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The following opinion is presented on-line for informational use only and does not replace the official version. (Mich Dept of Attorney General Web Site - www.ag.state.mi.us) STATE OF MICHIGAN FRANK J. KELLEY, ATTORNEY GENERAL Opinion No. 6078 June 17, 1982 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Const 1963, art 4, Secs. 22, 23, 26 and 33 LABOR, DEPARTMENT OF: Bureau of community services--authority over home weatherization program 1981 PA 230, Sec. 5(o), which authorizes the bureau of community services to administer the home weatherization program established pursuant to 1978 PA 615, is unconstitutional as violative of Const 1963, art 4, Secs. 22, 23, 26 and 33. Honorable David S. Holmes, Jr. State Senator Capitol Building Lansing, Michigan Your inquiry regarding the former home weatherization program review board in connection with the operation of a home weatherization program by the bureau of community services of the Michigan Department of Labor is rephrased as follows: Whether the bureau of community services of the Michigan department of labor, created by 1981 PA 230; MCLA 400.1101 et seq; MSA 16.615(1) et seq, may administer the home weatherization program established by 1978 PA 615, as amended by 1979 PA 207; MCLA 400.1051 et seq; MSA 16.613(1) et seq, as it is directed to do by 1981 PA 230, supra, Sec. 5(o), despite the fact that 1978 PA 615, supra, Sec. 21, provides that said act 'shall expire on December 31, 1981.' 1981 PA 230, Sec. 5(o), supra, provides: 'The bureau of community services is created within the department. The director shall appoint an executive director who shall be a member of the state classified service or the state career executive service, as established and approved by the civil service commission. Under the supervision of the department, the bureau shall serve as a statewide advocate for social and economic opportunities for low income persons and may do all of the following: Administer the home weatherization program established pursuant to Act No. 615 of the Public Acts of 1978, as amended, being sections 400.1051 to 400.1071 of the Michigan Compiled Laws. The bureau shall administer the home weatherization program in a manner that provides that public agencies, nonprofit private agencies, and nonprofit organizations are eligible and shall have the opportunity for funding for each portion of a program which a community action agency may undertake.' In view of the interaction of 1981 PA 230, supra, and 1978 PA 615, supra, the issue to be determined is whether the title of 1981 PA 230, supra, satisfies the 'one object' requirement of Const 1963, art 4, Sec. 24, which provides in pertinent part: 'No law shall embrace more than one object, which shall be expressed in its title. . . .' The purpose of 1981 PA 230, supra, is stated as follows: 'AN ACT to create a bureau of community services and a commission on economic and social opportunity within the department of labor to reduce the causes, conditions, and effects of proverty and promote social and economic opportunities that foster self-sufficiency for low income persons; to provide for the designation of community action agencies; and to prescribe the powers and duties of the bureau, the commission, and the community action agencies.' The purpose of 1978 PA 615, supra, was stated as follows: 'AN ACT to establish a home weatherization program for low income households; to prescribe the powers and duties of the department of labor and the department of social services; to create a home weatherization program review board; to prescribe its powers and duties; to limit the liability of the state; to provide penalties; and to make an appropriation. Amended by P.A. 1979, No. 207, Sec. 1, Imd. Eff. Jan. 8, 1980.' Inasmuch as the stated object of 1981 PA 230, supra, is to create a bureau of community services and a commission on economic opportunity whose objectives and functions are to be directed to the reducing of the causes, conditions and effects of poverty by the promotion of social and economic opportunities that foster the self-sufficiency of low income persons, while the stated object of 1978 PA 615 was to establish and operate, for a temporary period only, terminating on December 31, 1981, a weatherization program to insulate the homes of low income persons, it may not be persuasively contended that the title of 1981 PA 230, supra, actually gave notice to the Legislature and to the public that its purpose was to revive an expired public act, namely, 1978 PA 615, supra, the purpose of which was materially different from the purpose of 1981 PA 230, supra. In short, the Legislature and the public were not placed on notice that 1981 PA 230, supra, was reviving an expired 1978 public act. As recently observed in OAG, 1979-1980, No 5485, p 148 (April 26, 1979), the test for determining whether a statutory provision violates Const 1963, art 4, Sec. 24, was discussed in Vernor v Secretary of State, 179 Mich 157, 160; 146 NW 338 (1914), as follows: "What is the constitutional test? We think it is that a title must embrace the object of the act, and the body of the act must not be inconsistent with the title. The pertinent questions should be: Does the title of the act fairly indicate the purpose of the legislation? Is the title a fair index of the act? Does the title of the act fairly inform the legislators and the public of its purposes, as a whole?' 'Further, in Continental Motors Corp v Township of Muskegon, 376 Mich 170, 179; 135 NW2d 908 (1965), the Supreme Court stated: '. . . It is sufficient to say only that the title of a legislative act must give notice to legislators and others interested of [sic (1) the object of the law thereby assuring them that only matters germane to the object expressed in the title will be enacted into law.' (Emphasis added) 'and in Advisory Opinion re Constitutionality of 1972 PA 294, 389 Mich 441, 465; 208 NW2d 469 (1973): 'An act may include all matters germane to its object. It may include all those provisions which directly relate to, carry out and implement the principal object. . . . [T]he purpose of this constitutional limitation is to insure that both the legislators and the public have proper notice of legislative content and to prevent deceit and subterfuge.' (Emphasis added) 'See also Maki v city of East Tawas, 385 Mich 151; 188 NW2d 593 (1971); and the concurring opinion in Alan v Wayne County, 388 Mich 210, 371; 200 NW2d 628 (1972). The Alan court quotes from People v Mahaney, 13 Mich 481 (1865): '. . . The framers of the constitution meant . . . to require that in every case the proposed measure should stand upon its own merits, and that the legislature shall be fairly notified of its design when required to pass upon it.' 388 Mich 210, 377 (Emphasis the court's)' The purpose, in summary, of Const 1963, art 4, Sec. 24, is to place the Legislature and the public on notice of the object of the law, thereby assuring that only matters germane to the object noted in the title will become law. OAG, 1973-1974, No 4824, p 164 (July 24, 1974). There is nothing in the title of 1981 PA 230, supra, to suggest that its purpose included the revival of an expired program, namely, the home weatherization program or the continuation of the home weatherization program review board, which the Legislature had previously covered in legislation specifically devoted to that program and board. 1978 PA 615, supra. It is also to be observed that 1981 PA 230, supra, did not become effective until January 12, 1982, twelve days after 1978 PA 615, supra, expired pursuant to its own terms. (2) 1978 PA 615, Sec. 21, supra. This factor impacts those provisions of Const 1963, which regulate the legislative process, particularly, art 4, Secs. 22, 23, 26, and 33. Const 1963, art 4, Sec. 22, provides: 'All legislation shall be by bill and may originate in either house.' Const 1963, art 4, Sec. 23, provides: 'The style of the laws shall be: The People of the State of Michigan enact.' Const 1963, art 4, Sec. 26, provides: 'No bill shall be passed or become a law at any regular session of the legislature until it has been printed or reproduced and in the possession of each house for at least five days. Every bill shall be read three times in each house before the final passage thereof. No bill shall become a law without the concurrence of a majority of the members elected to and serving in each house. On the final passage of bills, the votes and names of the members voting thereon shall be entered in the journal.' Const 1963, art 4, Sec. 33, provides: 'Every bill passed by the legislature shall be presented to the governor before it becomes law, and the governor shall have 14 days measured in hours and minutes from the time of presentation in which to consider it. If he approves, he shall within that time sign and file it with the secretary of state and it shall become law. If he does not approve, and the legislature has within that time finally adjourned the session at which the bill was passed, it shall not become law. If he disapproves, and the legislature continues the session at which the bill was passed, he shall return it within such 14-day period with is objections, to the house in which it originated. That house shall enter such objections in full in its journal and reconsider the bill. If two-thirds of the members elected to and serving in that house pass the bill notwithstanding the objections of the governor, it shall be sent with the objections to the other house for reconsideration. The bill shall become law if passed by two-thirds of the members elected to and serving in that house. The vote of each house shall be entered in the journal with the votes and names of the members voting thereon. If any bill is not returned by the governor within such 14-day period, the legislature continuing in session, it shall become law as if he had signed it.' It is clear that 1981 PA 230, Sec. 5(o), supra, is on its face violative of Const 1963, art 4, Secs. 22, 23, 26, and 33, respectively. In answer to your question, it is my opinion that 1981 PA 230, Sec. 5(o), supra, has no legal effect because it is violative of Const 1963, art 4, Sec. 24 in that it undertakes to revive a former public act, namely, 1978 PA 615, supra, an object not contained in its title. It is my further opinion that 1981 PA 230, Sec. 5(o), supra, is also violative of Const 1963, art 4, Secs. 22, 23, 26, and 33, which set forth the requisite steps of the legislative process. Lacking evidence that the Legislature desired 1981 PA 230, supra, to be non-severable, it is concluded that the remaining provisions of said act are valid. Frank J. Kelley Attorney General (1)
(2)
It should be noted that the Legislature enacted HB 4910 on December 29, 1981 and the Governor approved the bill on January 12, 1982.
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