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The following opinion is presented on-line for informational use only and does not replace the official version. (Mich Dept of Attorney General Web Site - www.ag.state.mi.us) STATE OF MICHIGAN FRANK J. KELLEY, ATTORNEY GENERAL Opinion No. 6049 March 26, 1982 SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS: Authority to deny transportation to pupil for violating transportation regulation WORDS AND PHRASES: 'State aid eligible pupil' A board of education has authority to deny transportation on a temporary basis to a state aid eligible pupil, who has neither been suspended nor expelled from school, for violating a transportation regulation while enroute to or from school. Honorable Lucille H. McCollough State Representative The Capitol Lansing, Michigan You have requested my opinion on a question which may be stated as follows: Does a board of education have the statutory authority to deny transportation to a state aid eligible pupil, (1) who has neither been suspended nor expelled from school, as a disciplinary measure for violating a transportation regulation while enroute to or from school? Boards of education have only such powers as the Legislature confers upon them either expressly or by reasonably necessary implication in statutes enacted by the Legislature. Senghas v L'Anse Creuse Public Schools, 368 Mich 557, 560; 118 NW2d 975,977 (1962); Singer Architectural Services Co v Doyle, 74 Mich App 485, 489; 254 NW2d 587, 588 (1977), lv app den, 402 Mich 811 (1977). The School Code of 1976, 1976 PA 451; MCLA 380.1 et seq; MSA 15.4001 et seq, in section 1300, provides: 'The board of a school district shall make reasonable regulations relative to anything necessary for the proper establishment, maintenance, management, and carrying on of the public schools of the district, including regulations relative to the conduct of pupils concerning their safety while in attendance at school or enroute to and from school.' (Emphasis added.) In Jones v Cody, 132 Mich 13; 92 NW 495 (1902), the Detroit Board of Education had adopted a rule which provided that pupils were required to go directly to their homes at the close of school at noon and at night, unless required by their teachers to remain at school. The Michigan Supreme Court concluded that the rule was reasonable, stating: '[The] rule and the method of enforcing it are reasonable, unless it be the law that those in control of our public schools have no jurisdiction over pupils outside the schoolhouse yard. It is not only the legal right, but the moral duty, of the school authorities, to require children to go directly from school to their homes.' Jones v Cody, supra, 132 Mich at 16; 92 NW at 496. Similarly, in Tanton v McKenny, 226 Mich 245; 197 NW 510 (1924), the court upheld the expulsion of a student for persistently violating a school regulation, although said violations occurred outside the school area. The court held that a student's right to attend school was tempered by, and subject to, obeying the school's regulations pertaining to conduct. These holdings conform with the general principle of law regarding the authority of a board of education to regulate its pupils' conduct enroute to or from school. This rule is succinctly set forth in 79 CJS, Schools and School Districts, Sec. 496, p 445, as follows: '[t]he supervision and control of a teacher over a pupil, and of a school board, to make needful rules for the conduct of the pupils, are not confined to the schoolroom and school premises, but extend over the pupil from the time he leaves home to go to school until he returns home from school, and, where the effect of acts done out of a schoolroom while the pupils are coming to or going from school reaches within the schoolroom, and is detrimental to good order and the best interests of the school, such acts may be forbidden and the teacher may punish an offending pupil when he comes to school, . . .' Unequivocally, a board of education has the authority to make reasonable rules and regulations for the conduct of its pupils concerning their safety while in attendance at school or enroute to and from school. 1976 PA 451, supra, Sec. 1300. Your inquiry raises the narrower issue concerning whether a board of education may enforce transportation regulations by denying transportation to a student that violates such a regulation. II OAG, 1960, No 3493, p 51 (March 17, 1960), considered whether a school district had the authority to enforce a student driving regulation by suspension or expulsion. It concluded that a school district has the authority to suspend or expel students who persistently disobey safety regulations imposing limitations on driving automobiles to or from school. In reaching this result, the opinion held: 'In answer to the second question, the school district, having the authority to pass reasonable driving regulations which must be obeyed in order to be effective, must necessarily have the power to enforce said regulatons.' II OAG, No 3493, supra p.52. The opinion relied on the case of Burkitt v School District No. 1, Multnomah County, 195 Or 471, 494; 246 P2d 566, 577 (1952), where the court upheld a rule of conduct promulgated by the board of education. The court concluded that the power to make the rule implies the power to enforce it by expulsion. School districts providing pupil transportation are obligated to provide such transportation in a safe manner. To that end, a board of education may impose sanctions, including a temporary suspension from school, upon a student whose conduct interferes with the safe transportation of other students to and from school. Clements v Board of Trustees of Sheridan County School District No. 2, 585 P2d 197, 204 (Wyo, 1978). In Cochrane v Mesick Consolidated School District Board of Education, 360 Mich 390; 103 NW2d 569 (1960), the Michigan Supreme Court, by an equally divided court, affirmed the lower court decision sustaining the reasonableness of a school board rule prohibiting married students from participating in extracurricular activities. The court divided upon whether this particular rule was reasonable. However, none of the justices questioned the authority of a board of education to enforce its rule making authority by prohibiting students violating the rules from participating in extracurricular activities. In 1976 PA 451, supra, Sec. 1311, the Legislature has authorized boards of education to suspend or expel pupils 'from school' for persistent disobedience. In 1976 PA 451, supra, Sec. 1321, the Legislature has required boards of education that transport any resident pupils, other than handicapped pupils, to transport each resident pupil for whom the school district is eligible to receive state school transportation aid. Neither of these statutory provisions precludes the authority to deny transportation to a pupil who has violated a reasonable school transportation regulation designed to protect the safety of pupils while enroute to and from school. The power to suspend or expel pupils 'from school' does not prevent a board of education from imposing lesser sanctions such as a temporary in school suspension from the classroom or the denial of participation in extracturicular activities. Cochrane v Mesick Consolidated School District Board of Education, supra. It is my opinion, therefore, that a board of education has authority to deny transportation on a temporary basis to a state aid eligible pupil, who has neither been suspended nor expelled from school, for violating a transportation regulation while enroute to or from school. However, the authority to deny transportation to a state aid eligible pupil may not be exercised arbitrarily and unreasonably. Hiers v Detroit Superintendent of Schools, 376 Mich 225; 136 NW2d 10 (1965). Thus, a student living a great distance from school who is dependent upon public school bus transportation to reach school may not be subjected to a long term suspension from transportation privileges for a minor infraction. Moreover, for serious transportation related infractions a student may be suspended or expelled from school in conformity with applicable due process requirements. Goss v Lopez, 419 US 565; 95 S Ct 729; 42 L Ed 2d 725 (1975). Frank J. Kelley Attorney General (1)
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