STATE OF MICHIGAN

Words alone, whether or not accompanied by physical conduct, may constitute "domestic violence" as that term is defined in the Domestic Violence Prevention and Treatment Act.

Opinion No. 7114

July 26, 2002

Honorable Doug Bovin
State Representative
The Capitol
Lansing, MI

You have asked whether words alone, unaccompanied by physical conduct, may constitute "domestic violence" as that term is defined in the Domestic Violence Prevention and Treatment Act.

The Domestic Violence Prevention and Treatment Act (Act), 1978 PA 389, MCL 400.1501 et seq, is "An Act to provide for the prevention and treatment of domestic violence . . . ." The Act creates a Domestic Violence Prevention and Treatment Board within the Michigan Family Independence Agency that awards grants and contracts to prevent and treat domestic violence. The Board has the power to develop standards for the implementation and administration of services and procedures to prevent domestic violence and to provide services and programs for victims of domestic violence. Section 4(b). The Act is civil in nature and does not impose criminal penalties or provide for protective orders.

The Act's original definition of "domestic violence," as found in section 1(c), read as follows:

(c) "Domestic violence" means a violent physical attack or fear of violent physical attack perpetrated by an assailant against a victim;. . . . [Emphasis added.]

This definition was broadened by 2000 PA 84, which amended section 1 and added specific language in subsection (d) that now defines "domestic violence" as follows:

(d) "Domestic violence" means the occurrence of any of the following acts by a person that is not an act of self-defense:

(i) Causing or attempting to cause physical or mental harm to a family or household member.

(ii) Placing a family or household member in fear of physical or mental harm.

(iii) Causing or attempting to cause a family or household member to engage in involuntary sexual activity by force, threat of force, or duress.

(iv) Engaging in activity toward a family or household member that would cause a reasonable person to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested. [Emphasis added.]

The primary rule of judicial interpretation of statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Frankenmuth Mut Ins Co v Marlette Homes, Inc, 456 Mich 511, 515; 573 NW2d 611 (1998). The first criterion for determining legislative intent is the specific language of the statute. In re MCI Telecommunications Complaint, 460 Mich 396, 411; 596 NW2d 164 (1999). Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, judicial construction is neither necessary nor permitted. Lorencz v Ford Motor Co, 439 Mich 370, 376; 483 NW2d 844 (1992).

Here the Act's definition of "domestic violence" is clear and unambiguous. The Legislature has clearly defined "domestic violence" to include several enumerated acts that can be readily accomplished by words alone. These acts include causing or attempting to cause "mental harm" to a family or household member, placing such person in "fear of mental harm," or engaging in any act toward such person that would cause a reasonable person to feel frightened, intimidated, or threatened. Causing a family or household member to fear harm or to feel frightened, intimidated, or threatened may be accomplished by words alone. Based on the Act's express language, it must be concluded that domestic violence, as that term is defined in the Act, may include words alone, whether or not accompanied by physical conduct.

It is my opinion, therefore, that words alone, whether or not accompanied by physical conduct, may constitute "domestic violence" as that term is defined in the Domestic Violence Prevention and Treatment Act.

JENNIFER M. GRANHOLM
Attorney General