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The following opinion is presented on-line for informational use only and does not replace the official version. (Mich Dept of Attorney General Web Site - www.ag.state.mi.us)



STATE OF MICHIGAN

FRANK J. KELLEY, ATTORNEY GENERAL


Opinion No. 6055

April 15, 1982

CRIME VICTIMS COMPENSATION:

Reimbursement to crime victim of expense of temporary relocation pending disposition of the criminal case

Authority of Crime Victims Compensation Board to make reimbursement to crime victim

The Crime Victims Compensation Board is not authorized by the Legislature to reimburse a crime victim-witness for expenses incurred as result of temporary relocation as a witness in the criminal case arising from the commission of the crime.

Mr. William L. Cahalan

Wayne County Prosecuting Attorney

1200 Frank Murphy Hall of Justice

Detroit, Michigan 48226

You have requested my opinion on the following question:

Is the Crime Victims Compensation Board authorized by statute to reimburse a victim of a crime who is a witness in a pending criminal prosecution for reasonable and necessary expense of temporary relocation pending disposition of the criminal case where such relocation is necessitated by threats and dangers to such victim-witness caused by or on behalf of the criminal defendant?

The Crime Victims Compensation Board was created by 1976 PA 223; MCLA 18.351 et seq; MSA 3.372(1) et seq. Its power to hear and determine claims is set forth in 1976 PA 223, supra Sec. 3(e) and is subject to many limitations enumerated in the Act. Conduct which is a crime under the laws of Michigan must have caused an injury or death of the victim within Michigan. (1) The crime must be reported to the police within 48 hours unless good cause for delay is shown. (2) A claim must be filed with the Crime Victims Compensation Board not later than 30 days after the occurrence of the crime or not later than 90 days after the death of the victim unless the Board extends the time for good cause up to a year after the occurrence of the crime. (3) The only persons eligible for an award are a victim, an intervenor, a surviving spouse, parent or child of a victim who died, or any other person who was dependent for his or her principal support upon a victim who died as a direct result of the crime. (4) An award may be made only for out-of-pocket loss or for loss of earnings or support. (5) Any award for loss of earnings or support shall not exceed $100.00 for each week. (6) The maximum, aggregate award per claimant which is allowed is $15,000.00. (7) If the Board finds that the claimant will not suffer serious financial hardship as a result of the injury, considering all of his or her financial resources, then the Board is required to deny the award. (8) Furthermore, if an award is granted, it must be reduced according to certain standards. (9)

Expenses incurred by a victim-witness for temporary relocation do not qualify as loss of earnings or support; thus, the question is whether such expenses qualify as an out-of-pocket loss. As used in 1976 PA 223, supra, the term 'out-of-pocket loss' is defined in section 1(e) to mean:

'[T]he unreimbursed and unreimbursable expenses or indebtedness reasonably incurred for medical care, any nonmedical remedial treatment rendered in accordance with a recognized religious method of healing, or other services necessary as a result of the injury upon which a claim is based.' (Emphasis added.)

Under the rule of statutory construction known as ejusdem generis, when general words follow a designation of particular subjects in a statute, the meaning of the general words will ordinarily be presumed to be restricted by the particular designation and construed as including only things of the same kind, class, character or nature as those specifically enumerated. People v Smith, 393 Mich 432, 436; 225 NW2d 165 (1975).

The phrase 'other service necessary' in 1976 PA 223, supra, Sec. 1(e); follows 'medical care' and 'nonmedical remedial treatment rendered in accordance with a recognized religious method of healing.' Limiting the general phrase 'other services necessary' to include only services of the same kind, class, character or nature as the services specifically described, we must conclude that such services must be related to assisting the victim to recover from his or her injury.

Moreover, the Legislature directly expressed the intent to limit out-of-pocket loss to expense related to assisting victims to recover from their injuries. In 1976 PA 223, supra, Sec. 1(e); the term 'other services necessary' is immediately qualified by the phrase 'as a result of the injury upon which a claim is based.' That limiting phrase is repeated in 1976 PA 223, supra, Sec. 11(1).

The need to temporarily relocate results not from the injury but from the fact of threats made after the crime and from the fact of prosecution. Even though the need to relocate is related to the crime, a statute must be construed as it reads without reference to equitable considerations. Geraldine v Miller, 322 Mich 85, 95; 33 NW2d 672 (1948). Further, the terms of a statute may not be extended by construction beyond the obvious import of the language of the statute. Oakland County Treasurer, v Auditor General, 292 Mich 58, 64; 290 NW 327 (1940).

It should be noted that 1976 PA 223, supra, Sec. 11(4); deals with the cause of the injury and describes when the amount of an award for otherwise allowable loss must be reduced because the victim contributed to the infliction of his or her own injury. It deals only with what happens at the time the crime is occurring in the victim's or intervenor's presence. Therefore, 1976 PA 223, supra, Sec. 11(4); does not expand the definition of what is reimbursable.

It is my opinion, therefore, that because the Legislature limited compensation under 1976 PA 223, supra, to expenses which are incurred in recovering from an injury caused by a criminal act and which result in serious financial hardship, the Crime Victims Compensation Board is not authorized to reimburse a crime victim-witness for expenses incurred as a result of temporary relocation as a witness in the criminal case arising from the commission of the crime.

Frank J. Kelley

Attorney General

(1) 1976 PA 223, supra, Secs. 1(c) and 10(a)-(b).

(2) 1976 PA 223, Sec. 10(c), supra.

(3) 1976 PA 223, supra, Sec. 5(2).

(4) 1976 PA 223, supra, Sec. 4.

(5) 1976 PA 223, supra, Sec. 11(1).

(6) 1976 PA 223, supra, Sec. 11(2).

(7) 1976 PA 223, Sec. 11(1), supra.

(8) 1976 PA 223, supra, Sec. 11(5).

(9) 1976 PA 223, supra, Sec. 11(3)-(4).

 


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