1. Must a county board of commissioners appoint to the committee which administers a county department of veterans' affairs a veteran of World War I if such a veteran is willing to serve thereon?

2. If a World War I veteran is available but is not appointed to the committee, what impact would the failure of the county commissioners to appoint a World War I veteran have on the validity of the actions of the committee?

3. Would the committee member holding the seat which should have gone to a World War I veteran be entitled to per diem and other statutory payments provided for committee members?

'The county board of commissioners may create a county department of veterans' affairs. The department shall be under the administration of a committee of 4 veterans, appointed by the county board of commissioners, who shall be residents of the county and who have served honorably on active duty in the armed forces, volunteers or regulars or women marines, who served activiely in a war in which the United States has been, is, or may hereafter be a participant as defined in title 38 of the United States code, including the conflict in Vietnam, 1 of whom shall have served in World War I, 1 of whom shall have servded in World War II, 1 of whom shall have served in the Korean War, and 1 of whom shall have served during the conflict in Vietnam, to be appointed upon the recommendation of the posts of each chartered veterans' organization within the county. If a World War I veteran cannot be located who is willing to serve, a veteran of any war may be appointed to serve on the committee. Notwithstanding the provisions of any law of this state to the contrary, a member of the board of commissioners of a county shall be eligible for appointment. Members appointed by the board of commissioners shall be appointed for a term of 4 years each. Of the members first appointed, 1 shall be appointed for a term of 1 year, 1 for a term of 2 years, 1 for a term of 3 years and 1 for a term of 4 years. Vacancies shall be filled in the same manner as original appointments for the unexpired terms.' [Emphasis added]

"Lord Ellenborough has defined an officer de facto as one who has the reputation of being the officer he assumes to be, and yet is not a good officer in point of law, and this definition has been quoted with approval in many cases. Another approved definition is that a de facto officer is one whose title is not good in point of law, but who is in fact in the unobstructed possession of an office and is discharging its duties in full view of the public in such manner and under such circumstances as not to present the appearance of being an intruder or usurper. A still more comprehensive definition is as follows: A person is a de facto officer where the duties of the office are exercised (1) without a known appointment or election, but under such circumstances of reputation or acquiescence as were calculated to induce people, without inquiry, to submit to or invoke his action, supposing him to be the officer he assumed to be; (2) under color of a known and valid appointment or election, but where the officer had failed to conform to some precedent, requirement, or condition, as to take an oath, give a bond, or the like; (3) under color of a known election or appointment, void because the officer was not eligible, or because there was a want of power in the electing or appointing body, or by reason of some defect or irregularity in its exercise, such ineligibility, want of power, or defect being unknown to the public; (4) under color of an election or an appointment by or pursuant to a public, unconstitutional law, before the same is adjudged to be such. And this has been widely accepted. Numerous other definitions may be found in judicial opinions."

'. . . Upon the high ground of public policy and to prevent a failure of public justice we follow the salutary rule that while one is in public office, exercising the authority thereof under color of law, we cannot, except in a direct proceeding to test his right to the office, pass upon the question here raised, and besides it would avail defendant nothing becuase there is no difference between the acts of de facto and de jure officers, so far as the public interests are concerned. . . .'