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The following opinion is presented on-line for informational use only and does not replace the official version. (Mich Dept of Attorney General Web Site - www.ag.state.mi.us) STATE OF MICHIGAN FRANK J. KELLEY, ATTORNEY GENERAL Opinion No. 5935 July 17, 1981 HOME RULE COUNTIES: Veto power of appointed chief administrative officer A county charter may not confer veto power upon an appointed chief administrative officer. Only an elected county executive may exercise veto power over an ordinance or resolution adopted by the county board of commissioners. Honorable William R. Bryant, Jr. House of Representatives State Capitol Lansing, Michigan You have requested my opinion upon the following question: May a county charter give an appointed chief administrative officer complete veto power, such as is provided for by statute for an elected county executive? Veto power was added to the charter county act, 1966 PA 293, by 1980 PA 7, Sec. 11a; MCLA 45.511a; MSA 5.302(11a), which provides, in pertinent subsections: '(1) In a county with a population of 1,500,000 or more (a1) the commission shall approve alternative charter proposals for simultaneous submission to the electors pursuant to the provisions of this section. '(4) Except as to the method of selection of a chief administrative officer or an elected county executive; the veto power of the chief administrative officer or the elected county executive; and the removal of the chief administrative officer or the elected county executive, the 2 alternative charter proposals shall not differ. '(8) One charter proposal shall provide for the duties and responsibilities of the elected county executive. The other charter proposal shall provide for the duties and responsibilities of the chief administrative officer. Under each charter proposal, the duties and responsibilities of the elected county executive or chief administrative officer shall not differ, except as provided in subsection (4). '(9) The elected county executive may veto an ordinance or resolution adopted by the county board of commissioners. . . .' [Emphasis added.] 1966 PA 293, Sec. 11a(4), supra, enumerates three differences between county charters providing for an appointed chief administrative officer and county charters providing for an elected county executive, namely: (1) the manner of selection; (2) the veto power; and (3) removal. Both charter proposals are required to be submitted to the electors, and except for these three differences, shall be identical. The difference regarding veto power is that one officer has it, and the other does not. It follows that if both officers had veto power, there would be no difference, and such an interpretation would be at variance with the expressed legislative intent. Thus, 1966 PA 293, Sec. 11a(4), supra, may not be interpreted as conferring veto power on a chief administrative officer. Further, 1966 PA 293, Sec. 11a(9), supra, expressly confers the veto power upon the elected county executive, but is silent about veto power in a chief administrative officer. In Sebewaing Industries, Inc v Village of Sebewaing, 337 Mich 530, 545; 60 NW2d 444, 446-447 (1953), the Supreme Court reiterated the rule of statutory construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The expression of one thing is the exclusion of another. The express mention of veto power in 1966 PA 293, Sec. 11a(9), supra, operates to the exclusion of such power in a chief administrative officer, and such a construction is consistent with the intention expressed in 1966 PA 293, Sec. 11a(4), supra. Compare the act providing for an optional unified form of county government, 1973 PA 139, Secs. 8 and 11; respectively, MCLA 45.558; MSA 5.302(58), and MCLA 45.561; MSA 5.302(61). In 1973 PA 139, supra, the power of veto is conferred upon the elected county executive. Further, a study of the legislative history of amendatory 1980 PA 7 (Senate Bill 652) demonstrates the manifest intent of the Legislature that only an elected county executive exercise the veto power. The House of Representatives amended Senate Bill 652 to insert Section 11a(9), in pertinent part, to provide: 'The single county executive may veto an ordinance or resolution adopted by the county board of commissioners including an item of an ordinance which appropriates funds.' 1979 House Journal, p 3051, 3055. The first conference report approved by both the Senate and House of Representatives provided for the insertion within Section 11(9) of the term 'elected' to describe the only county executive empowered to exercise the veto power upon an ordinance or resolution adopted by the county board of commissioners. 1980 Senate Journal, p 161, 189; 1980 House Journal, p 202. It is my opinion, therefore, that a county charter may not confer veto power upon an appointed chief administrative officer, such as is conferred upon an elected county executive. Frank J. Kelley Attorney General (a1.)
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