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The following opinion is presented on-line for informational use only and does not replace the official version. (Mich Dept of Attorney General Web Site - www.ag.state.mi.us)



STATE OF MICHIGAN

FRANK J. KELLEY, ATTORNEY GENERAL


Opinion No. 5653

February 14, 1980

MENTAL HEALTH:

Patient rights

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:

Due process rights of a patient

The provisions of the Mental Health Code regarding the rights of mental patients to a preliminary hearing, to counsel, and to privacy are constitutional under test of the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.

Honorable George Montgomery

State Representative

The Capitol

Lansing, Michigan 48909

You have requested my opinion on the following question:

Whether the Mental Health Code, 1974 PA 258, MCLA 330.1001, et seq, MSA 14.800(1) et seq, with regard to the rights of mental patients and/or individuals accused by parents or peers of having an unstable mental condition is constitutional?

Specifically, allegations have been made to you that current statutes, presumably the Mental Health Code, supra, violate constitutional guarantees 'of immediate hearing, [right] to counsel, privacy, five to ten day incarceration for those deemed 'mentally disturbed'.'

The leading case in Michigan on the constitutional rights of mentally ill persons in the context of involuntary confinement is Bell v Wayne County General Hospital at Eloise, 384 F Supp 1085 (ED Mich, 1974) (3-Judge Court). In that case, the Court held that key provisions of 1923 PA 151 (repealed by the Mental Health Code, supra), providing for the involuntary confinement of mentally ill persons, were unconstitutional as 'facially violative' of due process of law.

The opinion in Bell went farther than simply declaring key provisions of 1923 PA 151 to be unconstitutional; the Court laid down due process standards that must be met before a person may be involuntarily confined because of mental illness. It is against the Bell standards that the allegations of unconstitutionality with respect to the Mental Health Code, supra, must be tested.

The first allegation is that the Mental Health Code, supra, violates a constitutional guarantee of an immediate hearing. In Bell, supra, 384 F Supp at 1098, the Court said:

'. . . We hold that a person believed to be mentally ill may not be involuntarily detained without a prompt preliminary hearing. We do not specify the precise length of time a person may be confined before an initial hearing must be held; however, the limit of five days prescribed in the emergency detention provisions, MCLA Sec. 330.19, appears to be appropriate.'

The Mental Health Code, supra, Sec. 450(1) provides:

'If requested by an individual who was received at a hospital for hospitalization pursuant to section 423 or 438, a preliminary hearing shall be convened within 5 days after the request is made to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that the individual is a person requiring treatment.'

Your attention is invited, also, to the provisions of the Mental Health Code, supra, Sec. 452, which requires a prompt hearing, 'but in no case more than 7 days' after the filing of a petition with appropriate certificates for the involuntary admission of a person to a mental health institution.

In my opinion, the Mental Health Code, supra, meets constitutional requirements for a prompt hearing when a person is involuntarily hospitalized for mental illness.

The next allegation is that the Mental Health Code violates constitutional guarantees of the right to counsel. In Bell, supra, 384 F Supp at 1093, the Court said:

'. . . [W]e hold that a respondent has the right to legal counsel and, if indigent, to appointed counsel, to assist him at every step of the commitment proceedings; and further that he must be notified of this right at the outset of the proceedings.'

The Mental Health Code, supra, Sec. 454, provides:

'(1) Every individual who is the subject of a petition is entitled to be represented by legal counsel.

'(2) Unless an appearance has been entered on behalf of the subject of a petition, the court shall, within 48 hours of its receipt of any petition together with the other documents required by section 452, appoint counsel to represent the subject of the petition, except that if an individual has been hospitalized pursuant to section 423 or 438, counsel shall be appointed within 24 hours of such hospitalization.

(5) If the subject of a petition is indigent, the court shall compensate appointed counsel from court funds in an amount which is reasonable and based upon time and expenses.'

I note, also, that under the provisions of the Mental Health Code, supra, Sec. 448, when a person is involuntarily hospitalized before a judicial hearing, not later than 12 hours after the hospitalization he must be advised in writing of his right to be represented by legal counsel.

In my opinion, the Mental Health Code, supra, complies with the constitutional guarantee of right to counsel.

The next allegation is that the Mental Health Code, supra, denies a person involuntarily hospitalized because of mental illness his constitutional right to privacy in the context of intrusive physical treatment. As to intrusive physical treatment, your attention is directed to the decision in Bell, supra, 384 F Supp at 1102, where the Court said:

'3. That MCLA Sec. 330.21; MSA Sec. 14.811 and MCLA Sec. 330.54; MSA Sec. 14.844 are violative of the constitutional right of due process insofar as they permit, prior to a final adjudication of mental illness, involuntary surgery, shock treatment and chemotherapy. Chemotherapy shall not be administered to an individual until after final adjudication unless the individual consents to such chemotherapy or unless the administration of such chemotherapy is necessary to prevent physical injury to the individual or others. Such treatment shall be given only where acts of the patient or other objective criteria clearly demonstrate to a physician that the patient is presently dangerous to himself or others.

'Nothing in this order shall be construed as a finding or a declaration that it is unconstitutional to involuntarily treat a person who has not been finally adjudicated as mentally ill, but who in the professional judgment of a physician appears to be in immediate need of treatment in order to prevent him from physically harming himself or others, provided such treatment is necessary to maintain physical health.'

The Mental Health Code, supra, Sec. 716, prohibits surgery or electroconvulsive therapy, or another procedure intended to produce convulsions, on a recipient of mental health services unless consent is obtained except in the case where the life of the recipient is threatened and there is not time to obtain consent. Further, the Mental Health code, supra, Sec. 718, prohibits the administering of chemotherapy to a person who has been hospitalized without a judicial hearing unless the individual consents to the administering of the chemotherapy or the administering of chemotherapy is necessary to prevent physical injury to the individual or others.

As to divulging confidential communications and medical records, the Mental Health Code, supra, Secs. 748 and 750, expressly maintain the confidentiality of patient records and the privilege surrounding patient-physician communications.

In my opinion, the Mental Health Code, supra, does not permit an unconstitutional invasion of the privacy of a person who has been involuntarily confined to a hospital because of mental illness.

The last allegation is 'five to ten day incarceration for those deemed 'mentally disturbed'.'

The Mental Health Code, supra, Sec. 400(a), defines mental illness as 'a substantial disorder of thought or mood which significantly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or ability to cope with the ordinary demands of life.'

The Mental Health Code, supra, Sec. 401, defines the term 'person requiring treatment' as:

'(a) A person who is mentally ill, and who as a result of that mental illness can reasonably be expected within the near future to intentionally or unintentionally seriously physically injure himself or another person, and who has engaged in an act or acts or made significant threats that are substantially supportive of the expectation.

'(b) A person who is mentally ill, and who as a result of that mental illness is unable to attend to those of his basic physical needs such as food, clothing, or shelter that must be attended to in order for him to avoid serious harm in the near future, and who has demonstrated that inability by failing to attend to those basic physical needs.

'(c) A person who is mentally ill, whose judgment is so impaired that he is unable to understand his need for treatment and whose continued behavior as the result of this mental illness can reasonably be expected, on the basis of competent medical opinion, to result in significant physical harm to himself or others. This person shall be hospitalized only under the provisions of sections 434 through 438 of this act.'

The standard, as stated in Bell, supra, 384 F Supp at 1096, is:

'. . . Thus to validate the 'massive curtailment of liberty' which involuntary commitment occasions, the basis for commitment must lie in a threatened or actual behavior stemming from mental disorder, and of a nature which the state may legitimately control, viz., that causing harm to self or to others.'

The Mental Health Code, supra, does not authorize involuntary hospitalization for those deemed 'mentally disturbed.' Thus, the standard of the Mental Health Code, supra, is far more detailed and in accord with the dictates of Bell, supra. It does require that a person suffer a mental disorder coupled with actual or threatened causing of harm to self or to others.

To conclude, it is my opinion that the provisions of the Mental Health Code, supra, regarding the rights of mental patients to a prompt hearing, to counsel and to privacy are constitutional.

Frank J. Kelley

Attorney General


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