1. Can the legislative act to prevent the representative from completing the term he is now serving?

2. Can the representative again seek election and serve in the legislature?

'. . . Each house shall be the sole judge of the qualifications, elections and returns of its members, and may, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members elected thereto and serving therein, expel a member. The reasons for such expulsion shall be entered in the journal, with the votes and names of the members voting upon the question. No member shall be expelled a second time for the same cause.'

'The predecessor to Const 1963, art 4, Sec. 7, is the last sentence of Const 1908, art 5, Sec. 5, which differs only to the extent that it does not contain a 20-year limitation. This sentence was added to Const 1908, art 5, Sec. 5, by amendment in 1956.

'Research of these constitutional provisions reveals no direct interpretations thereof by the Michigan Courts on this point. However, both the amendatory language to 1908 Const, art 5, Sec. 5, adopted in 1956, and the 1963 Constitution which included art 4, Sec. 7, were adopted at a time when the terms 'convicted' and 'conviction' had a well established meaning in Michigan jurisprudence.

'Relevant judicial authorities in Michigan indicate that conviction occurs on adjudication of guilt as evidenced by the jury's verdict, and remains unaffected by the pendency of an appeal, the granting of a new trial, or the failure to impose sentence.

'Attorney General ex rel O'Hara v Montgomery. 275 Mich 504; 267 NW 550 (1963), involved title to the office of Wayne County Clerk. On November 4, 1935 incumbent O'Hara was convicted in Macomb Circuit Court of a felony and for that reason the Wayne Circuit bench removed O'Hara from office, declared the same vacant, and appointed Montgomery to fill out the unexpired term on December 4, 1935. On January 23, 1936 the Macomb Circuit Judge set aside the verdict of guilty and granted O'Hara a new trial because of improper contact with the jury. Acting on O'Hara's behalf the Attorney General then sued Montgomery in quo warranto. Montgomery successfully defended his right to occupy the office. Quoting with approval from People v Adams. 95 Mich 541; 55 NW 978 (1893), the Michigan Supreme Court held:

"'The conviction is the finding of guilt. 1 Bishop Crim. Law, Sec. 963; Stevens v. People, 1 Hill (N.Y.), 261; State v. Volmer, 6 Kan. 379; Nason v. Staples, 48 Me. 123; Commonwealth v. Lockwood, 109 Mass. 323 (12 Am. Rep. 699). As is said by Gray, J. in Commonwealth v. Lockwood, ----

""The ordinary legal meaning of 'conviction,' when used to designate a particular stage of a criminal prosecution triable by a jury, is the confession of the accused in open court, or the verdict returned against him by the jury, which ascertains and publishes the fact of his guilt; while 'judgment' or 'sentence' is the appropriate word to denote the action of the court before which the trial is had, declaring the consequences to the convict of the fact thus ascertained."

"'It is the declaration of consequences, only, that is bad; but there is no reversal, the conviction stands as evidence of the fact, and the statute is satisfied." Attorney General ex rel O'Hara, supra, 275 Mich at 514; 267 NW at 553-554

'The court continued to note that such interpretation was in accord 'with the common use of the language.'

'The possible harshness of such doctrine was recognized by the court, which also acknowledged the vitality of public policy considerations which favor immediate removal from office:

"An innocent man who is unjustly convicted of a felony is doubly unfortunate, but that he may ultimately succeed in establishing his innocence does not entitle him in the menatime to hold on to a public office. The law allows an appeal from a conviction of felony, but if the person so convicted is the incumbent of a public office, these considerations do not weigh in favor of retaining him in that position pending an appeal. McKannay v. Horton, 151 Cal. 711 (91 Pac. 598, 13 L.R.A. [N.C.] 661, 121 Am St. Rep. 146).' Attorney General ex rel O'Hara, supra, 275 Mich at 513; 267 NW at 553

'Also relevant is our recent formal opinion No. 4774 dated June 15, 1973 holding that a person who had been convicted of a crime would have to answer an inquiry to that effect on the application for the Michigan Bar Examination in the affirmative even though he had been granted a new trial during which charges against him were dismissed.' (emphasis added)

'. . . No person who has been convicted of subversion or who has within the preceding 20 years been convicted of a felony involving a breach of public trust shall be eligible for either house of the legislature.'

'While recognized as a responsible and necessary officer of the court in the conduct of its business, exercising by legislative authority a privilege or franchise in that particular, he [the attorney] is not a public officer in the constitutional or statutory sense of that term.'

'In Re Disbarment of Greathouse, 189 Minn. 51, 53, 55 (248 NW 735), the court said:

"An attorney is not an officer of the State in a constitutional or statutory sense of that term, but he is an officer of the court, exercising a privilege during good behavior. . . ."

'. . . Offered in support of the claim that the lawyer is an 'office holder' in this sense is an enhanced version of the proposition, discussed above, that he is an 'officer of the court.' Specifically, the Committee states that the lawyer 'is an officer of the Court who acts by and with the authority of the State' and is entrusted with the 'exercise of actual government power.' Id., at 5.

'We note at the outset that this argument goes beyond the opinion of the Connecticut Supreme Court, which recognized that a lawyer is not an officer in the ordinary sense. 162 Conn, at 254, 294 A2d, at 283. This comports with the view of the Court expressed by Mr. Justice Black in Cammer v United States, 350 US 399, 100 L Ed 474, 76 S Ct 456 (1956):

'It has been stated many times that lawyers are 'officers of the court.' One of the most frequently repeated statements to this effect appears in Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall 333, 378 [18 L Ed 366]. The Court pointed out there, however, that an attorney was not an 'officer' within the ordinary meaning of that term. Certainly nothing that was said in Ex parte Garland or in any other case decided by this Court places attorneys in the same category as marshals, bailiffs, court clerks or judges. Unlike these officials a lawyer is engaged in a private profession, important though it be to our system of justice. In general he makes his own decisions, follows his own best judgment, collects his own fees and runs his own business. The word 'officer' as it has always been applied to lawyers conveys quite a different meaning from the word 'officer' as applied to people serving as officers within the conventional meaning of that term.' Id, at 405, 100 L Ed 474 (footnote omitted).

'Lawyers do indeed occupy professional positions of responsibility and influence that impose on them duties correlative with their vital right of access to the courts. Moreover, by virtue of their professional aptitudes and natural interests, lawyers have been leaders in government throughout the history of our country. Yet, they are not officials of government by virtue of being lawyers. Nor does the status of holding a license to practice law place one so close to the core of the political process as to make him a formulator of government policy.' (emphasis added)

'The words 'public trust' appear to include every agency in which the public, reposing special confidence in particular persons, appoints them for the performance of some duty or service.'