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The following opinion is presented on-line for informational use only and does not replace the official version. (Mich Dept of Attorney General Web Site - www.ag.state.mi.us)



STATE OF MICHIGAN

FRANK J. KELLEY, ATTORNEY GENERAL


Opinion No. 6359

May 6, 1986

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:

Freedom of religion

Freedom of speech

MUNICIPALITIES:

Regulation of solicitation by religious organizations

A municipality may not require a $25.00 filing fee before a religious organization or group may canvass or solicit funds within the municipality.

A municipality may not require that a religious organization or group apply for a permit 60 days prior to the commencement of any solicitation or sale.

A municipality may not adopt a regulation which would permit only one religious organization to solicit funds in the municipality at one time.

Honorable Bob Emerson

State Representative

The Capitol

Lansing, Michigan 48909

You have requested my opinion upon three questions, the first of which is:

May a municipality within the State of Michigan have a regulation which requires a $25 filing fee before religious organizations or groups may canvass or solicit funds?

The Charitable Organizations and Solicitations Act, MCL 400.272; MSA 3.240(2), provides that a "[c]haritable organization' . . . does not include duly constituted religious organizations . . ..' Therefore, duly constituted religious organizations are not included within the application of the Charitable Organizations and Solicitations Act. Local regulation of charitable solicitations, however, is not preempted by the Charitable Organizations and Solicitations Act. OAG, 1977-1978, No 5381, pp 650-651 (October 3, 1978).

Your questions raise issues concerning religious exercise and free expression which are protected by the United States Constitution and by the Michigan Constitution.

US Const, Am I, provides:

'Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.'

The Michigan Constitution contains the following provisions which protect freedom of religion and freedom of speech:

'No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws; nor shall any person be denied the enjoyment of his civil or political rights or be discriminated against in the exercise thereof because of religion, race, color or national origin. The legislature shall implement this section by appropriate legislation.' Const 1963, art 1, Sec. 2.

'Every person may freely speak, write, express and publish his views on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of such right; and no law shall be enacted to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press.' Const 1963, art 1, Sec. 5.

OAG, 1977-1978, No 5381, 650-653, examined the authority of municipalities to regulate the solicitation of contributions by religious organizations, stating in part:

'The freedom to exercise one's religion is one of the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and occupies a preferred place with freedom of speech and the other liberties enumerated therein in our basic society. Prince v Massachusetts, 321 US 158; 64 S Ct 438; 88 L Ed 645 (1944). The actions of distributing literature and soliciting contributions by a person for religious purposes is an intimate part of the exercise of religion. Murdock v Pennsylvania, 319 US 105; 63 S Ct 870; 87 L Ed 1292; 146 ALR 81 (1943). Const 1963, art 1, Secs. 2 and 5 contain no less guarantees.

'The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States protects the right of persons to go house to house, speak to occupants, distribute literature and solicit funds for religious purposes. A municipal ordinance which would make it a crime for a person to knock on doors or ring door bells in order to distribute literature inviting persons to a religious meeting violates the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Martin v City of Struthers, Ohio, 319 US 141; 63 S Ct 862; 87 L Ed 1313 (1943). Thus, a municipality may not prohibit persons from going from door to door to distribute literature and solicit contributions for religious purposes without violating the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Const 1963, art 1, Secs. 2 and 5.

. . ..

'Nor may a municipality impose a fee or the posting of a bond as a condition precedent before persons may canvass or solicit funds for religious purposes. In Follett v Town of McCormick, 321 US 573; 64 S Ct 717; 88 L Ed 938 (1944), the U.S. Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a town ordinance which required a fee of $1 per day or $15 per year to license persons seeking to distribute religious literature and to receive contributions therefor within the town. The Court struck down as unconstitutional the fee as a flat license tax on the constitutional right of free exercise of religion, and held that the power to tax the exercise of the right of religious freedom is the power to control or suppress its enjoyment. The law of the land protects the free exercise of religion immune from the interference of the requirement of a license. Concurring Opinion of Mr. Justice Reed in Follett, supra.

'While Cox v State of New Hampshire, 312 US 569; 61 S Ct 762; 85 L Ed 1049 (1941) upheld a fee imposed by a municipality for the use of public streets for parades or processions of organizations, including religious organizations, at amounts ranging from a nominal sum, undisclosed in the opinion, to $300 because the fee imposed was not a tax but one fairly apportioned to cover expenses in maintaining control of streets and public safety during the parade or procession, research reveals no decision of the high court extending the holding in Cox, supra, to the imposition of fees or requiring of bonds as a condition precedent for a municipality to allow representatives of religious organizations to go from door to door to raise funds for religious purposes. The line between the imposition of an unlawful tax and an apportioned fee to meet the costs of the community is exceedingly narrow. The freedom of exercise of religion and freedom of speech should not be subject to prior restraint while the amount of the fee may be litigated as to whether it has been fairly apportioned to represent the cost to the community or is in fact a tax upon the exercise of religious freedom, especially when municipal costs are, at best, nominal. [Footnote omitted.] Unlike the policing of parades and processions needed to protect public safety, the actions of individual canvassers of religious organizations within a community do not appear to require attendant police surveillance.

'However, the municipality may protect the community against possible crime and annoyance by requiring that solicitors or canvassers going house to house in behalf of religious organizations identify themselves and the organizations they represent, in advance and in writing, to municipal authorities. The constitutionality of an ordinance of a municipal corporation which required persons soliciting from house to house in behalf of charitable and political organizations to identify themselves and the organization they represented was upheld as within the proper authority of the municipality to safeguard the public, even though the ordinance itself was struck down because of its vagueness and overbreadth in the meaning of the phrase 'recognized charitable cause'. Hynes v The Mayor and Counsel of the Borough of Oradell, 425 US 610; 96 S Ct 1755; 48 L Ed 243 (1976).

. . ..

'It is also within the power of the municipality, in order to protect the health of its citizens, to regulate the hours that such solicitors may canvass from door to door within the municipality. Cantwell v Connecticut, supra. However, it must be stressed that a municipality may not 'chill' the constitutionally-protected rights of free exercise of religion and freedom of speech by imposing unreasonable hour restrictions so that, in effect, solicitors and canvassers may not freely exercise their constitutional rights within the municipality. In this regard, it must be observed that canvassers should be able to go from house to house during reasonable hours when persons residing therein are expected to be at home and available to answer the door.' [Emphasis added.]

The requirement that a religious organization pay a flat fee as a condition to canvassing by a religious organization 'restrains in advance those constitutional liberties of press and religion and inevitably tends to suppress their exercise.' Murdock v Pennsylvania (City of Jeannette), 319 US 105, 114; 63 S Ct 870; 87 L Ed 1292; 146 ALR 81 (1943); People v Lechner, 307 Mich 358; 11 NW2d 918 (1943). A municipality may not impose a fee as a condition precedent to persons canvassing or soliciting funds for religious purposes, OAG, 1977-1978, No 5381.

It is my opinion, in answer to your first question, that a municipality may not require a $25 filing fee before religious organizations or groups may canvass or solicit funds.

Your second question is:

May a municipality within the State of Michigan have a regulation which requires that an organization apply for a permit for solicitations 60 days prior to the commencement of any solicitation or sale?

'A license is the permission by competent authority to do an act which, without such permission, would be illegal.' People v Henderson, 391 Mich 612, 616; 218 NW2d 2 (1974). The requirement that an organization have a permit prior to solicitation is the imposition of a license and is contrary to the constitutional right of free exercise of religion. OAG, 1977-1978, No 5381; Follett v Town of McCormick, 321 US 573; 64 S Ct 717; 88 L Ed 938; 57 ALR 317 (1944).

It is my opinion, in answer to your second question, that a municipality may not have a regulation which requires that a religious organization or group apply for a permit for solicitations 60 days prior to the commencement of any solicitation or sale.

Your third question is:

May a municipality within the State of Michigan have a regulation which does not permit more than one religious organization at a time to be actively soliciting funds within the boundaries of the municipality at one time?

A municipality may not prohibit persons from going from door to door to solicit contributions for religious purposes without violating the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Const 1963, art 1, Secs. 2 and 5. OAG, 1977-1978, No 5381. A requirement that no more than one religious organization at a time actively solicit in a municipality is a temporary prohibition against solicitation which is contrary to the constitutionally-protected free exercise of religion and speech.

It is my opinion, in answer to your third question, that a municipality may not have a regulation which would permit only one religious organization to solicit funds within the boundaries of the municipality at one time.

Frank J. Kelley

Attorney General


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