The following opinion is presented on-line for informational use only and does not replace the official version. (Mich Dept of Attorney General Web Site - www.ag.state.mi.us) STATE OF MICHIGAN FRANK J. KELLEY, ATTORNEY GENERAL Opinion No. 5247 December 7, 1977 STATUTES: Amendments LICENSES AND PERMITS: Reenactment of grandfather clause extending time BOARD OF EXAMINERS OF SOCIAL WORKERS: Reenactment of grandfather clause extending time The enactment of a statute amending an earlier statute which contained a grandfather clause to the effect that a certificate shall issue to a person who applies 'within one year after the effective date of this act' is operative for one year after the effective date of the amendatory act. Honorable Mark Clodfelter State Representative The Capitol Lansing, Michigan 48901 You have requested my opinion pertaining to the social workers certification act, 1972 PA 352; MCLA 338.1751 et seq; MSA 18.365(1) et seq. As its title indicates, this act, supra, as amended by 1975 PA 216, was enacted to provide for the certification and registration of persons engaged in social work; to create and prescribe the functions of a state board of examiners of social workers; to provide for confidentiality of communications; and to prescribe fees and penalties. The essence of your inquiry concerns 1972 PA 352, Sec. 6, as amended, dealing with the right to certification of persons who seek to be grandfathered (1) as a social worker. 1972 PA 352, supra, Sec. 6, as amended, provides: '(1) The department shall issue a certificate as a social worker to a person who submits evidence verified by oath and satisfactory to the department that the person: '(a) Is 18 years of age or older. '(b) Is of good moral character. '(c) Is a legal resident of, or is employed in the state. '(d) Has obtained a baccalaurete degree. '(e) Has 2 years or more of social work experience acceptable to the board or is enrolled in a graduate school of social work, or if the person has a masters degree, or its equivalent, upon successfully completing a course of study at a graduate school of social work approved by the department, or has the equivalent of 4,000 hours of voluntary service with recognized agencies. '(f) Is employed in the practice of social work or is enrolled in a graduate school of social work. This subdivision shall be waived if the person has received a bachelors or masters degree in social work from an accredited college which includes supervised instructional field experience, or if the person was previously certified under this act and fulfills the other requirements of this subsection. '(2) The department shall issue a certificate as a social worker to a person who is employed in the practice of social work and meets the requirements of subsection (1)(a) to (c) and who applies for certification within 1 year after the effective date of this act.' [Emphasis added] The legislature enacted 1975 PA 216, immediately effective on August 6, 1975, amending 1972 PA 352, Sec. 6, supra, to make changes in both subsections (1) and (2) thereof. Pertaining to 1972 PA 352, supra, Sec. 6(2), you have asked the following question: Even though the language 'after the effective date of this act' originally referred to 1972 PA 352, does the re-enactment of Sec. 6 now make that phrase applicable to 1975 PA 216, (the amendatory act) thereby extending the operation of the grandfather clause until August 26, 1976? 1972 PA 352, supra, Sec. 16, provided that the act take effect July 1, 1973. The amendatory act, 1975 PA 216, supra, was approved August 26, 1975, and was ordered to take immediate effect. These dates are significant for if 'this act', as expressed in the amendatory act had been meant to refer to the original act, then Sec. 6(2), as amended, would be devoid of any significance since the amendatory act became effective subsequent to 1 year from the effective date of the original act. It should also be noted that the legislature could have omitted Sec. 6(2) from the amendatory act had it desired to. Instead, the legislature included Sec. 6(2) in the amendatory act and made a minor change in the section changing its wording from 'the requirements of subdivisions (a) to (c) of subsection (1)' as stated in 1972 PA 352, supra, Sec. 6(2), to 'the requirements of subsection (1)(a) to (c)' as stated in 1975 PA 216, supra, Sec. 6(2). While this change in wording does not make a substantive change, it nevertheless is indicative of the legislature's intention to extend the 'grandfather' period. It is a fundamental principle in the construction of statutes that the entire statute must be considered in the determination of the meaning of any of its parts. Krevsky v Naccarato, 56 Mich App 704; 224 NW2d 731 (1974); People v Detroit Edison Co, 16 Mich App 423; 168 NW2d 320 (1969). It is presumed that the legislature intended that the whole of the statute and every part of it should be significant and effective. Hence, every effort should be made to find such a meaning as will give operation and effect to every part and provision of the enactment. No portion of a statute should be declared inoperative if it can be sustained by any rational construction and without putting upon the language employed a forced or unnatural meaning. Black on Interpretation of Laws, Ch 13, p 356. It has been stated that: 'If the language of the statute is ambiguous, or lacks precision, or is fairly susceptible of two or more interpretations, the intended meaning of it must be sought by the aid of all pertinent and admissible considerations. But here, as before, the object of this search is the meaning and intention of the legislature, and the court is not at liberty, merely because it has a choice between two constructions, to substitute for the will of legislature its own ideas as to the justice, expediency, or policy of the law.' Black on Interpretation of Laws, Ch 3, p 36 In seeking to arrive at the correct statutory construction to be given 1972 PA 352, supra, Sec. 6(2), as amended, it is helpful to make reference to the apparent problems to which 1975 PA 216, supra, addresses itself, and to its overall tenor and spirit. 1975 PA 216, supra, provides in Sec. 5(c) that the employment requirement for certification as a social work technician, be waived if the applicant was previously certified or has an associate degree in social work which included supervised field experience. The employment for certification as a social worker, 1975 PA 216, supra, Sec. 6(1)(f), would be waived if the applicant has a bachelor's or master's degree in social work including supervised field experience, or if the person was previously certified and fulfills the other requirements of the subsection. The provisions for waiver of the employment requirement thus allow persons who were once certified but whose certification has lapsed, or those who have completed training at the college level but are not employed to become certified and obtain employment certification may be a prerequisite. Absent the waiver provisions, persons who have received specialized training in college might be prevented from obtaining positions in which their skills can be put to use. Further, 1975 PA 216, supra, Sec. 6(1)(e) and Sec. 7(1) provide for the modification of the 'full-time' work experience requirement for certification as a social worker or certified social worker. Persons seeking such certification would be required to have only two years of social work experience acceptable to the state board of social work examiners. Also, I note that 1975 PA 216, supra, Sec. 7(2) extends and modifies the grandfather clause for certification of certified social workers by allowing 'part-time' social work experience to quality, and by extending the application date for certification to July 1, 1976. It therefore seems that in view of this overall tenor and spirit of the amendatory act, the more logical and reasonable statutory construction to be given 1972 PA 352, supra, Sec. 6(2), as amended, would be that the legislature did not intend to close the door on this extended option for certification as a social worker, but rather intended that it be given renewed effect. In Detroit Club v State of Michigan, 309 Mich 721, 724; 16 NW2d 136, 138 (1944), an act was amended by adding a section which read as follows: 'No claim shall be maintained against the State unless the claimant shall, within 1 year after such claim shall have accrued, file in the office of the clerk of the court of claims either a written claim or a written notice of intention to file a claim against the State or any of its departments, commissions, boards, institutions, arms or agencies, stating the time when and the place where such claim arose and in detail the nature of the same and of the items of damage alleged or claimed to have been sustained. Provided, that claim or notice of intention of filing any claim which has accrued prior to the effective date of this amendatory act may be filed within 1 year after the effective date thereof.' Plaintiff failed to file a claim or written notice of the claim within the stipulated time limit. Soon thereafter, the legislature again amended the court of claims act by adding: 'Provided, however, that in all actions for property damage or personal injuries, claimant shall file with the clerk of the court of claims a notice of intention to file a claim or the claim itself within 6 months following the happening of the event giving rise to the cause of action.' Pursuant to Const 1908, art 5, Sec. 21 (Const 1963, art 4, Sec. 25), the entire body of the section was re-enacted with the above provision constituting the only new amendment in the section. Plaintiffs claimed that by the re-enactment of the words 'provided, that claim or notice of intention of filing any claim which has accrued prior to the effective date of this amendatory act may be filed within 1 year after the effective date thereof', the legislature intended to create another 1 year period from the effective date of the second amendment in which to file any claims. It was the plaintiffs' contention that the words 'this amendatory act' referred to the second amendment, thereby extending the filing date requirement. The court in the Detroit Club case, supra, pp 732-733 stated the rule to be: "Where a section of a statute is amended, the original ceases to exist, and the section as amended supersedes it and becomes a part of the statute for all intents and purposes as if the amendments had always been there.' 25 R.C.L. p. 907. "The provisions carried over have their force from the new act, not from the former. 1 Lewis' Sutherland Statutory Construction (2dEd), Sec. 237. "It is plain from the authorities in this state and elsewhere that the effect of an act amending a specific section of a former act, in the absence of a saving clause, is to strike the former section from the law, obliterate it entirely and substitute the new section in its place. This effect is not an arbitrary rule adopted by the courts. It is the natural and logical effect of an amendment 'to read as follows.' It accomplishes precisely what the words import. Any other construction would do violence the the plain language of the legislature. In Stebbins v State Board of Pharmacy, 297 Mich 676; 298 NW 327 (1941), the pertinent portion of both the original act and the amendatory act read as follows: 'The State board of pharmacy is authorized and required to issue a certificate to any person as a registered pharmacist who has been an assistant druggist twenty-five years last past.' [Emphasis added] The issue in the Stebbins case, supra, was whether the required 25 year period of engaging in business as an assistant druggist should be construed to be that period of time prior to the 1913 original act or prior to the 1933 amendatory act. In holding that the same words appearing in the original act were carried forward in the amendment and that the period of time involved was controlled by the amendment, the court stated, on p 678, the following: 'While the italicized words are identical in the two acts, in a statute of this character, they should be held to be of an entirely different purport. In the earlier act these words fixed a time limitation of 'twenty-five years last past' prior to 1913; but as used in the later act they fixed a period of 'twenty-five years last past' prior to 1933. The words are the same, but the meaning entirely different. 'In Wade v. Farrell, 270 Mich. 562, 567, we quoted approvingly the following: 'When a statute continues a former statute law, first law common to both acts dates from its first adoption.' But in the Wade Case vested rights were involved. In the instant case no vested rights are involved. Instead, the legislature was providing that persons with certain qualifications were entitled to certificates as registered pharmacists. In the 1913 act the requisite period of experience was 'twenty-five years last past' prior to the 1913 act; but, as noted above, in the 1933 act the period of 'twenty-five years last past' was plainly the specified period next preceding the act of 1933. Therefore it cannot be said the later statute 'continues the former statute law.' . . ..' Perry v Hogarth, 261 Mich 526; 246 NW 214 (1933), stating provisions of law compatible with Wade v Farrell, 270 Mich 562; 259 NW 326 (1935), can be distinguished from the case at hand. There, the court held that an act providing that tax on certain state lands shall be paid out of a 'game protection fund' when in the hands of the state treasurer, was not repealed by another act which provided for protection of game animals. An effective date was not the issue in the Hogarth case, but rather the existence of an implied repeal. Considering (1) that the legislature chose to amend and reenact 1972 PA 352, supra, Sec. 6(2) in the amendatory act; (2) that to hold 'this act' as referring to the original act rather than the amendatory act would render the provision ineffective; and (3) that the general tenor and spirit of the amendatory act is of a broadening effect by the easing of requirements, it is my opinion that the legislature intended 1972 PA 352, Sec. 6(2) to be operative for an additional year. Frank J. Kelley Attorney General (1)