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The following opinion is presented on-line for informational use only and does not replace the official version. (Mich Dept of Attorney General Web Site - www.ag.state.mi.us)



STATE OF MICHIGAN

FRANK J. KELLEY, ATTORNEY GENERAL


Opinion No. 6358

April 29, 1986

OPEN MEETINGS ACTS:

Exclusion of elected or appointed officers from closed session of public body

Exclusion from a closed session of a public body of a person intruding upon the meeting

Notice of time and place of closed session if recessed or reconvened to remove intruder

Elected municipal officers, department heads, and other officers and individuals who are not members of a public body may be excluded from attending a closed session of the public body.

An elected officer of a municipality, who is not a member of the city council, may be excluded from a closed session of the city council convened to discuss pending litigation with the city attorney, despite the fact that the elected officer is named as a party with the city in the litigation.

A person intruding upon a closed session of a public body may be excluded therefrom by forcible removal by a law enforcement officer or the removal may be accomplished by recessing and moving the closed session to another location.

A public body recessing and removing its closed session to a different location in order to secure the removal of an individual intruding upon the closed session is not required to provide the 18-hour notice to the public of the time and place of the recessed closed session, provided the closed session reconvenes within 36 hours.

Honorable Dennis M. Dutko

State Representative

Capitol Building

Lansing, MI 48909

You have requested my opinion on several questions pertaining to the Open Meetings Act, MCL 15.261 et seq; MSA 4.1800(11) et seq.

Your first question is:

'Under the Open Meetings Act, may elected municipal officials, their representatives, or municipal department heads or their representatives be excluded from closed meetings of the City Council?'

In OAG, 1979-1980, No 5532, p 324 (August 7, 1979), a similar question was presented as to whether a public body, having properly convened in closed session, could selectively exclude persons from the closed meeting. Specifically at issue was the propriety of excluding a newspaper reporter from a closed meeting where a board of education had permitted a minister, the assistant superintendent of schools, the school principal and an education association official to be present to assist the board in considering the suspension of a tenured teacher.

That opinion reviewed each of the eight situations in which a closed session is authorized under the Open Meetings Act, MCL 15.268; MSA 4.1800(18), and concluded:

'A review of these eight situations in this section reveals that the Legislature anticipated that in many instances persons, other than the public body itself, would be necessity, be included in a closed session to assist the public body in considering the particular matter.

'A public body may rely upon its officers and employees to assist it in considering one of the matters enumerated in 1976 PA 267, Sec. 8, supra. In addition, it is not precluded from requesting private citizens to assist it in such consideration. The fact that public officers, employees and private citizens are requested to attend such deliberation does not thereby bar the public body from meeting in a closed session on such occasion.' OAG, 1979-1980, No 5532, 325.

Thus, assuming that a closed session is otherwise lawful under the Open Meetings Act, a public body may selectively include certain individuals in the closed session while at the same time excluding all other individuals.

The reasoning of OAG, 1979-1980, No 5532, applies with equal force to the question presented here. While a public body is free to exercise its discretion to request the assistance of certain individuals in its closed session deliberations, no provision of the Open Meetings Act requires that any particular individuals who are not members of the public body be permitted to attend.

Additional support for this proposition is found in OAG, 1977-1978, No 5286, p 403 (March 31, 1978), which concluded that a city councilperson acting in his individual capacity had no greater right to participate in city business than any other member of the public and, therefore, could be excluded from collective bargaining sessions closed to the public where a bargaining agent or committee had been appointed to act on the city's behalf.

It is my opinion, in answer to your first question, that a public body which has lawfully convened in a closed session in accordance with MCL 15.268; MSA 4.1800(18), may exclude elected municipal officers, department heads and other officers and individuals who are not members of the public body from attending the closed session.

Your second question is:

'May City Council exclude an elected officer of the city from a closed meeting involving discussions with the city attorney on pending litigation in which the officer is a named co-defendant?'

This question requires consideration of whether the discretion of a public body to exclude non-members of the body from closed sessions as discussed above should be limited where the purpose of the closed session is to consult with the public body's attorney concerning pending litigation and where the non-member is a co-party in that litigation.

The Open Meetings Act, MCL 15.268(e); MSA 4.1800(18)(e), permits a public body to meet in closed session 'to consult with its attorney regarding trial or settlement strategy in connection with specific pending litigation, but only when an open meeting would have a detrimental financial effect on the litigating or settlement position of the public body.' An examination of this subsection and of the remaining provisions of the Open Meetings Act reveals that the Legislature had made no special provision governing the specific situation you have described. In the absence of such a special provision directing that non-member co-parties to litigation have a right to attend such closed sessions, no such right can be inferred. Rather, it must be concluded that attendance at such closed sessions is governed by the principles discussed above in response to your first question and, thus, rests in the sound discretion of the public body.

It may be observed, moreover, that a city council may have good reasons for excluding an elected official of the city from a closed council session called to discuss pending litigation, even though the excluded official is a co-defendant. It is entirely possible, for example, that the interests of the council and the elected official in the lawsuit may be adverse. Under such circumstances, the inclusion of the elected official could seriously hamper the public body's ability to fully and candidly discuss its litigation strategy with its attorney. Thus, while it may on occasion be advisable and prudent for the council to include all co-defendants in such closed sessions, on other occasions it may be more prudent, and may better serve the public interest, to exclude co-defendants who are not members of the public body. The Open Meetings Act contains no provisions which would limit a public body's discretion in making such a determination.

It is my opinion, in response to your second question, that a city council may exclude elected officers who are not members of the council from a closed session held to consider trial or settlement strategy in pending litigation, even though the excluded public officer is named as a party with the city in that litigation.

Your third and fourth questions may be combined and re-phrased as follows:

What actions may be taken by a public body to exclude an unauthorized individual from a closed session if the individual, intrudes upon the closed session and refuses to leave?

While there are no express provisions in the Open Meetings Act regarding the exclusion of unauthorized persons from closed sessions of a public body, the Act does provide for the exclusion of persons from public meetings of the public body under certain limited circumstances. Specifically, MCL 15.263(6); MSA 4.1800(13)(6), provides:

'A person shall not be excluded from a public meeting except for a breach of the peace actually committed at the meeting.'

The Michigan Court of Appeals had occasion to consider this provision in Regents of the University of Michigan v Washtenaw County Coalition Against Apartheid, 97 Mich App 532; 296 NW2d 94 (1980), lv den, 411 Mich 878 (1981). There, a large group of demonstrators had repeatedly disrupted a meeting of the Board of Regents to the extent that the board was unable to conduct its regular business. Although several arrests were made, the remaining demonstrators continued to heckle and disrupt the meeting. Rather than resorting to further arrests and direct physical confrontation, the regents decided to obtain a temporary restraining order and to recess the meeting and move it to a different location in accordance with the court order. University officials were posted at the door of the old meeting room in order to advise the press and the general public of the room change. Although the press and most members of the general public were permitted to enter the new meeting room and attend the meeting, the individuals involved in the disruptive activities were excluded.

The Court of Appeals, upon review, recognized at least implicitly that physical expulsion by a law enforcement officer is an acceptable means of removing persons who breach the peace at a public meeting. The court went on to conclude, however, that the 'recess and remove' strategy adopted by the Board of Regents was an acceptable alternative to such forcible expulsion:

'[T]he Regents should not be required to have demonstrators who breach the peace at a meeting physically and forcefully expelled by law enforcement officials. Confrontation is not mandated by the act. We hold that a peaceful alternative, such as 'recess and remove' is an appropriate expedient.' 97 Mich App, at 540; 296 NW2d, at 98.

There is nothing in the court's analysis in this case which suggests that this conclusion is inapplicable to the exclusion of an unauthorized individual from a closed session of a public body. Indeed, a review of the provisions of the Open Meetings Act suggests that the remedies described by the court in Regents of the University of Michigan are, if anything, even more appropriate in the context of an unauthorized intrusion into a closed session. While the fundamental purpose of the Open Meetings Act is to assure the right of citizens to attend ordinary open session meetings of public bodies, the closed session provisions of the Act clearly contemplate that a public body may exclude members of the general public from a lawfully closed session. The Act does not give the general public the right to attend a closed session, nor to disrupt a closed session by means of an unauthorized intrusion upon the public body's deliberations.

It is my opinion, therefore, that a public body may, if necessary, exclude an unauthorized individual who intrudes upon a closed session by either (1) having the individual forcibly removed by a law enforcement officer, or (2) by recessing and removing the closed session to a new location.

Your final question may be stated as follows:

If a public body elects to recess and remove its closed session to a different room, is the public body required to provide notice to the public as to the time and place where the closed session will be held?

The notice requirements of the Open Meetings Act are set forth in MCL 15.265; MSA 4.1800(15), which provides in pertinent part:

'(1) A meeting of a public body shall not be held unless public notice is given as provided in this section by a person designated by the public body.

'(2) For regular meetings of a public body, there shall be posted within 10 days after the first meeting of the public body in each calendar or fiscal year a public notice stating the dates, times, and places of its regular meetings.

'(3) If there is a change in the schedule of regular meetings of a public body, there shall be posted within 3 days after the meeting at which the change is made, a public notice stating the new dates, times, and places of its regular meetings.

'(4) Except as provided in this subsection . . ., for a rescheduled regular or a special meeting of a public body, a public notice stating the date, time, and place of the meeting shall be posted at least 18 hours before the meeting. . . .

'(5) A meeting of a public body which is recessed for more than 36 hours shall be reconvened only after public notice, which is equivalent to that required under subsection (4), has been posted. . . . Nothing in this section shall bar a public body from meeting in emergency session in the event of a severe and imminent threat to the health, safety, or welfare of the public when 2/3 of the members serving on the body decide that delay would be detrimental to efforts to lessen or respond to the threat.

In Regents of the University of Michigan, the Court of Appeals discussed at some length the application of the notice provisions of MCL 15.265; MSA 4.1800(15), to a public meeting which had been briefly recessed and moved to a new location. After citing and quoting at length its provisions, the court stated:

'Defendants argue that because subsection (5) above does not expressly permit a change of location of a recessed meeting, it is forbidden and that the change of location that occurred here converted the meeting from 'recessed' to 'rescheduled' under the act. Principles of statutory construction do not support this position. Each of the above five subsections deals with a distinct topic and does not require interpolation of language from the other clearly independent provisions except when expressly referred to. See 2A Sutherland, Statutory Construction (4th ed), Sec. 47.02, p 71. Furthermore, the language of subsection (5), which pertains to recessed meetings, is clear and unambiguous; the plain meaning controls. Sutherland, supra, Sec. 46.01, p 48. A meeting that is recessed in excess of 36 hours must comply with the notice rules applicable to rescheduled meetings; a shorter recess, as occurred here, does not trigger application of those rules. As the trial court opinion correctly points out, a multitude of reasons might necessitate a meetings brief recess and relocation: fire, cessation of utility service, unrelated noise interference, etc. Viewed in this context, defendants' position is clearly untenable; the act does not contemplate 18-hour notice requirements under such circumstances. We find no support for the position advanced by defendants that relocation changes the meeting's categorization from 'recessed' to 'rescheduled'.

'We do, however, share the concern obviously felt by defendants and the trial court that a meeting which is recessed remain open to the public. In order to remain faithful to the spirit and purpose of the Open Meetings Act the Regents were required to provide notice of the new time and place of the reconvened meeting. Plaintiff complied with the court order to this effect by posting officials at the Regents Room to advise the press and members of the general public of the room change. Therefore, we find no conflict with MCL 15.268; MSA 4.1800(18), which permits closed sessions only for the limited purposes specified therein.' Regents of the University of Michigan, 97 Mich App, 539-540.

The obvious purpose of the notice provisions contained in the Open Meetings Act is to assure that the members of the general public and the press are aware of the time and place of public meetings so that they are able to attend and participate. Such considerations are somewhat less compelling in the case of a closed session inasmuch as the press and the general public have no right to attend or to participate in closed sessions. Nevertheless, as the Court of Appeals recognized in Regents of the University of Michigan the provision of some form of reasonable notice is necessary in order to 'remain faithful to the spirit and purpose of the Open Meetings Act.' 97 Mich App, 540. Even though the press and the general public have no right to actually attend and participate at such closed sessions, nevertheless, the public does have an interest in knowing when and where the public body convenes in such a session. Any other interpretation of the Act would run counter to the mandate that the act be construed so as to favor openness. See, Wexford County Prosecutor v Pranger, 83 Mich App 197; 268 NW2d 344 (1978).

It is my opinion, in response to your final question, that a public body which recesses an open meeting and convenes in a separate location for a closed session within less than 36 hours, may do so without satisfying the 18-hour notice requirement of MCL 15.265(4); MSA 4.1800(15)(4), but must, nevetheless, take reasonable steps to inform the general public as to when and where the closed meeting will convene.

Frank J. Kelley

Attorney General


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