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The following opinion is presented on-line for informational use only and does not replace the official version. (Mich Dept of Attorney General Web Site - www.ag.state.mi.us)



STATE OF MICHIGAN

FRANK J. KELLEY, ATTORNEY GENERAL


Opinion No. 5974

September 3, 1981

SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS:

Authority of a board of education to charge students fees for participation in interscholastic athletic activities

The Legislature has not authorized boards of education of school districts to charge students fees in connection with their participation in interscholastic athletic activities.

The Honorable Gary Corbin

State Senator

The Capitol

Lansing, Michigan

You have requested my opinion on the following questions:

1. Do boards of education have the statutory authority to charge students a fee to participate in extracturricular interscholastic athletic activities, such fee being for the purpose of financing part of the general cost of providing such athletic atcitivies.

2. Is it constitutionally permissible, under Const 1963, art 8, Sec. 2, for a board of education to charge students a fee to participate in extracurricular interscholastic athletic activities?

Boards of education have only such powers as the Legislature confers upon them either expressly or by reasonably necessary implication in statutes enacted by the Legislature. Senghas v L'Anse Creuse Public Schools, 368 Mich 557; 118 NW2d 975 (1962). Singer Architectural Services Company v Doyle, 74 Mich App 485; 254 NW2d 587, lv app den, 402 Mich 811 (1977).

In the School Code of 1976, 1976 PA 451; MCLA 380.1522; MSA 15.41522, Sec. 1522(4), the Legislature has specifically addressed the question of what fees a participant in interscholastic athletics may be charged. In that regard, the Legislature has expressly provided: (1)

'(4) A board may require a fee from participants in interscholastic athletic programs for the cost or a portion thereof of medical care, mutual benefit programs, or insurance programs to insure protection for pupils. A pupil shall not be barred from participation in interscholastic athletic activities because of inability to pay the fee.' (Emphasis added.)

It is a well settled rule of statutory construction that an express grant of statutory power in a particular field is deemed to imply the exclusion of all other powers in that same field. Sebewaing Industries, Inc v Village of Sebewaing, 337 Mich 530, 545; 60 NW2d 444 (1953); Alan v Wayne County, 388 Mich 210, 253; 200 NW2d 628 (1972); Ellis v Wakefield Township School District, 79 Mich App 347, 350; 261 NW2d 320 (1977). The statutory authority to charge participants in interscholastic athletics for medical care, mutual benefit programs or insurance programs implies the exclusion of the authority to charge such participation for other purposes.

It is my opinion, therefore, that boards of education lack the statutory authority to charge students fees in connection with their participation in interscholastic athletic activities.

The second question is more complex and will be the subject of a separate opinion.

Frank J. Kelley

Attorney General

(1) At the time OAG, 1963-1964, No 4376, p 484 (October 16, 1964), concluded that boards of education lacked statutory authority to charge students fees in connection with participation in interscholastic athletics, there was no statute in existence comparable to the School Code of 1976, supra, Sec. 1522(4).

 


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