May a police officer submit a sworn statement in lieu of appearing at an informal hearing under the provisions of 1949 PA 300, Sec. 746 on a traffic citation issued by the officer?

'(1) The judge, referee, or district court shall conduct the informal hearing in an informal manner so as to do substantial justice according to the rules of substantive law. . . .

'(3) [T]he citing police agency . . . may subpoena witnesses for the plaintiff. The defendant may also subpoena witnesses. . . .

'(4) If the judge, referee, or district court magistrate determines by a preponderance of the evidence that the person cited is responsible for a civil infraction, the judge, referee, or magistrate shall enter an order against the person as provided in section 907. . . .'

'In almost every setting where important decisions turn on questions of fact, due process requires an opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. E.g., ICC v Louisville & N. R. Co., 227 US 88, 93-94, 57 L Ed 431, 434, 33 S Ct 185 (1913); Willner v Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 US 96, 103-104, 10 L Ed 2d 22, 229, 230, 83 S Ct 1175, 2 ALR3d 1254 (1963). What we said in Greene v McElroy, 360 US 474, 496-497, 3 L Ed 2d 1377, 1390, 1391, 79 S Ct 1400 (1959), is particularly pertinent here:

'Certain principles have remained relatively immutable in our jurisprudence. One of these is that where governmental action seriously injures an individual, and the reasonableness of the action depends on fact findings, the evidence used to prove the Government's case must be disclosed to the individual so that he has an opportunity to show that it is untrue. While this is important in the case of documentary evidence, it is even more important where the evidence consists of the testimony of individuals whose memory might be faulty or who, in fact, might be perjurers or persons motivated by malice, vindictiveness, intolerance, prejudice, or jealousy. We have formalized these protections in the requirements of confrontation and cross-examination. They have ancient roots. They find expression in the Sixth Amendment. . . . This Court has been zealous to protect these rights from erosion. It has spoken out not only in criminal cases, . . . but also in all types of cases where administrative . . . actions were under scrutiny." (Emphasis added.)

"'Unless the right is waived, the person charged is at least entitled to:

"'(1) Notice of a time and place of hearing.

"'(2) A hearing before a properly authorized body.

"'(3) A reasonably definite statement of the charge or charges preferred against the accused.

"'(4) The right to cross-examine the witnesses who testify against him.

"'(5) The right to produce witnesses in his own behalf.

"'(6) A full consideration and a fair determination according to the evidence of the controversy by the body before whom the hearing is had.' Hanson v. State Board of Registration in Medicine (1931), 253 Mich 601, 607." (Emphasis added.)