STATE OF MICHIGAN

FRANK J. KELLEY, ATTORNEY GENERAL

Opinion No. 6605

November 7, 1989

LICENSES AND PERMITS:

Licensure of expert witnesses as private detectives

PRIVATE DETECTIVES:

Licensure of expert witnesses as private detectives

WITNESSES:

Licensure of expert witnesses as private detectives

Persons hired because of their technical knowledge and expertise to provide testimony as expert witnesses in civil or criminal lawsuits are not required to be licensed as private detectives under the provisions of the Private Detective License Act of 1965.

Honorable Bart Stupak

State Representative

The Capitol

Lansing, MI

You have requested my opinion on a question concerning the construction and application of the Private Detective License Act of 1965, MCL 338.821 et seq; MSA 18.184(1) et seq. Your question may be stated as follows:

Section 3 of the Private Detective License Act of 1965, MCL 338.823; MSA 18.184(3), prohibits a person, firm, partnership, company, or corporation from engaging in the private detective or private investigator business without first obtaining a license from the Michigan Department of State Police. Section 2(b) of the Act, MCL 338.822(b); MSA 18.184(2)(b), defines the terms "private investigator" and "private detective," in pertinent part, as

This language, read literally, could be construed as including not only detectives in the traditional sense of that word, but also members of other trades and professions who have been retained as expert witnesses. A chemical engineer, for example, who is retained as an expert to examine the scene of a fire in order to determine the source of combustion, arguably has "agreed to make ... an investigation for the purpose of obtaining information with reference to ... [t]he cause or responsibility for fires" within the meaning of section 2(b). The issue that must be resolved is whether the Legislature intended such a result.

Research discloses no reported decisions by Michigan courts that have construed the definition set forth in Sec. 2(b) of the Act. However, in Kennard v Rosenberg, 127 CalApp2d 340; 273 P2d 839 (1954), the California Court of Appeals considered a substantially identical provision. Kennard involved two registered chemical engineers and a former fireman who had been retained to determine the cause of a suspicious fire. In making their determination, these experts examined the premises where the fire had occurred, consulted with the owners, took samples from the premises, examined photographs, conducted experiments on the premises and in their own laboratories, and prepared exhibits for use in court.

The question before the court was whether, under the circumstances, the fireman and the chemical engineers were required to be licensed as private detectives under a California statute similar to the Michigan Act at issue here. Applying a statutory definition of "private detective" virtually identical to that contained in section 2(b) of the Michigan Act, the court concluded that these expert witnesses were not "private detectives" within the meaning of the act and were, therefore, not required to be licensed as such:

The court, citing basic rules of statutory construction requiring that statutes are to be interpreted in a manner which is practical, consistent with justice and wise policy, and that does not produce absurd results, went on to conclude

Id, at 842.

Although the decision in Kennard is not binding in Michigan, the court's analysis is compelling. Application of established canons of construction in Michigan, similar to those relied upon by the court in Kennard, compel a like result under our own statute.

The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Production Credit Ass'n of Lansing v Dep't of Treasury, 404 Mich 301; 273 NW2d 10 (1978). To this end, a court should interpret a statute in the most probable and reasonable way in which the Legislature could have intended. Bd of Education of Oakland Schools v Sup't of Public Instruction, 392 Mich 613; 221 NW2d 345 (1974). A related rule is that statutes are to be construed so as to avoid absurd results. Magreta v Ambassador Steel Co, 378 Mich 689; 148 NW2d 767 (1967). Indeed, when an absurd result would be reached by the literal construction of the act, an exception or qualification is presumed to have been intended. Scholten v Rhoades, 67 MichApp 736; 242 NW2d 509 (1976). Finally, statutes must be read as a whole; particular provisions should not be isolated, but must be construed in light of the entire act. Smith v Wayne County Sheriff, 278 Mich 91; 270 NW 227 (1936).

Although section 2(b) of the Act, MCL 338.822(b); MSA 18.184(2)(b), defines "private detective" and "private investigator" very broadly, section 3 of the Act mandates licensing only for those persons who actually engage "in the business of private detective or investigator for hire, fee or reward" or "advertise [their] business to be that of detective or of a detective agency, ... ." MCL 338.823; MSA 18.184(3). (Emphasis added.) Pursuant to section 6 of the Act, a license that is issued under the Act is one to "conduct business as a private detective or private investigator ... ." MCL 338.826; MSA 18.184(6). (Emphasis added.) Thus, read as a whole, the Private Detective License Act of 1965 evidences an intent by the Legislature to regulate, by licensing, those who are in the business of carrying on the activities of a private investigator or detective. The Act was not intended to apply to persons who, by virtue of their technical knowledge and experience, have been employed to provide expert testimony in a lawsuit even though, in doing so, they may incidentally perform one or more of the activities described in the Act.

It is my opinion, therefore, that persons who, because of their technical knowledge and expertise, are hired to provide testimony as expert witnesses in civil or criminal lawsuits, are not required to be licensed as private detectives under the provisions of the Private Detective License Act of 1965.

Frank J. Kelley

Attorney General