'The question, then, in applying MCLA 46.30a; MSA 5.353(1), is one of determining what matters involve the lawful compensation of an individual commissioner who is carrying out legitimate business of the board under authority of the board, and what matters instead fall within the prohibited appointments or employment proscribed by MCLA 46.30a; MSA 5.353(1). 73 Mich App 204

'What is the business of the county board of commissioners? Apart from its legislative powers and specific administrative powers and duties imposed upon it by the Legislature, it has only such administrative powers as are necessary to accomplish its own organizational housekeeping and to enable it to attend to the details of performing its other duties. An example used by defendant's counsel in arguing clearly illustrates the distinction to be made. Noting that the board's Building and Grounds Committee must meet regularly to insure that the maintenance and repairs of county buildings and grounds are attended to and custodial work performed, it was argued that the committee members might personally perform such work and be compensated therefor. The argument fails to distinguish between county business and the business (or responsibility) of the county board of commissioners. It is the business of the county to have public buildings maintained and repaired. It is the business of the county board of commissioners to see that the necessary work is done. It is not the duty of the board, or of any individual member thereof, to do the work personally. The abstract work done in Hanna v Chalker, supra, was county business and the employee-commissioner could be compensated prior to the enactment of MCLA 46.30a; MSA 5.353(1), just as any work done by a county employee was compensable; but he was compensated as an employee and not as a commissioner performing work of the board of commissioners under MCLA 46.30(1)(c); MSA 5.353(1)(c).

'Statutes such as MCLA 46.30(1)(c); MSA 5.353(1)(c), are designed to protect the public by keeping the business of government untainted by the business of self-interest.

'An examination of the duties of the defendant, noted above, discloses that they were not mandated by act of the Legislature nor by the Federal legislation or implementing regulations of the Emergency Employment Programs. If a county participated in the EEA programs, these were things that had to be done to implement and comply with the Federal acts and regulations, and it would be the duty of the board of commissioners to insure that they were done. But the day-to-day work involved in performing those duties was not the personal responsibility of the board of commissioners. The function of a 'co-ordinator' or 'liaison officer' was not the function of the board. This implementation of the program, while county business, is not the business of the board of commissioners and the defendant's day-to-day performance of the duties described above was ordinary employment and within the express prohibition of MCLA 46.30a; MSA 5.353(1). 73 Mich App 204-206

'. . . this shall not affect in any way remuneration received by any state or local official who, in addition to his responsibilities and duties as a state or local official, serves also as a member of the regional planning commission. All members may be reimbursed for actual expenses incurred as members of the commission in carrying out the work of the commission.

'Members of the regional planning commission may receive such per diem allowance and mileage as is established by the regional planning commission for each meeting attended and may be reimbursed for actual expenses incurred as members of the commission in carrying out the work of the commission.' . . . [Emphasis added]