The following opinion is presented on-line for informational use only and does not replace the official version. (Mich Dept of Attorney General Web Site - www.ag.state.mi.us)



STATE OF MICHIGAN

FRANK J. KELLEY, ATTORNEY GENERAL


Opinion No. 5522

July 10, 1979

SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS:

Authority of board of education to convey land to city for recreational purposes

CITIES:

Authority of local board of education to convey land to city for recreational purposes

A board of education of a second class school district may sell or lease property no longer required for school purposes to a city upon condition that such property be used for public recreational purposes.

Honorable William A. Sederburg

State Senator

The Capitol

Lansing, Michigan

You have requested my opinion on the following two questions:

'1) May a Board of Education of a school district of the second class sell unused school property to a city for $1.00?

'2) May such a Board of Education lease unused school property to a city for an annual payment of $1.00?'

School officials have informed my office that the School District of the City of Lansing, a second class school district, is contemplating selling or leasing one or more recently closed school buildings to the City of Lansing. The sale or lease would be upon the condition that the City of Lansing use the property for a public recreation program. The School District of the City of Lansing includes all of the City of Lansing within its boundaries along with some additional area.

The law is settled in Michigan that boards of education have only such powers as are conferred upon them by legislative enactments either expressly or by reasonably necessary implication. Senghas v L'Anse Creuse Public Schools, 368 Mich 557, 560; 118 NW2d 975, 977 (1962); Singer Architectural Services Company v Doyle, 74 Mich App 485, 489; 254 NW2d 587, 588, leave to app den'd, 402 Mich 811 (1977).

In 1976 PA 451, MCLA 380.1 et seq; MSA 15.4001 et seq, (hereinafter referred to as the School Code of 1976), Sec. 1262(3), the legislature has expressly provided:

'(3) The board of a school district or a local act school district may sell, exchange, or lease real or personal property of the school district which is no longer required for school purposes, and give proper deeds, bills of sale, or other instruments passing title to the property.'

Thus, boards of education have been empowered to sell or lease property, which they determine is no longer required for school purposes, without obtaining voter approval. Further, boards of education are not required to solicit competitive bids in selling or leasing property no longer required for school purposes.

Our Supreme Court has ruled that a sale is parting with one's interest in something for valuable consideration. Steadman v Clemens, 321 Mich 54, 59; 32 NW2d 45, 48 (1948). A lease is the sale of an interest in land. Malone v Levine, 240 Mich 222, 227; 215 NW 356, 358 (1927).

Valuable consideration for the sale of land need not be the payment of money. Valuable consideration may include acts to be done after the conveyance involving the use of the property by the grantee in a manner that will benefit the grantor. Smith v Maxey, 186 Mich 151, 165-166; 152 NW 1011, 1016 (1915); Stanley v Schwalby, 162 US 255, 276 (1896).

In the School Code of 1976, supra, Sec. 1511, the legislature has expressly provided:

'(1) A board of a school district may operate a system of public recreation and playgrounds; acquire by lease, purchase, or other means, equip and maintain land, buildings, or other recreational facilities; employ a superintendent or director of recreation and assistants; and vote and expend funds for the operation of the system. A board may cooperate with a city, village, county, or township to operate and conduct a system in a manner in which they mutually agree or may delegate the operation of the system to a recreation board created by 1 or more of them. . . .'

Clearly, boards of education may operate public recreation programs by themselves or in cooperation with cities. Thus, it must be concluded that the use of the property by the City of Lansing for a program of public recreation constitutes valuable consideration to the School District of the City of Lansing.

This conclusion is supported by Brozowski v City of Detroit, 351 Mich 10; 87 NW2d 114 (1957), which held that a city was authorized to convey land to a county for the consideration of $1.00 and the provision of services by the county to children of the city. See also Sinas v City of Lansing, 382 Mich 407; 170 NW2d (1969).

It is my opinion, therfore, that a board of education of a second class school district may sell or lease property no longer required for school purposes to a city for $1.00 upon condition that such property be used for a public recreation program.

Frank J. Kelley

Attorney General