1. Are provisions of 1972 PA 288, supra, authorizing the adoption and enforcement by a municipality of an ordinance requiring the connection of a structure to a public sewer system located within 200 feet of the structure constitutional?

'Sec. 3. (1) Structures in which sanitary sewage originates lying within the limits of a city, village or township shall be connected to any available public sanitary sewer in the city, village or township if required by the city, village or township.

'(2) Structures in which sanitary sewage originates lying outside the limits of the city, village or township in which the available public sanitary sewer lies shall be connected to the available public sanitary sewer after the approval of both the city, village or township in which the structure and the public sanitary sewer system lies and if required by the city, village or township in which the sewage originates.

'(3) The connection provided for in subsections (1) and (2) shall be completed promptly but in no case later than 18 months after the date of occurrence of the last of the following events or before the city, village or township in which the sewage originates requires the connection:

'(a) Publication of a notice by the governmental agency which operates the public sanitary sewer system of availability of the public sanitary sewer system in a newspaper of general circulation in the city, village or township in which the structure is located.

'(b) Modification of a structure so as to become a structure in which sanitary sewage originates.

'(c) This act becomes effective.

'(4) A city, village or township, for reasons of public health, by ordinance of a county or district board of health by rule may require completion of the connection within a shorter period of time.'

'The United States Supreme Court has twice faced this issue, and twice found that the police power of a state allows this type of sewer regulation, with no compensation to property owners. District of Columbia v Brooke, 214 US 138; 29 S Ct 560; 53 L Ed 941 (1909), Hutchinson v Valdosta, 227 US 303; 33 S Ct 290; 57 L Ed 520 (1913). In Hutchinson, supra, the Court noted that:

"It is the commonest exercise of the police power of a State or city to provide for a system of sewers and to compel property owners to connect therewith. And this duty may be enforced by criminal penalties.' Hutchinson, supra, 227 US 303, 308; 33 S Ct 290, 292; 57 L Ed 520, 523.

'See also Queenside Hills Realty Co v Saxl, 328 US 80; 66 S Ct 850; 90 L Ed 1096 (1946).

'An examination of other state court decisions reveals that mandatory connection with public sewers has been readily upheld against constitutional attack. We find the rationale of Sanitation District No 1 of Jefferson County v Campbell, 249 SW2d 767 (Ky, 1952), particularly convincing:

"'The community is to be considered as a whole in the matter of preservation of the health of all inhabitants, for a failure by a few to conform to sanitary measures may inflict ill health and death upon many.' Though the action of the governing boards charged with responsibility may work a hardship on one or more individuals whose facilities may be sanitary, their action cannot be regarded as unconstitutionally arbitrary, or the taking of property without due process of law. It would seem that although properly operated private septic tanks may afford a sanitary disposal system, the publicly maintained sewage system of the whole community is undoubtedly better at doing away with potential as well as actual health menaces.' Sanitation District No 1, supra, at 772.'

'Plaintiffs also criticize the lower court's decision via summary judgment which rebuffed an equal protection challenge to the statute. Plaintiffs contend that a provision of 1972 PA 288 requiring sewer connection of only those structures located within 200 feet of an available public sewer line, MCLA 123.282(1); MSA 5.2769(152)(1), is arbitrary, irrational and unsupported by a compelling state interest. They argue further that this provision vested inordinate discretionary power in the township board to 'gerrymander' the precise location of the public system so as to absolve 'certain favored persons' of an obligation to tap into the system.

'Neither argument persuades us. In Manistee Bank & Trust Co v McGowan 394 Mich 655, 671; 232 NW2d 636 (1975), the Michigan Supreme Court recently held that where a legislative classification is attacked on equal protection grounds, both the classification itself and the test with which to scrutinize the classification are to be weighed against a 'rule of reason':

"'The Equal Protection Clause, like the Due Process Clause, is a quaranty that controls the reasonableness of governmental action'. The classification must be a reasonable one, and it must bear a reasonable relation to the object of the regislation.'

'The Court, in Manistee Bank & Trust, supra, held that the validity of nonexperimental, timehonored legislation, which sets up an explicit exception to a general rule, should be gauged against a stricter 'substantial-relation-to-the-object test.' Id, see also Schigur v Secretary of State, 73 Mich App 239; 251 NW2d 567 (1977). However, with respect to legislation of recent vintage which can fairly be doubbed 'experimental', the traditional equal protection test applied. Schigur, supra, at 247-248. Under this test, "[a] statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it". Manistee Bank & Trust, supra, at 668, quoting Dandridge v Williams, 397 US 471, 485; 90 S Ct 1153; 25 L Ed 2d 491 (1970).

'In light of Manistee Bank & Trust, we hold 1972 PA 288 to be experimental legislation which has not 'been enforced for a sufficiently long period of time' for 'all the rationales likely to be advanced in its support' to have been developed. 394 Mich at 672. We further hold the 200-foot scope of Act 288 to be a reasonable upper limit on the reach of the statute.

'In an area where there is a 'perceived need for experimentation', the Legislature is not constrained to adopt an all-or-nothing approach; it may instead proceed in piecemeal fashion. Manistee Bank & Trust, supra, at 672. Thus, we believe the Legislature could well have decided that the potential menace occasioned by the widespread use of septic tanks is best remedied by a 200-foot limitation 'as but the first experimental step in a legislative scheme designed eventually to require' the abandonment of all septic tanks, wherever located. Id.'

2. May a municipality adopt and enforce an ordinance compelling the connection of a structure into a sanitary sewage system where the structure is more than 200-feet distant from the public sewer system?

'This act is in addition to and not in limitation of the power of a governmental agency to adopt, amend and enforce ordinances relating to the connection of a structure in which sanitary sewage originates to its public sanitary sewer system.'

'Sec. 6. (a) It shall be unlawful for any persons directly or indirectly to discharge into the waters of the state any substance which is or may become injurious to the public health, safety or welfare; or which is or may become injurious to domestic, commercial, industrial, agricultural, recreational, or other uses which are being or may be made of such waters; or which is or may become injurious to the value or utility of riparian lands; or which is or may become injurious to livestock, wild animals, birds, fish, aquatic life, or plants or the growth or propagation thereof be prevented or injuriously affected; or whereby the value of fish and game is or may be destroyed or impaired.

'(b) The discharge of any raw sewage of human origin, directly or indirectly into any of the waters of the state shall be considered prima facie evidence of a violation of this section by the municipality in which the discharge originated unless the discharge shall have been permitted by an order or rule of the commission. . . .

'(c) A violation of a provision of this section shall be prima facie evidence of the existence of a public nuisance and in addition to the remedies provided for in this act may be abated according to law in an action brought by the attorney general in a court of competent jurisdiction.

'Sec. 7. (1) After April 15, 1973, a person shall not discharge any waste or effluent into the waters of this state unless he is in possession of a valie permit therefor from the commission. . . .'

3. Has 1961 PA 151, MCLA 123.191 et seq, MSA 5.2767(101) et seq been superseded by provisions of 1972 PA 288, supra?