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The following opinion is presented on-line for informational use only and does not replace the official version. (Mich Dept of Attorney General Web Site - www.ag.state.mi.us)



STATE OF MICHIGAN

FRANK J. KELLEY, ATTORNEY GENERAL


Opinion No. 5933

July 23, 1981

EDUCATION, DEPARTMENT OF:

Measuring distances for purposes of state school aid transportation reimbursement.

SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS:

Reimbursement for transportation of pupils

Distances for purposes of state school aid transportation reimbursement are to be measured from the point of intersection of the center line of the school drive, public street or road running through or by school district property with the center of the nearest schoolhouse doorway to the point of intersection of the public street or road with the center of the nearest walk or drive serving the child's home.

Dr. Phillip E. Runkel

Superintendent of Public Instruction

Michigan National Tower

Lansing, Michigan

You have requested my opinion whether the interpretation of 1979 PA 94; MCLA 388.1601 et seq; MSA 15.1919(901) et seq, Sec. 71(1) by the Department of Education, concerning measuring distances for purposes of state school aid transportation reimbursement to school districts, is consistent with such statutory provision.

In 1979 PA 94, supra, Sec. 71(1), the Legislature has provided:

'[Reimbursement] shall not be granted for the transportation of pupils living within 1 1/2 miles of the schools which the pupils attend, except for handicapped pupils, as defined by rules promulgated by the state board, whom the department determines cannot safely walk the distance, or for pupils in attendance at alternative education programs for pregnant persons. Transportation distances shall be measured along public streets and highways.' (Emphasis added.)

In your letter, you state that the Department of Education's long-standing interpretation of the above-quoted statutory language is as follows:

'The point of beginning shall be the point of intersection of the center line of the public street or road with the center of the nearest walk or drive available for pedestrian use where it enters onto the school site. A drive used by vehicles without provision for pedestrians shall not be considered as being an entrance onto school property for pedestrians.

'The point of ending shall be the point of intersection of the center line of the public street or road with the center of the nearest walk or drive serving the child's home.'

Initially, it should be observed that the Legislature has clearly directed that the distances for determining eligibility for state school aid transportation reimbursement to school districts must 'be measured along public streets and highways.' 1979 PA 94, Sec. 71(1), supra. Thus, cases indicating that the distance for determining eligibility for transportation should be measured from the student's home or yard are not applicable since, under the instant statute, the distances must be measured along public streets and highways. See 52 ALR3d 1032. In People ex rel Schuldt v Schimanski, 130 Ill App 2d 780; 266 NE2d 409 (1971), the Court ruled that the transportation distance started at the public road without any intimation that the starting point for measuring the transportation distance was the student's home or yard.

It is, therefore, my opinion that the Department of Education's interpretation of the point of ending is consistent with 1979 PA 94, Sec. 71(1), supra.

Your interpretation of the point of beginning for measuring purposes is based upon the entry to the school site, provided a walk or drive is provided therefrom for pedestrian use. The statutory language speaks of 'living within 1 1/2 miles of the schools which the pupils attend.' 1979 PA 94, Sec. 71(1), supra. The statute does not expressly state whether the reference to schools is to school buildings or to the school sites on which the buildings are located.

Where the meaning of a statute is in doubt, a court will construe the statute in a reasonable way to effectuate the legislative purpose underlying enactment of the statute. Zawacki v Detroit Harvester Co, 310 Mich 415; 17 NW2d 234 (1945). The 1 1/2 mile limitation for state school aid reimbursement purposes is obviously designed to encourage school districts to provide transportation for students who would have to walk over 1 1/2 miles to the schools they attend. Using the point of entry to the school site in measuring the distance for reimbursement purposes could result in students who live 1.4 miles from the entry to the school site having to walk an additional half mile to a mile across school owned land to reach their school buildings. Such construction would not further the statutory purpose. Courts have held that distances for determining eligibility for school district transportation are measured from the school building. People ex rel Schuldt v Schimanski, supra; Purkeypyle v School District No 101, 127 Kan 751; 275 P 146 (1929).

Using the point of entry to the school site in measuring the distance for transportation reimbursement purposes is not consistent with 1979 PA 94, Sec. 71(1), supra. The point of beginning should be the point of intersection of the center line of the public street or road with the center of the nearest schoolhouse doorway.

It is, therefore, my opinion that the Department of Education's interpretation of the point of beginning is not consistent with 1979 PA 94, Sec. 71(1), supra.

Frank J. Kelley

Attorney General


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