Whether the conviction of a felony crime under 1956 PA 218, Sec. 8090(2), supra, constitutes an 'infamous crime' under the provisions of 1954 PA 116, Sec. 368, supra, a creating a vacancy in the township office held by the person so convicted?

'The township offices become vacant upon the happening of any of the following events: . . . his conviction of an infamous crime. . . .' [Emphasis added.]

'Any person who shall wilfully make a false statement of any material fact or thing in a sworn statement as to the death or disability of a certificate holder in any such society for the purpose of procuring payment of a benefit named in the certificate of such holder, and any person who shall wilfully make any false statement in any verified report or declaration under oath required or authorized by this chapter, elsewhere than by sections 8087 or 8088, shall be guilty of perjury and shall be proceeded against and punished as provided by the statutes of this state in relation to the crime of perjury.' [Emphasis added.]

'The reason for the enactment of Act No. 172, Laws of 1851 (Ex. Sess.) (1 Comp. Laws 1929, Sec. 3350), providing that every office shall become vacant upon the conviction of the incumbent of any infamous crime is well stated in State, ex rel. Anderson, v. Fousek, 91 Mont. 448 (8 Pac. [2d] 791, 84 A. L. R. 303), where it was held the underlying principle is that the security of government depends upon respect for laws and the confidence of the people in public officers. The legislature has declared, in effect, that that confidence cannot extend to an officer convicted of a felony. State, ex. rel. Blake, v. Levi, 109 W. Va. 277 (153 S. E. 587). Nor can the people generally have proper respect for laws if their officers treat the laws with indifference. The reason for the rule applies equally to one convicted under the Federal law and under the State law. Act No. 172, Laws of 1851 (Ex. Sess.) (1 Comp. Laws 1929, Sec. 3350), does not say an officer may be removed from office. It does not provide that somebody must declare a vacancy therein exists. It establishes a legislative rule, a declaration that every office shall become vacant before the expiration of the term of such office upon the conviction of the incumbent of any infamous crime. When the incumbent of the office during the term thereof is convicted of any infamous crime, his office thereby becomes vacant.

'An innocent man who is unjustly convicted of a felony is doubly unfortunate, but that he may ultimately succeed in establishing his innocence does not entitle him in the meantime to hold on to a public office. The law allows an appeal from a conviction of a felony, but if the person so convicted is the incumbent of a public office, these considerations do not weigh in favor of retaining him in that position pending an appeal. McKannay v. Horton, 151 Cal. 711 (91 Pac. 598, 13 L. R. A. [N. S.] 661, 121 Am. St. Rep. 146).' [Emphasis added.]

Whether the Governor, when reviewing the evidence submitted, should also consider the punishment given the convicted person, in determining the removal of a township officer, under the provisions of 1954 PA 116, Sec. 369, supra?

'The governor shall remove a township officer chosen by the electors of any township . . . when it appears by a certified copy of the judgment of a court of record of this state that the officer, after the officer's election or appointment, was convicted of a felony. The governor shall not take action upon the charges made against the officer until the charges are exhibited in writing, verified by the affidavit of the party making the charges that the party believes the charges to be true. . . . The service of the charges upon the officer shall be made by handing to the officer a copy of the charges, together with the affidavits or exhibits which may be attached to the original petition if the officer can be found; . . . An officer who has been removed in accordance with this section shall not be eligible for election or appointment to an office for a period of three years after the date of removal from office.'

'If the office of county clerk was vacant, relator could not be removed therefrom. One may not be removed from an office he is not in. An office is vacant when it is empty,--when it is unoccupied,--when there is no one who, of right, may exercise its functions. No proceedings under the removal statute were proper or necessary if the office was vacant. The office became vacant by the conduct, action or status of the erstwhile occupant. The statute of removal provides the governor may remove a county clerk from office 'whenever it shall appear by a certified copy of the jugment of a court of record of this State that such officer, after his election or appointment, shall have been convicted of a felony,' while the statute relating to vacancies provides the office shall become vacant upon the conviction of the occupant of any infamous crime. 1 Comp. Laws 1929, Sec. 3350.' [Emphasis added.]