The following opinion is presented on-line for informational use only and does not replace the official version. (Mich Dept of Attorney General Web Site - www.ag.state.mi.us) STATE OF MICHIGAN FRANK J. KELLEY, ATTORNEY GENERAL Opinion No. 5307 May 18, 1978 CONSTITUTION OF MICHIGAN: Art 7, Sec. 29 (rights of municipalities to control highways, streets, and public places) CONSTITUTION OF MICHIGAN: Art 5, Sec. 28 (jurisdiction of State Highway Commission over state trunk line highways) HIGHWAYS & ROADS: Authority of municipalities to exercise control over state trunk line highways Local units of government have a right of reasonable control over highways and streets, including state trunk line highways, within their municipal boundaries. Local units of government may adopt ordinances restricting commercial vehicles such as double tandem tankers to certain roads, may impose weight limitations thereon, and may require that certain types of cargos be covered. However, an ordinance adopted by a municipality with respect to a state trunk line highway within its boundaries must reasonably address a local concern, must not contravene any state law, and must defer to the state's right of paramount jurisdiction over its trunk line highways reserved by Const 1963, Art 5, Sec. 28. Honorable James DeSana State Senator The Capitol Lansing, Michigan You have requested my opinion on the following questions dealing with the authority of local units of government to regulate motor vehicles on roadways within their territorial boundaries: '1. Can cities, townships, and villages place a ban on certain kinds of motor vehicles from routes passing through a specific community whether they are county roads or state trunk lines? '2. Can they also place restrictions on the type of vehicles to require them to have the cargo which they are transporting covered? '3. Could they also become involved in placing weight limitations on these vehicles in route on county roads and state trunk lines?' The right of local units of government to the reasonable control of their streets and alleys is guaranteed by Const 1963, art 7, Sec. 29, which provides in pertinent part, as follows: '. . . Except as otherwise provided in this constitution the right of all counties, townships, cities and villages to the reasonable control of their highways, streets, alleys and public places is hereby reserved to such local units of government.' On the other hand, the right of the State Highway Commission to jurisdiction and control over state trunkline highways is guaranteed by Const 1963, art 5, Sec. 28 which states: 'There is hereby established a state highway commission, which shall administer the state highway department and have jurisdiction and control over all state trunkline highways and appurtenant facilities, and such other public works of the state, as provided by law.' In Jones v City of Ypsilanti, 26 Mich App 574, 579-580; 182 NW2d 795 (1970) the Court of Appeals reviewed the relationship between these two constitutional provisions and reconciled the competing state and local interests in trunkline highways passing through municipal boundaries: '. . . The question then is whether Sec. 28 vested 'exclusive' jurisdiction over state trunkline highways in the state or only 'paramount' jurisdiction, leaving room for local jurisdiction in those areas particular to local government, such as sidewalks, where the exercise of local jurisdiction would not interfere with the state's paramount jurisdiction.' Reading the two constitutional provisions relating to control of highways with reference to each other and in light of existing law when the provisions were framed, we believe that municipalities were meant to retain reasonable control over state trunkline highways located within their boundaries so long as that control pertains to local concerns and does not conflict with the paramount jurisdiction of the state highway commission.' In determining the scope of the term 'reasonable control' within the meaning of Const 1963, art 7, Sec. 29, the court, at 26 Mich App 580, relied upon and adopted the definition set forth in People v McGraw, 184 Mich 233; 150 NW 836 (1915): 'The existing law was more fully set forth in People v McGraw (1915), 184 Mich 233, 238; 150 NW 836, 837: 'In other words, the municipality retains reasonable control of its highways, which is such control as cannot be said to be unreasonable and inconsistent with regulations which have been established, or may be established, by the State itself with reference thereto. This construction allows a municipality to recognize local and peculiar conditions and to pass ordinances regulating traffic on its streets, which do not contravene the State laws.' (Emphasis in McGraw)' (a1) The requirement of uniformity with state laws as set down in People v McGraw, supra, was clarified by Fenton Gravel Co v Village of Fenton, 371 Mich 358, 363-365; 123 NW2d 763 (1963) in sustaining a local ordinance which prohibited heavy vehicles, including 'double-bottom' trucks, from using certain residential streets when measured against the Motor Vehicle Code, 1949 PA 300; MCLA 257.1 et seq; MSA 9.1801 et seq. In so deciding, the court stated: 'Thus, while there is a requirement of uniformity as appellants argue, it is not required, as they seem to contend, that every local ordinance be similar to every other, or that each ordinance be but a copy of the statute. The requirement of uniformity is this: that statutes herein involved by applied uniformly in all political subdivisions of the State. This uniformity is explained, basically, in the language of the statute that, 'no local authority shall enact or enforce any ordinance, rule or regulation in conflict with,' applicable statutory provisions. In further delineation of the uniformity requirement is a specific authorization to 'local authorities', in the reasonable exercise of police power, to restrict use of local highways. Obviously, this is no more than legislative implementation of the general grant of power to municipalities in the State Constitution, that is, reasonable control.' It seems clear, therefore, that under ordinary conditions weight restrictions imposed under section 722 are maximal. Highly significant, of course, is the absence of language in the section from which it may be reasonably construed that the legislature intended statutory weight restrictions to be other than 'normal maximum limits.' Specific categories are not required under the statute, nor does the statute prohibit reasonable weight classification for local streets less than normal maximal limits. There is no warrant, therefore, for appellants' argument that uniformity requirements of the statute have not been met.' It should also be noted, however, that while a municipality may clearly, in the exercise of its police powers, exert reasonable control over its streets to accommodate local concerns, any regulations which are so arbitrary as to preclude effective use of the public ways or otherwise needlessly invade property or personal rights will be of no legal force. Lincoln Park Coach Co v Detroit, 295 Mich 189; 294 NW 149 (1940). Thayer v Michigan Dept of Agriculture, 323 Mich 403; 35 NW2d 360 (1949). Considering these authorities, it is my opinion that, subject to the limitations noted herein, Const 1963, art 7, Sec. 29 when read together with Const 1963, art 5, Sec. 28 guarantees to local units of government the right to reasonable control over highways and streets, including state trunkline highways, within their municipal boundaries. Local units of government are, therefore, free to enact ordinances restricting commercial vehicles, such as double tandem tankers, to certain routes; they may also impose weight limitations thereon and require that certain types of cargoes be covered. It is stressed, however, that an ordinance adopted by a municipality with respect to a state trunkline highway within its boundaries must reasonably address a local concern, must not contravene any state law and must defer to the State's right of paramount jurisdiction over its trunkline highways reserved by Const 1963, art 5, Sec. 28. Frank J. Kelley Attorney General (a1)