorize an initiative or referendum on the most mundane executive matter: whether a particular secretary or clerk is to be hired or terminated, whether the garbage is to be collected on Monday or Tuesday, and whether male municipal employees may wear short-sleeved shirts in the summer time and female employees may wear pantsuits at any time.

"We recently had occasion to observe that, 'for practical reasons, the people's power or right of referendum has usually been subjected to certain constitutional restrictions.' For reasons historical and practical and in implementation of the apparent intent of the Legislature, the rights of initiative and referendum under the home-rule act are limited to legislative measures." [Footnote omitted.]

"In West v. Portage, 392 Mich 458, 465-466; 221 NW2d 303 (1974), the lead opinion by Justice LEVIN concludes that a right of referendum authorized by the home-rule act extends only to legislative acts:

"The opinion was signed by three Justices, one Justice concurring in the result. In Rollingwood Homeowners Corp, Inc v City of Flint, 386 Mich 258, 268; 191 NW2d 325 (1971), the Court stated that '[t]here is nothing inherently legislative about a decision to acquire real estate'. We are of the view that the opinion of Justice LEVIN in West, supra, correctly and adequately treats the governing legal principle and adopt the reasoning and conclusion of Justice LEVIN in part I of West.

"[W]e affirm that part of the Court of Appeals judgment holding that the action of the City of Saline in purchasing real property constitutes an administrative act not subject to a referendum." [Footnotes omitted.]

"We similarly find that plaintiffs have failed to make a case below for the exercise of the trial court's discretion to grant the writ of mandamus because they have failed to prove that the city council violated the provisions of its charter by refusing to place the initiated ordinance on the ballot.

"The Port Huron City Council determined upon the advice of corporate council that the subject matter of the petition was administrative and therefore not properly referable to the electorate....

"To permit the electorate to initiate piecemeal measures affecting land development is as inconceivable to us as allowing the electorate to initiate ordinances affecting the fiscal affairs of the city without regard to the budget or to the overall fiscal program. We believe that the implementation by ordinance of a general policy, program or plan is an administrative act which is not subject to voter initiative or referendum."

"Cases from other jurisdictions offer no clear guidelines for classifying salary ordinances.... The Kentucky court, in the case relied on by the trial court, observed that 'The courts of other jurisdictions are sharply divided on the question. See Annotation, 122 A.L.R. 769, and supplemental decisions. It appears that Illinois, Iowa, Georgia, Ohio and Utah have held that ordinances of this kind are administrative and thus not within the initiative power, while Texas, South Dakota, Washington, Missouri and Alabama take the opposite view. California courts have gone both ways.' (City of Newport v. Gugel [Ky., 1960], 342 S.W.2d 517, 520.) It took the position that a 'piece-meal' approach to the fiscal and personnel problems of a city was more administrative than legislative, and not subject to the state's initiative statute....

"The Texas case, Glass v. Smith, 150 Tex. 632, 244 S.W.2d 645, (1952).... is illustrative of those taking the other tack. The Texas court noted that that state's legislature had expressly provided that classification within police and fire departments be done by ordinance of the city council, rather than by administrative action of the city's civil service commission. Had the legislature chosen the latter course, the court said, such action might have served to withdraw the subject from the operative field of the initiative. Since it did not, the court found the whole area of classification and salaries to be within the traditional province of the legislative branch. The court's holding was consistent with its earlier position that initiative and referendum provisions in city charters represented powers 'reserved to the people,' and that 'such charter provisions should be liberally construed in favor of the power reserved.' (Taxpayers' Assn. v. City of Houston, 129 Tex. 627, 632, 105 S.W.2d 655, 657.)....

"A discussion of the arguments on both sides of the issue appears in Shriver v. Bench, 6 Utah 2d 329, 313 P.2d 475 (1957). Summarizing the arguments found in the cases supporting the view that the fixing of salaries is a legislative function, the court found them to be: that a liberal view of powers reserved to the people is consonant with the ideals of a democratic society; that the legislature always has an overriding power to fix salaries, even if it has delegated that authority to an administrative agency; that proper salaries are so intimately connected with efficient public service as to be a matter of basic public policy; and that the question must be legislative because so much time of a city council is devoted to it.

"The primary argument on the other side was said to be that 'legislative' actions are of a permanent character, while salaries are necessarily subject to frequent re-examination (even when tied to the consumer price index, as in that case). The court went on to say:

'Another consideration, the " 'practicality test" supports the administrative viewpoint. The fixing of salary schedules in a modern city with its numerous departments and various classes of employees is a duty which can best be performed by persons having specialized training and experience in municipal government generally and particular knowledge of the affairs, fiscal and otherwise, of the city. They must be conversant with many facts, such as: prevailing wage scales for similar services both in public service and private industry; the supply and demand for labor of the classes involved; the demands of the various departments upon the public treasury and the balance to be maintained among them; the current inflationary or deflationary trend of money; the extent of the public debt; the money resources available; the tax potential and its limitations; and the overall budget within which the city is required by law to operate.

"It can readily be seen from the foregoing that analyzing the factors which should be taken into consideration in fixing salaries, together with other considerations which must be weighted in individual cases, presents a problem of such complexity that it is not practical for the public to give it sufficient time and attention to make a proper determination of the matter, and further, that the changes which are continually occurring make it highly desirable that there be some expeditious method of re-examining the situation at frequent intervals. This points to the conclusion that it is much simpler, easier, and comports more with reason and the practical exigencies of the operation of city government that the salaries be adjusted by the administrative procedure set up in the charter. This is one of the bases of reasoning relied on by the courts in passing on whether a proposed action is legislative or administrative. If the result would be to impair the efficient administration of the municipality, the courts tend toward the conclusion that initiative and referendum provisions are not applicable.' (Id., p. 333, 313 P.2d p. 478...." (Emphasis of the court.)