The following opinion is presented on-line for informational use only and does not replace the official version. (Mich Dept of Attorney General Web Site - www.ag.state.mi.us)



STATE OF MICHIGAN

FRANK J. KELLEY, ATTORNEY GENERAL


Opinion No. 5133

April 1, 1977

LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS TRAINING COUNCIL:

Persons with restricted or special police powers.

LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS TRAINING COUNCIL:

Scope of Authority

POLICE:

Law Enforcement Officers Training Council.

A person authorized to exercise restricted or special police officer powers is not required to comply with the recruitment and training standards of the Law Enforcement Officers Training Council.

Detroit housing guards and park rangers are required to comply with the recruitment and training standards of the Law Enforcement Officers Training Council.

Trust officers and federal prison guards are not subject to the provisions of the Law Enforcement Officers Training Council.

The Law Enforcement Officers Training Council is not authorized to operate a police academy or determine eligibility for admission to an academy operated by another agency.

The Law Enforcement Officers Training Countil may not prohibit a police academy from admitting persons for training at the request of the employer on the ground that the person does not fall within the definition of the term 'police officer' or 'law enforcement officer'.

Mr. Leslie Van Beveren

Executive Secretary

Law Enforcement Officers Training Council

Department of State Police

7426 North Canal Road

Lansing, Michigan 48913

You have requested my opinion on the following questions:

1. Must persons vested with restricted or special powers of a police officer comply with the recruitment and training standards established by the Law Enforcement Officers Training Council?

(By way of example, this question refers to such officers as: City of Detroit housing guards, park rangers, truant officers, and federal prison guards employed at federal penal institutions.)

2. Does the Council have the authority to admit persons into a police academy at the request of the employer where the person does not fall within the definition of the term 'police officer' or 'law enforcement officer'?

3. Is the Council authorized to issue diplomas to persons who have successfully completed academy training?

4. May the Council expend appropriations line-itemed by the legislature to local law enforcement officers?

1965 PA 203, as last amended by 1976 PA 422; MCLA 28.601 et seq; MSA 4.450(1) et seq, hereinafter referred to as 'the act,' provides for the creation of the Law Enforcement Officers Training Council and vests it with authority to promulgate recruitment, selection and training standards for police officers and law enforcement officers.

Responding to your first question, section 2(c) provides:

"Police officer' or 'law enforcement officer' means a member of a police force or other organization of a city, county, township, village or of the state, regularly employed as such and who is responsible for the prevention and detection of crime and the enforcement of the general criminal laws of this state, but shall not include any person serving as such solely by virtue of his occupying any other office or position.' (Emphasis added)

By this definition of the terms 'police officer' and 'law enforcement officer,' it is clear that persons with restricted or special police officer powers are not covered by the act as by the restrictions or special characteristics they are not responsible for the enforcement of the general criminal laws of the state. See OAG, 1977-1978, No 5166, p ___ (March 25, 1977). Therefore, they are not required to comply with the recruitment and training standards established by the Council unless the legislature has provided by separate statute that a specifically designed public employee shall be required to comply.

Applying these principles to the examples you have suggested, I will address each of them separately.

Detroit Housing Guards

In the case of Detroit housing guards, Assistant Corporation Counsel Geoffrey Taft of the City of Detroit, by a memorandum dated November 4, 1974, has characterized the duties and responsibilities of this position. In this memo Mr. Taft states that:

'An examination of [City Charter] Chapter XI, Section 7-1117 reveals that the function of patrolmen employed by a governmental institution is strictly limited to the 'place designated by the Chief.' Although this section delineates their equal standing with Detroit Police Officers, it must be interpreted in conjunction with the first sentence of the attached Charter Section.

'Therefore, it is our legal opinion that Chapter XI, Section 7-1117 must be interpreted to mean that while housing guards are on duty, in their designated area, they have equal standing which police officers regarding their powers, privileges, duties, etc.

'While housing guards are on duty at their designated area, the City would be liable for their actions, under the Indemnification Ordinance. See attached Article XII, Section 16-13-1, which includes these guards as 'employees' and their 'official duties' as 'acts done pursuant to authority conferred by law . . . whether or not negligent.' Obviously, wilful misconduct does not constitute good faith performance of their duties and such acts cannot be indemnified.

'Thus, a guard hired by a governmental institution, and vested with specific authority by the Chief of Police, could be indemnified by the City while he/she is acting in the course of their official duties.' (Emphasis added)

Inasmuch as a Detroit housing guard has an equal standing with Detroit police officers except for the limited geographic area in which they function, and are charged with the enforcement of the general criminal laws of the state, they are therefore subject to the provisions of the act. 1965 PA 203, section 2(c), supra. This is true because every police officer is required to comply with instructions given to him by his superior and, among these instructions, is the place where he is to exercise the powers of his office. The city could assign regular city patrolmen to serve as housing guards or, as it appears to have done, select a special group with the responsibility for policing housing areas. Although this choice remains with the city, the fact that the persons selected must enforce the general criminal laws and are of 'equal standing with Detroit police officers,' requires the legal result that they are subject to the same recruitment and training requirements as police officers.

Park Rangers

MCLA 46.364(4); MSA 4.570(114), provides in pertinent part:

'. . . No park ranger shall be appointed unless he or she meets the minimum standards established by the law enforcement officers training council. Park rangers shall exercise their authority and powers only on lands, waters and property administered by or under the jurisdiction of a county or regional commission.'

Since the legislature has specifically required that park rangers meet the minimum standards established by the Council, it is clear that they are subject to the provisions of that act.

Truancy Officers

1976 PA 451, section 1571(3); MCLA 380.1571(3); MSA 15.41571(3), provides that attendance officers shall have all the powers of a deputy sheriff while performing official duties. Nevertheless, the responsibility of the attendance officer is to enforce the compulsory school attendance provisions of the school code and not to enforce the general criminal laws of the state. It is my opinion therefore that attendance officers are not subject to the recruitment and training requirements of the act.

Federal Prison Guards

Inasmuch as the act applies to members of a police force of a city, county, township, village or of the state only, it is clear that neither federal marshals, F.B.I. agents nor any other federal law enforcement officers are subject to the provisions of the act.

2. Does the Council have the authority to admit persons into a police academy at the request of the employer where the person does not fall within the definition of the term 'police officer' or 'law enforcement officer'?

Sections 9 and 11 of the act delineate the powers, duties and responsibilities of the Council and they deal, among others, with the preparation and publication of advisory training standards. Section 9(a) authorizes the Council to prepare and publish advisory training standards relative to the 'minimum standards of physical, emotional, mental and moral fitness which shall govern the recruitment, selection and appointment of police officers.'

This authority, as well as its authority to serve as an accreditation agency of a police academy, does not authorize the Council to deny to a police academy the right to admit any person into its training program even though that person does not fall within the definition of a 'police officer' or 'law enforcement officer'.

3. Is the Council authorized to issue diplomas to persons who have successfully completed academy training?

Section 11(c) of the act empowers the Council to 'authorize the issuance of certificates of graduation or diplomas by approved police training schools.' It does not authorize the Council to issue its own diploma for successfully completing academy training.

4. May the Council expend appropriations line-itemed by the legislature to local law enforcement officers?

Since receiving your letter of request, the act was amended by 1976 PA 422, which was signed by the Governor on January 11, 1977 and given immediate effect. Section 13 and 14 of the act were amended by 1976 PA 422. These sections provide for the financial support of the operations of the Council and for the subsidization of the cost of training officers who attend police academies. Section 13 establishes a law enforcement officers training fund to which the legislature appropriates sums necessary to carry out the purposes of the act. Section 14 provides that the sums annually appropriated shall be paid by the state treasurer upon certification of the executive secretary of the Council. The amount allocated by certification of the executive secretary is for the purpose of reimbursing the academies in an amount not to exceed the training costs incurred. Thus, an appropriation limited for this specific purpose by the legislature may only be expended for that purpose. Const 1963, art 9, Sec. 17.

Frank J. Kelley

Attorney General