The following opinion is presented on-line for informational use only and does not replace the official version. (Mich Dept of Attorney General Web Site - www.ag.state.mi.us)



STATE OF MICHIGAN

FRANK J. KELLEY, ATTORNEY GENERAL


Opinion No. 5298

May 2, 1978

OPEN MEETINGS ACT:

Political party caucus of members of board of county commissioners.

COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS:

Political party caucus subject to Open Meetings Act.

A political party caucus at which a quorum of the members of the board of county commissioners are present to discuss business that will arise at a meeting of the board is subject to the Open Meetings Act.

Honorable H. Lynn Jondahl

State Representative

The Capitol

Lansing, Michigan

You have requested my opinion on questions which may be stated as follows:

Are rules which forbid the full participation of Republican County Commissioners in the Democratic County Commissioners' caucus contrary to the Open Meetings Act when such caucuses are used to discuss official county business?

Are the notice provisions contained in the Open Meetings Act applicable to those caucuses?

The Ingham County Board of Commissioners consists of 17 Democrats and four Republicans. Prior to each official board meeting the Democratic members hold a party caucus. These caucuses, which typically constitute a board quorum, are used to discuss business that will arise at the monthly board meetings. Democratic caucus rules forbid participation by Republican board members except at designated times when public comment is allowed.

The Open Meetings Act (OMA) applies to all meetings of public bodies. 1976 PA 267; MCLA 15.261 et seq; MSA 4.1800(11) et seq. The OMA defines 'public bodies' as:

'any state or local legislative or governing body, including a board, commission, committee, subcommittee, authority, or council, which is empowered by state constitution, statute, charter, ordinance, resolution or rule to exercise governmental or proprietary authority or perform a governmental or proprietary function, . . ..' 1976 PA 267, Sec. 2(a); MCLA 15.262; MSA 4.1800(12).

For purposes of the OMA a meeting of a public body is defined as a

'. . . convening of a public body at which a quorum is present for the purpose of deliberating toward or rendering a decision on a public policy.' 1976 PA 267, Sec. 2(b); MCLA 15.262; MSA 4.1800(12).

An organization which falls within the OMA's public body definition may not circumvent the open meetings requirements by gathering informally prior to the official meetings in order to deliberate public questions. OAG 1977, No 5183, p ___ (March 8, 1977), which interprets the act, states:

'Meetings with a quorum present held to deliberate a public question must be held at a public meeting. Thus, if the members of a public body gather, a quorum being present, for the purpose of deliberating, the meeting is subject to the provisions of the Act even if there is no intention that the deliberations shall lead to the rendering of a decision on that occasion. In other words, a public body may not meet informally in advance of a public meeting to determine what will be decided formally at the public meeting.'

State ex rel Lynch v Conta, 71 Wis 2d 662; 239 NW2d 313 (1976) supports that conclusion. In this case the court was asked to decide whether that state's Open Meetings Act applied to a gathering of the Democratic members of the state legislature's Joint Committee on Finance, where a quorum of the committee was present. Although the court held that such a caucus fell within an exception to the Wisconsin Open Meetings Act, the court stated:

'When the members of a governmental body gather in sufficient numbers to compose a quorum, and then intentionally expose themselves to the decision-making process . . . an evasion of the law is evidenced. Some occurrence at the session may forge an open or silent agreement. When the whole competent body convenes, this persuasive matter may or may not be presented in its entirety to the public. . . . The likelihood that the public and those members of the governmental body excluded from the private conference may never be exposed to the actual controlling rationale of a government decision thus defines such private quorum conferences as normally an evasion of the law.' 71 Wis 2d at 685-86; 239 NW2d at 330-331.

Thus it is clear that, when members of a public body meet informally, a quorum being present, to discuss matters which will subsequently be considered by the board, the conference is a meeting of the public body that must be open to the public.

As to whether the notice provisions of the Open Meetings Act, supra, apply to the Democratic caucus, it is clear that, since a caucus is a meeting of members of the public body with a quorum present, the notice provisions of the act must be observed and all members of the body may participate in the discussions. (1)

It is my opinion, therefore, that (1) rules which forbid the full participation of minority party county commissioners in a majority party's county commissioners' caucus are contrary to the Open Meetings Act, supra, and (2) the notice provisions contained in the act are applicable to party caucuses where a quorum of the public body is to be present.

Frank J. Kelley

Attorney General

(1) The Legislature has enacted 1978 PA 51, an act which modifies the title and several sections of the law regarding county boards of commissioners. This law specifically requires that county boards of commissioners conduct their meetings in compliance with the requirements of 1976 PA 267, the Open Meetings Act. Further, section 3 of 1978 PA 51 provides that 'a majority of the members of the county board of commissioners of a county shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of the ordinary business of the county, . . .'.