Where in any decree of divorce, or decree of separate maintenance granted in this state, or by order entered during the pendency of any such proceedings, if personal service is had upon the husband or upon the father of any minor child or children, under the age of 17 years, or such husband or father shall have entered an appearance in such proceedings either as plaintiff or defendant, the court shall order such husband to pay any amount to the clerk or friend of the court for the support of any wife or former wife who by reason of any physical or mental affliction is unable to support herself, or father to pay any amount to the clerk or friend of the court for the support of such minor child or children, and said husband or father shall refuse or neglect to pay such amount at the time stated in such order and shall leave the state of Michigan, said husband or father shall be guilty of a felony. [ Emphasis added.]

Thus, it is clear that the statute, as construed prior to the institution of proceedings against the defendant, required a refusal to pay or a neglect of the duty to do so which must have occurred contemporaneously with or prior to a defendant's leaving the state. These are the elements of the offense. There is no vagueness in this regard.

The remaining question concerns defendant's claim as to imprecision with respect to the meaning of the word "flight". As plaintiff argues, this statute presupposes the defendant's knowledge of the obligation of support, because of the previously entered order attendant to a decree of divorce or a modification thereof. As construed in Ditton, the statute requires neglect or refusal to pay prior to or at the time of leaving. The term "flight", read in context in the statute, means no more than leaving the state contemporaneously with or after refusing or neglecting to pay support, with knowledge of an obligation to do so. The term "flight", as understood by men of common intelligence, does not encompass the crossing of the state line where the leaving of the state is merely temporary or incident to one's occupation. If one leaves the state permanently or on a prolonged basis, doing so with the knowledge that an unfulfilled obligation of support exists by reason of neglect or refusal to pay, the flight requirement is satisfied. We cannot say this interpretation gives a trial court unfettered discretion to determine whether an offense has been committed. [ Emphasis added.] [Citation omitted.]

1. The defendant failed or refused to pay court-ordered child support, with knowledge of his or her obligation to do so; and

2. At or after the time of nonpayment, the defendant left the state on a prolonged or permanent basis.

In summary, the United States Supreme Court, in interpreting legislative intent regarding the element of fault, has applied an analytical framework that considers each separate element of the statute. Statutes creating strict liability regarding all their elements are not favored. However, where a statute requires a criminal mind for some but not all of its elements, it is not one of strict liability. In such a case, the Legislature is not imposing liability without any fault at all; instead, it has determined that regarding that element, responsibility for the protection of the public should be placed on the person who can best avoid the harm sought to be prevented--the actor himself. [ Emphasis added.] [Citation and footnote omitted.]