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The following opinion is presented on-line for informational use only and does not replace the official version. (Mich Dept of Attorney General Web Site - www.ag.state.mi.us)


STATE OF MICHIGAN

FRANK J. KELLEY, ATTORNEY GENERAL

Opinion No. 6129

February 24, 1983

INSURANCE:

No-fault act--rehabilitation benefits

No fault act--materials and services within scope of rehabilitation benefits

A person may receive rehabilitation benefits as part of his or her personal protection insurance benefits under the no-fault act upon sustaining bodily injury arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle.

Rehabilitation benefits as provided in the no-fault act include all reasonable charges for reasonably necessary products and services to restore an injured person to a condition of physical health, as well as useful and constructive activity within the limits of his or her physical disability through vocational or occupational retraining if reasonably necessary.

Honorable William Faust

State Senator

State Capitol

Lansing, Michigan

You have requested my opinion with respect to two questions regarding rehabilitation benefits under the Michigan no-fault insurance act, 1956 PA 218, added by 1972 PA 294; MCLA 500.3101 et seq; MSA 24.13101 et seq. Your first question is:

'Under what circumstances does an individual become entitled to rehabilitation benefits under the act?'

Under the compulsory no-fault act, supra, the owner or registrant of a motor vehicle is required to maintain, among other coverages, security for the payment of 'personal protection insurance' benefits. 1956 PA 218, supra, Sec. 3101(1); MCLA 500.3101(1); MSA 24.13101(1). Personal protection insurance benefits are payable upon accidental bodily injury 'arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle,' and are payable without regard to fault. 1956 PA 218, supra, Sec. 3105; MCLA 500.3105; MSA 24.13105.

The allowable expenses for which personal protection insurance benefits are payable under the no-fault insurance act, are set forth in 1956 PA 218, supra, Sec. 3107(a); MCLA 500.3107(a); MSA 24.13107(a), which provides that:

'Personal protection insurance benefits are payable for the following:

'(a) Allowable expenses consisting of all reasonable charges incurred for reasonably necessary products, services and accommodations for an injured person's care, recovery or rehabilitation. Allowable expenses within personal protection insurance coverage shall not include charges for a hospital room in excess of a reasonable and customary charge for semi-private accommodations except when the injured person requires special or intensive care, or charges for funeral and burial expenses in excess of $1,000.00.' (Emphasis added.)

Thus, 'rehabilitation' benefits are expressly encompassed within the personal protection insurance benefits, and consist of 'all 'reasonable charges' incurred for 'reasonably necessary products, services and accommodations' for an injured person's care, recovery or 'rehabilitation'.'

Circumstances under which persons are deemed not entitled to personal protection insurance benefits, including rehabilitation benefits, are set forth in 1956 PA 218, supra, Sec. 3113, MCLA 500.3113; MSA 24.13113, where it is provided that:

'A person is not entitled to be paid personal protection insurance benefits for accidental bodily injury if at the time of the accident any of the following circumstances existed:

'(a) The person was using a motor vehicle which he had taken unlawfully, unless he reasonably believed that he was entitled to take and use the vehicle.

'(b) The person was the owner or registrant of a motor vehicle involved in the accident with respect to which the security required by subsections (3) and (4) of section 3101 was not in effect.

'(c) The person was not a resident of this state, was an occupant of a motor vehicle not registered in this state and was not insured by an insurer which has filed a certification in compliance with section 3163.' (Footnotes omitted.)

Further, 'benefits provided or required to be provided under the laws of any state or the federal government' are to be subtracted from the personal protection insurance benefits otherwise payable for the injury. 1956 PA 218, supra, Sec. 3109(1); MCLA 500.3109(1); MSA 24.13109(1). Here it should be noted that the federal vocational rehabilitation act of 1973, as amended, 29 USC 721(8) requires that consideration be given by the state to eligible benefits under other programs prior to provision of rehabilitation services pursuant to federally funded state plans. In addition, the State Rehabilitation Act of 1964, 1964 PA 232, Sec. 4(3), as amended by 1982 PA 315; MCLA 395.84; MSA 15.859(4) provides in pertinent part that:

'If an insurer or self-insurer is responsible under applicable state or federal auto insurance law for the provision of vocational rehabilitation services to an injured person, and the services are provided by the state board, the state board shall collect fees from the responsible insurer or self-insurer in an amount equal to the full costs of providing the vocational rehabilitation services.'

Under this section it is clear that the State Board of Education in administering the state's vocational rehabilitation program is entitled to collect the full cost of providing the vocational rehabilitation services from an insurance company, provided the insurance carrier is responsible for vocational rehabilitation under Michigan's no-fault act.

In answer to your first question, it is my opinion that a person, not otherwise excluded, becomes entitled to rehabilitation benefits as a part of his personal protection insurance benefits under 1956 PA 218, supra, Sec. 3107(a) upon sustaining bodily injury arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle.

Your second question is:

'What materials and services are included in the scope of rehabilitation benefits?'

It is a well-established rule of statutory construction that words of a statute are to be given their plain and ordinary meaning in the absence of contrary legislative intent. Bingham v American Screw Products Co, 398 Mich 546, 563; 248 NW2d 537 (1976); Goethal v Kent County Supervisors, 361 Mich 104, 111; 104 NW2d 794 (1960). In interpreting statutes, all words and phrases should be construed according to common and approved usage of the language. Fuller Central Park Properties v City of Birmingham, 97 Mich App 517, 524; 296 NW2d 88 (1980). The meaning of a statute must be gleaned from plain meaning of words, with punctuation, read in harmony with the statute as a whole, from expressed legislative objectives, and from a common-sense application of the law. General Motors Corp v Erves, 399 Mich 241, 253-254; 249 NW2d 41 (1976).

'Rehabilitation' has been defined as follows:

'Rehabilitation: b: the physical restoration of a sick or disabled person by therapeutic measures and reeducation to participation in the activities of a normal life within the limitations of his physical disability, c: the process of restoring an individual (as a convict, mental patient, or disaster victim) to a useful and constructive place in society through some form of vocational, correctional, or therapeutic retraining or through relief, financial aid, or other reconstructive measure, d: the restoration of something damaged or deteriorated to a prior good condition: improvement to a higher level or greater value, Webster's Third New International Dictionary.

'Rehabilitate' has been defined as meaning:

'rehabilitate: to restore: 3. to put back in good condition; reestablish on a firm sound basis. 4. a) to bring or restore to a normal or optimum state of health, constructive activity, etc, by medical treatment and physical or psychological therapy, b) to prepare (the handicapped or disadvantaged) for useful employment by vocational counseling, training, etc. Webster's New World Dictionary.

'rehabilitate: 1a: to restore to a former capacity: b: to restore to a condition of health or useful and constructive activity. Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary.

Further, 'rehabilitation,' given its ordinary meaning, has been held to mean the restoration of an individual to his greatest potential, whether physically, mentally, socially, or vocationally. Jones v Grinnell Corp, 117 R.I. 44, 51; 362 A2d 139, 143 (1976), See Lane v Levi Strauss & Co, 92 NM 504, 507; 590 P2d 652, 655 (1979).

Thus the statutory term 'rehabilitation' under 1956 PA 218, supra, Sec. 3107(a), in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning, must be interpreted in a broad sense to embrace comprehensive care and services reasonably necessary to restore the injured person not only to a condition of physical health, in keeping within the limitation of his or her physical disability, but also, to restore that person to useful and constructive activity through occupational retraining if necessary. Had the legislature intended to narrowly restrict the interpretation to be given 'rehabilitation', they could have done so by expressly providing for only 'medical' rehabilitation or 'physical' rehabilitation, for example. The broad interpretation to be given 'rehabilitation' finds convincing support in 1956 PA 218, supra, Sec. 3157, MCLA 500.3157; MSA 24.13157, which provides that:

'A physician, hospital, clinic or other person or institution lawfully rendering treatment to an injured person for an accidental bodily injury covered by personal protection insurance, and a person or institution providing rehabilitative occupational training following the injury, may charge a reasonable amount for the products, services and accommodations rendered. The charge shall not exceed the amount the person or institution customarily charges for like products, services and accommodations in cases not involving insurance.' (Emphasis added.)

Thus, 1956 PA 218, Sec. 3157, supra, makes clear that a person or institution providing rehabilitative occupational training following an injury may charge under the no-fault act a reasonable amount for the products, services and accommodations rendered in providing rehabilitative occupational training, which the no-fault insurer must cover.

The no-fault insurance act was enacted to provide a comprehensive scheme of compensation designated to provide sure and speedy recovery of certain economic losses resulting from motor vehicle accidents. Belcher v Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, 409 Mich 231, 240; 293 NW2d 594 (1980). The objective of any such compensation system is to return the accident victim, as far as possible, to his or her pre-injury status. For many accident victims such as those who sustained permanent physical disability, that effort must go beyond mere medical treatment to include other forms of counseling, reeducation, and retraining so as to restore the person to useful and constructive activity within the limits of his or her physical disability. The precise scope of such a rehabilitative effort may be assessed only on a case by case basis. The scope shall not exceed 'reasonable charges' for 'reasonably necessary' products, services, and accommodations for the injured person's rehabilitation. It must be recognized that the no-fault insurance act is remedial in nature and must be liberally construed in favor of persons intended to be benefited thereby. Bierbusse v Farmers Insurance Group of Companies, 84 Mich App 34, 37; 269 NW2d 297 (1978).

I am aware that the Insurance Bureau, in a June 15, 1981 Informational Statement, Insurance Bureau Bulletin 81-15, addressed the scope of rehabilitation benefits under the no-fault insurance act. This bulletin stated that vocational rehabilitation costs incurred as a result of an auto accident are covered expenses under the no-fault act so long as the rehabilitative services are reasonable and necessary, although vocational rehabilitation benefits which an injured person receives under workers' compensation may be set off against the vocational rehabilitation benefits payable under no-fault insurance. I am in agreement with that administrative interpretation which states that the insurer is responsible to pay all reasonable charges for reasonably necessary services in connection with rehabilitation.

Therefore, in answer to your second question, it is my opinion that rehabilitation benefits, as provided for in 1956 PA 218, supra, Sec. 3107(a), includes all reasonable charges for reasonably necessary products and services to restore an injured person to a condition of physical health, as well as useful and constructive activity within the limits of his or her physical disability through vocational or occupational retraining, if reasonable and necessary.

Frank J. Kelley

Attorney General

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