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The following opinion is presented on-line for informational use only and does not replace the official version. (Mich Dept of Attorney General Web Site - www.ag.state.mi.us) STATE OF MICHIGAN FRANK J. KELLEY, ATTORNEY GENERAL Opinion No. 6465 September 10, 1987 APPROPRIATIONS: Validity of condition upon appropriations CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Const 1963, art 4, Sec. 24--conditions on appropriations STATE SCHOOL AID ACT: Forfeiture of expenditures for cars or chauffeurs for school district officers The Michigan Supreme Court has held that the Legislature can attach conditions concerning the use of funds it appropriates and that such conditions do not add a second object to the statute. Section 164 of the State School Aid Act of 1979, as amended by 1987 PA 128, which provides for a deduction from funds appropriated by the Legislature to a school district for the 1987-1988 fiscal year of a sum equal to the school district's expenditures in the 1986-1987 fiscal year for cars for board of education members or for chauffeurs for board members or administrators of the school district, was enacted in conformity with Const 1963, art 4, Sec. 24. Honorable David S. Holmes, Jr. State Senator The Capitol Lansing, Michigan You have requested my opinion on a question which may be phrased as follows: Is section 164 of the State School Aid Act of 1979 violative of Const 1963, art 4, Sec. 24? Section 164 of the State School Aid Act of 1979, 1979 PA 94, MCL 388.1764; MSA 15.1919(1064), was originally added by 1986 PA 212 to read as follows: "In 1986-87, a district or intermediate district shall not use state funds for cars for board members, or for chauffeurs for board members or administrators." Act 94, Sec. 164, as amended by 1987 PA 128, which will become effective October 1, 1987 and is the subject matter of this opinion request, provides: "In 1987-88, a district or intermediate district shall forfeit an amount of funds to which the district or intermediate district otherwise would be entitled under this act equal to the district's or intermediate district's expenditures in the 1986-87 fiscal year for cars for board members, or for chauffeurs for board members or administrators." In the 1986-1987 fiscal year, the Legislature prohibited the use of state funds by school districts or intermediate school districts for the purposes set forth above. For the 1987-1988 fiscal year, the Legislature has simply reduced the state school aid appropriation by the amount that a school district or intermediate school district expended in 1986-1987 for cars for board members or for chauffeurs for board members or administrators. The people have provided in Const 1963, art 4, Sec. 24, that "[n]o law shall embrace more than one object, which shall be expressed in its title." You have inquired whether Act 94, Sec. 164, adds a second purpose to Act 94 in violation of Const 1963, art 4, Sec. 24. It is beyond dispute that the Legislature can attach conditions concerning the use of funds it appropriates. State Bd of Agriculture v Auditor General, 226 Mich 417, 425; 197 NW 160 (1924). Further, the constitutionally-created state school aid fund is to be paid to school districts "as provided by law." The use of that phrase demonstrates that the Legislature does the whole job of implementing the constitutional provision. Beech Grove Investment Co v Civil Rights Comm, 380 Mich 405, 418-419; 157 NW2d 213 (1968). Const 1963, art 8, Sec. 2, as originally adopted by the people, provided: "The legislature shall maintain and support a system of free public elementary and secondary schools as defined by law. Every school district shall provide for the education of its pupils without discrimination as to religion, creed, race, color or national origin." The Address to the People accompanying Const 1963, art 8, Sec. 2, as the constitutional drafters' explanation of the proposed document to the people, provided in pertinent part: "This is a revision of Sec 9, Article XI, of the present [1908] constitution which fixes responsibility on the legislature to provide 'primary' education. To conform to present practice and court interpretations, 'primary' is changed to 'elementary and secondary.' The balance of the section is excluded because its restrictions as to finance and definitions as to basic qualifications needed to be eligible for state aid are better left to legislative determination." (Emphasis added.) 2 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 3395. Thus, the Legislature has great discretion to determine school district eligibility for the receipt of state school aid funds, including the funding formulas to be employed in allocating the appropriated funds among school districts. East Jackson Public Schools v State of Michigan, 133 Mich App 132, 137-138; 348 NW2d 303, lv den 419 Mich 943 (1984). In exercise of that discretion, the Legislature has determined to reduce the 1987-1988 state aid payments to particular school districts by the amount of certain expenditures the school districts made in 1986-1987 for purposes the Legislature manifestly deems unwise. Act 94, Sec. 164, is but one aspect of a larger funding formula allocating state school aid funds among school districts. See, e.g., Act 94, Sec. 21, MCL 388.1621; MSA 15.1919(921), where the amount of state school aid funds to be received by a school district is reduced by the amount of local property tax revenues to be received. Placing conditions upon the use of appropriated funds does not add a second object to the statute. See, OAG, 1983-1984, No 6225, p 303, 305-306 (May 7, 1984), citing Lewis v State, 352 Mich 422, 429-430; 90 NW2d 856 (1958). Further, a provision within an appropriation bill transferring moneys from one fund to another fund does not violate Const 1963, art 4, Sec. 24. Michigan Sheriffs' Ass'n v Dep't of Treasury, 75 Mich App 516, 521-522; 255 NW2d 666 (1977). In light of these authorities, it must be concluded that provisions that are part of the funding formula for allocating state school aid funds among school districts do not add a second purpose to the statute. It is my opinion, therefore, that Act 94, Sec. 164, does not violate Const 1963, art 4, Sec. 24. Frank J. Kelley Attorney General
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