STATE OF MICHIGAN

FRANK J. KELLEY, ATTORNEY GENERAL

Opinion No. 6426

March 6, 1987

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH:

Right of juveniles performing public service work to know of hazardous chemicals in workplace

Employers who permit youthful offenders to perform "public service work" in their places of employment must train and inform them regarding exposure to hazardous chemicals that would arise in the normal course of their duties or as a result of a foreseeable emergency as required by the "right to know" provisions of the Michigan Occupational Safety and Health Act.

Honorable Gilbert J. DiNello

State Senator

State Capitol

Lansing, MI 48909

You have requested my opinion on a question involving what is popularly referred to as the "right to know" provisions of the Michigan Occupational Safety and Health Act (MIOSHA), as amended or added by 1986 PA 80, MCL 408.1001 et seq.; MSA 17.50(1) et seq. Specifically, you inquire on behalf of the Macomb County Probate Court whether the "right to know" provisions of MIOSHA apply to the restitution program operated by a county in which juvenile offenders perform "public service work" as an alternative to incarceration. These provisions were enacted by the Legislature in 1986 to advance occupational safety through a number of requirements calculated to free the workplace from recognized hazards and advise employees of protections available to them.

The program director for the Juvenile Division of the Macomb County Probate Court advises that the court is in the process of developing and implementing a restitution program placing nonassaultive youthful offenders in community service positions involving such tasks as washing windows, floors and walls and performing outside maintenance for various schools and other nonprofit organizations within Macomb County. The positions are described as non-paying and lasting over a period of six months or less for 30, 60 or 90 hour intervals. The Juvenile Division has been told that the various employers accepting youthful offenders for placement will be required to train the youths with regard to the presence of chemicals and other substances in the workplace and your inquiry seeks to ascertain the accuracy of this proposition.

Analysis of your question involves consideration of a number of provisions of MIOSHA as added or amended by 1986 PA 80. MCL 408.1005; MSA 17.50(5) defines an "employee" as "a person permitted to work by an employer," and subsection (2) thereof defines an "employer" as "an individual or organization, including the state or a political subdivision, which employs 1 or more persons." It is within the legislative power to define the sense in which words are employed in a statute. Erdlandson v. Genesee County Employees' Retirement Commission, 337 Mich 195, 204; 59 NW 2d 389, (1953). For purposes of construing the additions and amendments made by 1986 PA 80, the Legislature has made no distinction between those employees who work for compensation and those who do not. Nor is any significance assigned to the duration of employment. Thus, it is likely that a court would rule that all persons permitted to work for an organization employing more than one person would be entitled to the protections afforded by the "right to know" provisions of MIOSHA including those who work for no remuneration or on a limited or part-time basis.

Moreover, this interpretation is consistent with established rules of statutory construction which provide that a remedial statute designed to introduce regulations conducive to the public good are to be liberally construed. In Re School District No. 6, 284 Mich 132, 144; 278 NW 792, (1938). Based on these principles, youthful offenders placed in schools or similar organizations employing more than one person as a part of the Juvenile Division's restitution program would be covered by the terms of the right to know law.

Under the terms of the "right to know" provisions of MIOSHA an employer is required to do a number of things. MCL 408.1011(a) and (c); MSA 17.50(11)(a) and (c) provides that an employer shall furnish to each employee a place of employment which is free from recognized hazards that "are causing, or are likely to cause, death or serious physical harm to the employee," and post notices to keep employees informed of their protections. In addition, employers are required to comply with "the rules and standards promulgated" pursuant to the Act. MCL 408.1011(b); MSA 17.50(11)(b). In that regard, MCL 408.1014a(1); MSA 17.50(14a)(1) expressly incorporates by reference the occupational safety and health hazard communication standard adopted by the United States department of labor and codified at 29 CFR 1910.1200. It further provides that MCL 408.1014b-14l; MSA 17.50(14b)-(14l), apply to covered employers, subject to certain limitations described in subsections (4), (5), (6) and (7) of MCL 408.1014a; MSA 17.50(14a). Of particular relevance to your inquiry is subsection (6) which provides:

This subsection provides that an employer must provide information and training to those employees exposed to hazardous chemicals in the normal course of employment or in the event of a foreseeable emergency. This provision necessarily calls upon employers to judge those circumstances where an employee's exposure arises in the normal course of employment or might arise as a result of a foreseeable emergency. If, for example, a youthful offender is placed in a maintenance position at a school setting and is responsible for washing walls or floors with materials containing hazardous chemicals, MCL 408.1014a(6); MSA 17.50(14a)(6) would oblige the employer to provide appropriate information and training to the youth.

It is my opinion, therefore, that employers who permit youthful offenders to perform "public service work" in their places of employment must train and inform them regarding exposure to hazardous chemicals that would arise in the normal course of their duties or as a result of a foreseeable emergency as required by the "right to know" provisions of the Michigan Occupational Safety and Health Act.

Frank J. Kelley

Attorney General