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The following opinion is presented on-line for informational use only and does not replace the official version. (Mich Dept of Attorney General Web Site - www.ag.state.mi.us)


STATE OF MICHIGAN

FRANK J. KELLEY, ATTORNEY GENERAL

Opinion No. 6310

July 29, 1985

CONSERVATION CORPS:

Validity of repeal of provisions of the act upon a future date

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:

Const 1963, art 4, Sec. 24--notice of repeal of statute in title of act

EMPLOYMENT SECURITY:

Repeal of provisions relating to definition of credit week for unemployment compensation benefit purposes

SUNSET LAW:

Notice of sunset provision in title of act

WORKER'S DISABILITY COMPENSATION ACT:

Repeal of provision requiring certain employers to participate in safety education and training programs

YOUTH CORPS ACT:

Validity of repeal of act upon future date certain

MCL 421.50(c)(5); MSA 17.554(c)(5), which purports to repeal upon a future date certain provisions relating to the definition of credit week for unemployment compensation benefit purposes, is unconstitutional because it was enacted and amended in violation of Const 1963, art 4, Sec. 24, and is, therefore, of no force and effect. The remaining portions of MCL 421.50(c); MSA 17.554(c), continue in full force and effect.

MCL 418.552a; MSA 17.237(552a), which provides for the expiration upon a future date of the statutory obligation of certain employers to participate in safety education and training programs, is unconstitutional because it was enacted in violation of Const 1963, art 4, Sec. 24, and is, therefore, of no force and effect. The remaining portions of MCL 418.552a; MSA 17.237(552a), continue in full force and effect.

MCL 409.229; MSA 17.759, which provides that the remaining provisions of the Michigan Youth Corps Act shall be repealed on October 1, 1986, is unconstitutional because it was enacted and amended in violation of Const 1963, art 4, Sec. 24 and is, therefore, of no force and effect. The remaining provisions of the Michigan Youth Corps Act continue in full force and effect.

MCL 409.314; MSA 17.644, which provides that the Michigan Conservation Corps Act shall expire on January 1, 1986, is unconstitutional because it was enacted and amended in violation of Const 1963, art 4, Sec. 24, and is, therefore, of no force and effect. The remaining provisions of the Michigan Conservation Corps Act continue in full force and effect.

Honorable Frederick P. Dillingham

State Representative

The Capitol

Lansing, Michigan

You have requested my opinion upon four questions, each of which will be responded to separately and sequentially. Your first question is:

'The Michigan Employment Security Act (Act 1 of 1936) contains a section [421.50(c)] that provides for the 'sunset' of the definition of a credit week on January 3, 1987. In view of your July 2, 1985 letter to Governor Blanchard in which you stated that the 'sunset' provisions in the disability sections of the Workers' Disability Compensation Act are unconstitutional because the title of the bill did not inform the legislators and the public of the 'sunset' provision, what is the legal status of the provision in MCL Section 421.50(c) that provides for a sunset of the definition of credit weeks in light of the fact that the title of that act does not inform the legislators or the public of that 'sunset' provision?'

MCL 421.50(c); MSA 17.554(c), provides:

'Notwithstanding subsection (b), for weeks of unemployment beginning January 2, 1983, 'credit week' means a calendar week of an individual's base period during which the individual earned wages equal to or greater than 30 times the state minimum hourly wage in effect on the first day of the calendar week in which the individual filed an application for benefits subject to the following:

'(1) If an individual earns wages from more than 1 employer in a credit week, that week shall be counted as 1 multiemployer credit week and shall be governed by the provisions of section 20(d), unless the individual has earned sufficient wages in the base period with only 1 of the employers for whom the individual performed services in the week of concurrent employment to entitle the individual to a maximum weekly benefit rate for his or her family class, in which case the week shall be a credit week with respect to that employer only and not to a multiemployer credit week.

'(2) Not more than 35 uncanceled and uncharged credit weeks shall be counted as credit weeks. In determining the 35 credit weeks to be used for computing and paying benefits, credit weeks shall be counted in the following sequence:

(a) First, all credit weeks which are not multiemployer credit weeks and which were earned with employers not involved in a disqualifying act or discharge under section 29(1), and all credit weeks earned with an employer involved in such a disqualifying act or discharge which were earned subsequent to the last act or discharge in which the employer was involved, shall be counted in inverse order of most recent employment with each employer.

(b) Second, if the credit weeks counted under paragraph (a) total less than 35, all credit weeks which are not multiemployer credit weeks and which were earned with each employer before a disqualifying act or discharge shall be counted, in inverse order to that in which the most recent disqualifying act or discharge with each employer occurred, to the extent necessary to use all available credit weeks with respect to the employers, or a total of 35 credit weeks, whichever is less.

(c) Third, if the credit weeks counted under paragraphs (a) and (b) total less than 35, all multiemployer credit weeks shall be counted, in inverse chronological order of their occurrence, to the extent necessary to count all available credit weeks, or a total of 35 credit weeks, whichever is less.

'(3) As used in this subsection:

(a) 'Uncharged credit week' means a credit week which has not been used as a basis for a benefit payment, a reduction of benefits under section 29(4), or a penalty disqualification under section 62(b).

(b) 'Uncanceled credit week' means a credit week which is not canceled in accordance with section 62(b).

'(4) There shall not be counted toward the wages required to establish a credit week under this subsection payments in the form of termination, separation, severance, or dismissal allowances; nor shall there be counted any payments for a vacation or a holiday unless the payment has been made, or the right to receive it has irrevocably vested, within 14 days following the vacation or holiday.

'(5) This subsection shall not apply to benefit years beginning after January 3, 1987.'

The letter opinion addressed to Governor James J. Blanchard, dated July 2, 1985, to which you have referred, concluded that in order to be in compliance with Const 1963, art 4, Sec. 24, the title to a bill to amend a particular section of a statute must give notice to the members of the Legislature and to the people of its purpose not only to amend particular sections of a statute, but also to repeal those sections of the statute on a future date certain.

Your question relates to subparagraph (5) of MCL 421.50(c); MSA 17.554(c). As originally enacted, MCL 421.50; MSA 17.554 did not contain a subsection (c). It was added by 1980 PA 358.

It is noted that the title to 1980 PA 358 stated that it was an act to amend sections 5, 27, 28, 29, 35, 36, 46 and 50 of Act No. 1 of the Public Acts of the Extra Session of 1936 and to add sections 68, 69 and 70. It contained no notice of the repeal of any provision of the Act. Similarly, 1982 PA 535 contained a comparable title giving notice of purpose to amend, inter alia, section 50 of Act No. 1 of the Public Acts of the Extra Session of 1936 'and to repeal certain acts and parts of acts.' Enacting section 2 of 1982 PA 535 repealed MCL 421.68; MSA 17.568 and MCL 421.69; MSA 17.569.

The authority of the Legislature to amend or repeal MCL 421.50(c); MSA 17.554(c), may not be questioned. Detroit v Detroit & H P R Co, 43 Mich 140; 5 NW 275 (1880).

The term 'amend' and the term 'repeal' are words of art with settled meanings. The repeal of a law destroys the law; an amendment, inter alia, keeps it alive. State v Baker, 71 ND 153; 299 NW 574 (1941); Rains v Contra Costa County, 37 Cal 2d 263; 531 P2d 55 (1951). An amendment implies continuation of the original plan and purpose of the law, with changes or corrections to better accomplish its purpose. Kelly v Laing, 259 Mich 212; 242 NW 891 (1932). Repeal, on the other hand, is the abrogation or annulling of a previously existing law by enactment of a subsequent statute. Heiden v Common Council of City of Wauwatosa, 37 Wis 2d 466; 155 NW2d 17 (1967).

The Legislature has not defined the term 'apply' in MCL 421.50(c)(5); MSA 17.554(c)(5). Its commonly understood meaning is 'to bring into action . . . to put into effect.' Webster's Third New International Dictionary. Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed, notes that the term 'apply' has several meanings, and is used in connection with statutes in two senses:

'The word 'apply' is used in connection with statutes in two senses. When construing a statute, in describing the class of persons, things, or functions which are within its scope; as that the statute does not 'apply' to transactions in interstate commerce. When discussing the use made of a statute, in referring to the process by which the statute is made operative; as where the jury is told to 'apply' the statute of limitation if they find that the cause of action arose before a given date.'

The fair import of subsection (c)(5) is that after January 3, 1987, MCL 421.50(c); MSA 17.554(c), shall be abrogated, annulled, and, in effect, repealed.

Const 1963, art 4, Sec. 24 requires that no law shall embrace more than one object, which shall be expressed in its title. The purpose of this provision is to give fair notice of law's purposes as a whole. Vernor v Secretary of State, 179 Mich 157; 146 NW 338 (1914). The history of Const 1963, art 4, Sec. 24, and its predecessor provisions demonstrates that its objective is to provide notice to the members of the Legislature and to the public of legislation under consideration irrespective of legislative merit. Anderson v Oakland County Clerk, 419 Mich 313, 329; 353 NW2d 448 (1984).

Here pertinent is the case of Brooks v Hydorn, 76 Mich 273; 42 NW 1122 (1889), where the court stated, at p 278:

'No one, in reading the title of this act while it was a bill before the Legislature, would have been apprised that the offices of respondent and Justice Hughes were not only to be abolished, but that they were to be deprived of holding the same after the fourth day of July, 1889. If one can gather from the clause in the title in relation to the repeal of the act of 1881, which provided for four justices, that the intention and purport of the bill might be to decrease the number of justices from four to two, yet there is not the slightest hint therein that any of the justices already in office should be deprived of their terms, or, if so, which one, or two, of them was thus to be legislated out of office. The notice in the title, which the Constitution imperatively requires, was therefore not given, and the plain purpose of the constitutional mandate evaded and violated.

'This purpose of the constitutional direction, which has been disregarded in this act, is that the intent of the bill--its object--shall be clearly shown by its title, for the benefit, not only of the members of the Legislature who are to vote upon it, but also for the benefit of the people of the State outside of the Legislature, who are interested, and have a right to be, in all legislation, whether the same be general or special.' (Emphasis added.)

See also, Knott v City of Flint, 363 Mich 483; 109 NW2d 908 (1961).

The constitutional test to be employed was delineated in Vernor v Secretary of State, 179 Mich at 160:

'What is the constitutional test? We think it is that a title must embrace the object of the act, and the body of the act must not be inconsistent with the title. The pertinent questions should be Does the title of the act fairly indicate the purpose of the legislation? Is the title a fair index of the act? Does the title of the act fairly inform the legislators and the public of its purposes, as a whole?' (Emphasis added.)

See, State Mutual Rodded Fire Insurance Co v Foster, 267 Mich 118, 121; 255 NW 174 (1934).

'The purpose of the constitutional requirement that the object of a law shall be expressed in its title is not accomplished by the mere fact that the object of the law may be discovered by a reading of the body of the act.' Leininger v Secretary of State, 316 Mich 644, 649-650; 26 NW2d 348 (1947).

If the object of the act as passed is fully expressed in its title, it is immaterial that the form of the title may have been amended at some stage of legislative consideration. Attorney General v Rice, 64 Mich 385; 31 NW 203 (1887); People v McElroy, 72 Mich 446; 40 NW 750 (1888).

The title to an act which partially repealed a statutory exemption was held to be defective under Fla Const, art 3, Sec. 6, comparable, in pertinent part, to Const 1963, art 4, Sec. 24, because it did not give notice thereof to legislators and the public. United Gas Pipe Line Co v Bevis, 336 So2d 561 (Fla, 1976).

The salutory purposes sought to be achieved by Const 1963, art 4, Sec. 24 are not to be subverted. People v E L Rice Co, 33 Mich App 699, 702; 190 NW2d 309 (1971).

Both amendatory 1980 PA 385 and 1982 PA 535 gave the members of the Legislature and the public notice of intent to continue and to make changes and corrections in the provisions of MCL 421.50; MSA 17.554, but they gave no notice of intent to abrogate, annul, and, thus, repeal subsection (c) thereof after a certain date.

The repeal provision of MCL 421.50(c); MSA 17.554(c), is not within the ambit of the title to either 1980 PA 385 or 1982 PA 535. It goes without saying that Const 1963, art 4, Sec. 24 does not require the title of an act to contain an index of all of its provisions, as long as the provisions are consistent with the object of the act as expressed in its title. People v Andrea, 48 Mich App 310, 323; 210 NW2d 474 (1973), lv den, 391 Mich 788 (1974).

It follows that the provisions contained in 1980 PA 385, Sec. 1, and 1982 PA 535, which repeal subsection (c) of MCL 421.50; MSA 17.554, on a date certain, are unconstitutional because they were enacted in violation of Const 1963, art 4, Sec. 24. Since both amendatory acts contained numerous other amendments to 1936 Ex Sess PA 1, which are complete, independent and capable of execution, People v McMurchy, 249 Mich 147; 228 NW 723 (1930); OAG, 1979-1980, No 5688, p 723 (April 21, 1980), it must be concluded that they are severable.

The Legislature may by bill expressly repeal subsection (c) of MCL 421.50; MSA 17.554, effective on whatever day it may select, provided, however, that proper notice of the intended repeal is conveyed to the members of the Legislature and to the people in the title as required by Const 1963, art 4, Sec. 24.

In answer to your first question, it is my opinion that MCL 421.50(c)(5); MSA 17.554(c)(5), is unconstitutional because it was enacted and amended contrary to Const 1963, art 4, Sec. 24, and that it is, therefore, of no force or effect. It is my further opinion that the remaining portions of MCL 421.50(c); MSA 17.554(c) continue in full force and effect.

Your second question is:

'The Workers' Disability Compensation Act (Act 317 of 1969) contains a section (418.552a) that provides for the 'sunset' of a provision that requires certain employers to participate in safety education and training programs effective January 1, 1986. In review of your July 2, 1985 opinion discussed above, what is the legal status of the provision in MCL Section 418.552a that provides for a January 1, 1986 'sunset' date in light of the fact that the title of that act does not inform the legislators or the public of that 'sunset' provision?'

In response to your question, it will be assumed that your concern is not with respect to when the safety education and training program began, but, rather, when it is scheduled to terminate.

MCL 418.552a; MSA 17.237(552a), provides:

'An employer whose liability is limited by the application of the silicosis, dust disease, and logging industry compensation fund shall be required to participate in safety education and training programs or to utilize services provided by the department of labor pursuant to section 54 of Act No. 154 of the Public Acts of 1974, as amended, being section 408.1054 of the Michigan Compiled Laws. This section shall expire January 1, 1986.'

This section was added to the Worker's Disability Compensation Act of 1969 by 1980 PA 357, the title of which provides:

'AN ACT to amend sections 161, 205, 251, 261, 301, 321, 351, 355, 361, 371, 381, 401, 435, 441, 501, 531, 535, 545, 551, 552, 858, and 859 of Act No. 317 of the Public Acts of 1969, entitled as amended 'An act to revise and consolidate the laws relating to worker's disability compensation; and to repeal certain acts and parts of act,' section 161 as amended by Act No. 21 of the Public Acts of 1976, sections 251 and 261 as amended by Act No. 456 of the Public Acts of 1978, section 351 as amended by Act No. 393 of the Public Acts of 1976, section 435 as amended by Act No. 337 of the Public Acts of 1972, sections 501 and 551 as amended by Act No. 149 of the Public Acts of 1971, and section 531 as amended by Act No. 62 of the Public Acts of 1979, being sections 418.161, 418.205, 418.251, 418.261, 418.301, 418.321, 418.351, 418.355, 418.361, 418.371, 418.381, 418.401, 418.435, 418.441, 418.501, 418.531, 418.535, 418.545, 418.551, 418.552, 418.858, and 418.859 of the Compiled Laws of 1970; to add sections 313, 352, 356, 358, 372, 373, 391, 552a, and 552b; and to repeal certain acts and parts of acts.'

MCL 418.552a; MSA 17.237(552a), has not been thereafter amended.

Although the title to 1980 PA 357 gave notice to the members of the Legislature and to the public that section 552a was being added to the Worker's Disability Compensation Act of 1969, it gave no notice that said provisions were also being prospectively repealed as of January 1, 1986.

The reasoning employed in the answer to your first question is equally applicable here. The term 'expire,' which means to become void through the passage of time, Webster's Third New International Dictionary, is yet another expression to indicate an intent to repeal MCL 418.552a; MSA 17.237(552a) on January 1, 1986. Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed, defines 'expiration' as:

'Cessation; termination from mere lapse of time, as the expiration of a lease, insurance policy, statute, and the like. Coming to close; termination or end.'

The members of the Legislature and the public must be fairly informed of the provision to be enacted. If the Legislature intends that a statutory provision to be added by the bill is to be repealed after a certain date, the Legislature must give notice in the title of its purpose to repeal such provision as of a future date certain. Since such notice was not given, the last sentence of MCL 418.552a; MSA 17.237(552a), was enacted in violation of Const 1963, art 4, Sec. 24. Inasmuch as the remaining portions of 1980 PA 357 are complete, independent, and capable of execution, it is concluded that they are severable and, therefore, remain in full force and effect. OAG, 1979-1980, No 5688, supra.

If the Legislature desires to repeal the subject section, it may accomplish this by passage of an appropriate bill meeting the requirements of Const 1963, art 4, Sec. 24.

In answer to your second question, it is my opinion that the last sentence, i.e., the expiration provision, of MCL 418.552a; MSA 17.237(552a), is unconstitutional because it was enacted in violation of Const 1963, art 4, Sec. 24, and is, therefore, of no force and effect. It is my further opinion that the remaining portions of MCL 418.552a; MSA 17.237(552a), remain in full force and effect.

Your third question is:

'The Michigan Youth Corps [Act] (Act 69 of 1983) contains sections (409.221-409.228) that 'sunset' September 30, 1986. In view of your July 2, 1985 opinion discussed above, what is the legal status of MCL Sections 409.221-409.228 that 'sunset' September 30, 1986 in the light of the fact that the title of that act does not inform the legislators or the public of the 'sunset provision?'

The title to the Michigan Youth Corps Act, 1983 PA 69; MCL 409.221 et seq; MSA 17.751 et seq, provides:

'AN ACT to establish the Michigan youth corps program for the purpose of providing summer employment and work training for the youth in this state; to prescribe the powers and duties of certain state officers and state departments; and to provide for penalties.'

MCL 409.229; MSA 17.759, provides:

'Sections 1 through 8 shall not apply after September 30, 1983.'

It is noted that this section was amended by 1984 PA 220 to substitute '1984' for '1983.' 1984 PA 220 also repealed MCL 409.230; MSA 17.760, which stated that the Act shall not take effect unless 1983 SB 195 is enacted into law. The compiler notes that SB 195 was enacted into law as 1983 PA 71, amending MCL 421.43; MSA 17.547, which deals with services which are excluded from the term 'employment' for purposes of the Michigan Employment Security Act.

The legislative history of the enactment of MCL 409.221 et seq; MSA 17.751 et seq, is instructive. As originally introduced, 1983 SB 151, as indicated in its title, proposed to establish a summer youth employment program grant fund for the establishment of youth employment programs to perform conservation work on public lands. Neither the title nor the contents of the original bill contained any reference to nonapplication, expiration, termination, annulment, abrogation, or repeal of its provisions. The Senate enacted Substitute (H-4) containing a section 9 to provide that sections 1 through 8 shall not apply after September 30, 1983. 1 SJ 932, 936 (1983). The House passed a Substitute (H-2) to SB 151, retaining section 9 without change. 2 HJ 1102 (1983). The Senate concurred in the substitute. 2 SJ 1013 (1983). Although the title to SB 151 as substituted by the house was amended, no notice was included in the title at any legislative stage that sections 1 through 8 would not apply after September 30, 1983.

As previously noted, the Legislature amended the Michigan Youth Corps Act, MCL 409.229; MSA 17.759, by 1984 PA 220 to substitute '1984' for '1983.' The title to 1984 PA 220 stated, in part, that it was an act to amend 'sections 2, 3, 4, 6 and 9 of Act No. 69 of the Public Acts of 1983.' It did not give notice that after September 30, 1984 sections 1 through 8 of the Michigan Youth Corps Act were not to 'apply.'

As its title indicates, 1985 PA 28 amended sections '2, 4, 6 and 9 of Act No. 69 of the Public Acts of 1983, to substitute '1986' for '1984" in MCL 409.229; MSA 17.759. The title to 1985 PA 28 gave no notice of the repeal, of MCL 409.221-409.228; MSA 17.751-17.758.

The Legislature has not seen fit to define the term 'apply' as it is used in MCL 409.229; MSA 17.759. As the foregoing discussion with respect to your first question indicates, it must be concluded that the manifest intent of the Legislature was that these sections are repealed as of September 30, 1986. The titles to neither the Michigan Youth Corps Act nor amendatory 1984 PA 220 nor 1985 PA 28 gave any notice whatsoever of the repeal of sections 1 through 8 of the Michigan Youth Corps Act on October 1, 1983 or October 1, 1984, respectively. It follows that, under the analysis explicated in the answer to your first question, MCL 409.229; MSA 17.759, was enacted and amended in violation of Const 1963, art 4, Sec. 24. Because the remaining provisions of the Michigan Job Corps Act, amendatory 1984 PA 220 and amendatory 1985 PA 28 are complete, independent and capable of being executed, the respective acts are severable. OAG, 1979-1980, No 5688, supra.

The Legislature may, if it chooses, repeal the Michigan Youth Corps Act effective October 1, 1986, or upon such other date it may select, provided that it observes the notice requirements of Const 1963, art 4, Sec. 24.

In answer to your third question, it is my opinion that MCL 409.229; MSA 17.759, and as last amended by 1984 PA 220 and 1985 PA 28, is unconstitutional because it was enacted and amended in violation of Const 1963, art 4, Sec. 24, and is, therefore, of no force and effect. It is my further opinion that MCL 409.221-409.228; MSA 17.751-17-758, remain in full force and effect.

Your fourth question is:

'The Michigan Conservation Corps Act (Act 22 of 1984) provides for the 'sunset' of sections 409.301-409.314 effective December 31, 1987. In view of your July 2, 1985 opinion discussed above, what is the legal status of MCL Sections 409.301-409-314 in light of the fact that the title of that act does not inform the legislators or the public of the 'sunset' provision?'

The title to the Michigan Conservation Corps Act, 1984 PA 22; MCL 409.301 et seq; MSA 17.631 et seq, states:

'AN ACT to establish the Michigan conservation corps; to prescribe the powers and duties of certain state officers, agencies, and departments; to provide for penalties; and to provide for an appropriation.'

MCL 409.314; MSA 17.644, provides:

'This Act shall not apply after December 31, 1985.'

1985 PA 30 amended MCL 409.314; MSA 17.644, to substitute '1987' for '1985.'

The title to 1985 PA 30 provides:

'AN ACT to amend the title and sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 9, and 14 of Act No. 22 of the Public Acts of 1984, entitled 'An act to establish the Michigan conservation corps; to prescribe the powers and duties of certain state officers, agencies, and departments; to provide for penalties; and to provide for an appropriation,' being sections 409.301, 409.302, 409.303, 409.304, 409.306, 409.309, and 409.314 of the Michigan Compiled Laws.'

Neither the title to 1984 PA 22 nor the title to 1985 PA 30, respectively, gave notice that the Act shall be repealed on a date certain.

Under the analysis set out in the answer to your first question, when the Legislature provides that an act 'shall not apply' after a certain date, it is to be presumed that it intends that the act be repealed. Since the Legislature has not provided notice to its members and to the public that the Michigan Civilian Conservation Corps Act shall be repealed as of a future date certain, MCL 409.314; MSA 17.644, as last amended by 1985 PA 30, was enacted and amended in violation of Const 1963, art 4, Sec. 24. Inasmuch as the remaining provisions of the Michigan Civilian Conservation Corps Act and 1985 PA 30 are complete, independent and capable of execution, they are, perforce, severable. OAG, 1979-1980, No 5688, supra.

The Legislature may, if it so desires, repeal the Michigan Civilian Conservation Corps Act, effective January 1, 1988, or any other date it may choose, provided, however, that it observes the notice requirements of Const 1963, art 4, Sec. 24.

In answer to your fourth question, it is my opinion that MCL 409.314; MSA 17.644, and as last amended by 1985 PA 30, is unconstitutional because it was enacted and amended in violation of Const 1963, art 4, Sec. 24, and is, therefore, of no force and effect. It is my further opinion that MCL 409.301-409.313; MSA 17.60117.613, remain in full force and effect.

Frank J. Kelley

Attorney General

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