The following opinion is presented on-line for informational use only and does not replace the official version. (Mich Dept of Attorney General Web Site - www.ag.state.mi.us) STATE OF MICHIGAN FRANK J. KELLEY, ATTORNEY GENERAL Opinion No. 5207 June 24, 1977 CONSTITUTION OF MICHIGAN: Art 4, Sec. 24. OPEN MEETINGS: Lessees performing an essential public purpose and function. The provision in the Open Meetings Act which defines a public body so as to include a lessee performing an essential public purpose is unconstitutional because the title of the Act does not refer to organizations other than 'public bodies'. Honorable Michael J. Griffin State House of Representatives Capitol Building Lansing, Michigan You have requested my opinion on an aspect of the 1976 Open Meetings Act, 1976 PA 267; MCLA 15.261 et seq; MSA 4.1800(11) et seq. Your question may be stated as follows: Is W. A. Foote Memorial Hospital, Inc. a 'public body' within the meaning of the Open Meetings Act and therefore subject to the provisions of that Act? The title of the Open Meetings Act, 1976 PA 267, supra, provides that it is: 'AN ACT to require certain meetings of certain public bodies to be open to the public; to require notice and the keeping of minutes of meetings; to provide for enforcement; to provide for invalidation of governmental decisions under certain circumstances; to provide penalties; and to repeal certain acts and parts of acts.' [Emphasis added.] Thus, the legislators and the people were notified that Senate Bill No. 920, subsequently enacted as 1976 PA 267, supra, was a bill designed to regulate the meetings of 'public bodies'. As required by Const 1963, art 4, Sec. 24: 'No law shall embrace more than one object, which shall be expressed in its title. No bill shall be altered or amended on its passage through either house so as to change its original purpose as determined by its total content and not alone by its title.' The constitutional control of the relationship between the body of an act and its title was discussed in Maki v City of East Tawas, 385 Mich 151, 157; 188 NW2d 593, 595, where the Court said: 'We have often held that this constitutional stricture on statutory enactments was not a hollow formality. MacLean v State Board of Control for Vocational Education (1940), 294 Mich 45 synopsizes our consistent adherence to the principle that an act shall not exceed the scope of its title. We said in MacLean: pp 48, 49: "The constitutional provision was designed mainly to prevent the legislature from passing laws not fully understood, Thomas v. Collins [1855], 58 Mich 64; it was intended that the legislature, in passing an act, should be fairly notified of its design, Attorney General, ex rel. Longyear v. Weiner [1886], 59 Mich 580; and the legislatures and parties interested might understand from the title that only provisions germane to the object therein expressed would be enacted, Blades v. Board of Water Commissioners of Detroit [1899], 122 Mich 366; and to avoid bringing into one bill subjects diverse in their nature and having no necessary connection, . . ." Maki, 385 Mich 157. Section 2(a) of the Open Meetings Act, supra, defines public body as: '. . . any state or local legislative or governing body, including a board, commission, committee, subcommittee, authority, or council, which is empowered by state constitution, statute, charter, ordinance, resolution, or rule to exercise governmental or proprietary authority or perform a governmental or proprietary function, or a lessee thereof performing an essential public purpose and function pursuant to the lease agreement.' [Emphasis added.] The clause emphasized above was first introduced as a floor amendment in the House on second reading of the House Substitute Bill. 1976 House Journal No. 88, p 2239. It was later included in the Conference Report. 1976 Senate Journal No. 89, p 1749. It is apparent that the last clause of Section 2(a) of the Open Meetings Act is inconsistent with the title of the Act. Legislative history reveals that the title of the Open Meetings Act, which began as Senate Bill No. 920, never contained any notice that it would include certain private bodies. It is unreasonable to presume that the legislators, reading a title which stated that the bill was to control the meetings of 'public bodies', would understand that the bill also deemed certain otherwise private organizations to be 'public bodies'. Further indication that the legislature did not anticipate the result of introducing the last clause of Section 2(a) is apparent from examining other provisions of the Act. For example, the definitions of 'meeting' and 'decision' in the Open Meetings Act hinge directly on the ability of the 'public body' to effectuate or formulate public policy. The internal decisions of a private organization do not effectuate or formulate public policy. Again, in the penalty sections of the Open Meetings Act (Sections 12 and 13), the Act refers to 'a public official'. Obviously the legislature was contemplating officials of public bodies in the normally understood sense of the term, not in the sense of a board member of a private corporation. W. A. Foote Memorial Hospital, Inc. is a private, non-profit corporation which leases the Foote Hospital facilities from the Jackson Hospital Authority for the purpose of operating the hospital. Foote Hospital v Jackson Hospital Authority, 390 Mich 193, 216-219; 211 NW2d 649, 658-659 (1973). (1) It is therefore my opinion that the final clause of the Open Meetings Act, Sec. 2(a), which reads, 'or a lessee thereof performing an essential public purpose and function pursuant to the lease agreement' is a violation of Michigan Const 1963, art 4, Sec. 24 in that this provision is not referred to in the title of the Act. This provision being thus unenforceable, the meetings of W. A. Foote Memorial Hospital, Inc. are not subject to the provisions of the Open Meetings Act. (2) The last clause of Section 2(a) of the Open Meetings Act, supra, is independent of the remainder of the entire Open Meetings Act and can therefore be severed from the Act. The remainder of the Open Meetings Act remains unaffected by the change. Maki, supra, 385 Mich at 159; 88 NW2d at 596. Frank J. Kelley Attorney General (1)
(2)
It should also be noted that amendment of the title of the Open Meetings Act, supra, may not cure the constitutional defect introduced by this clause. Const 1963, art 4, Sec. 24 also prohibits a law from embracing more than one object. An attempt to bring private organizations under the control of the Open Meetings Act could be held to be a violation of the single purpose clause of the Constitution by having a law which simultaneously controls meetings of public and private bodies.