You have asked whether a county board of commissioners has the statutory authority to regulate the keeping of livestock and poultry.  In particular, you ask whether such authority exists in the Dog Law of 1919, 1919 PA 339, MCL 287.261 et seq. (the Dog Law), or in the county’s general ordinance-making power of MCL 46.11(j).    

Your request references an Ingham County Board of Commissioners’ resolution, which asks whether state law authorizes a county to regulate the keeping of livestock and poultry on residential land (i.e., non-agricultural land) by way of a county animal control ordinance adopted under Section 29a of the Dog Law and MCL 46.11(j).  You note the importance of such an interpretation due to the increasing popularity of keeping livestock and poultry in urban and suburban areas.

The Dog Law of 1919

As stated in the title of the Dog Law, the purposes of the law are: 

[Protecting] live stock and poultry from damage by dogs; providing for the licensing of dogs; regulating the keeping of dogs, and authorizing their destruction in certain cases . . . imposing powers and duties on certain state, county, city and township officers and employees. . . .

In addition to licensing dogs and protecting livestock and poultry from damage by dogs, the Dog Law allows a county to establish an animal control agency and “provide for animal control programs, facilities, personnel and necessary expenses incurred in animal control.”  MCL 287.289a.  But section 29a, MCL 287.289a, expressly limits a county’s jurisdiction to cities, villages and townships that do not have their own animal control ordinances.

When interpreting a statute, such as the Dog Law, the primary rule is to discern and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.  Murphy v Mich Bell Tel Co, 447 Mich 93, 98 (1994).  That intent is evidenced by the statute’s plain language.  Wickens v Oakwood Healthcare Sys, 465 Mich 53, 60 (2001).  If the statute’s language is unambiguous, it must be presumed that the Legislature intended its clearly expressed meaning.  Id. (citations omitted).  “[F]urther construction is neither required nor permitted.”  Nastal v Henderson & Assoc Investigations, Inc, 471 Mich 712, 720 (2005). 

While section 29a authorizes counties to establish animal control agencies and hire animal control officers, there is no language in the Dog Law that authorizes a county to regulate the raising of livestock and poultry.  Based on the canons of statutory construction cited above, the Legislature did not, therefore, grant such authority. 

A similar question regarding the scope of a county’s authority under the Dog Law was addressed in OAG, 1977-1978, No. 5341, p 556 (July 31, 1978), which considered whether the Dog Law authorized a county to operate a spay and neuter clinic for dogs and cats.  That opinion explained that, consistent with its title, the Dog Law provides for protection of the public from damage caused by dogs, for the licensing of dogs, for regulation of the keeping of dogs, and for destruction of dogs in certain cases.  Id. at 557.  And it concluded that “[n]o provision of the act specifically or impliedly authorizes a county to establish and maintain a spay and neuter clinic and cats are not mentioned in either the title or body of the act.  Therefore, this law may not be used as a source of authority by a county to operate a spay and neuter clinic for dogs and cats.”  Id.

Likewise, since no provision of the Dog Law specifically or impliedly authorizes a county board of commissioners to adopt an animal control ordinance to regulate the raising of livestock or poultry, the Dog Law may not be used as a source of such authority. 

It is my opinion, therefore, that the Dog Law of 1919 does not authorize the county to adopt an animal control ordinance regulating the keeping of livestock or poultry. 

MCL 46.11(j); powers of a county board of commissioners

As to the other part of your question, a county’s general ordinance-making authority is created by section 11(j) of 1851 PA 156, MCL 46.11(j), which gives a county board of commissioners the power to “pass ordinances that relate to county affairs and do not contravene the general laws of this state or interfere with the local affairs of a township, city, or village within the limits of the county . . . .”          

“It is elementary that a county has only such powers as have been granted to it by the Constitution or the State Legislature.”  Alan v Wayne County, 388 Mich 210, 245 (1972); see also OAG, 2001-2002, No. 7117, p 115 (September 11, 2002) (“A county possesses only those powers delegated to it.”), citing Wright v Bartz, 339 Mich 55, 60 (1954).  Likewise, “[a] county board of commissioners has no inherent powers.”  OAG, 2001-2002, No. 7117, p 115, citing Mason County Civil Research Council v Mason County, 343 Mich 313, 324 (1955).

Accordingly, a county cannot adopt an ordinance unless it has been granted the authority to do so.  Examples of Michigan statutes that authorize various specific county ordinances include certain zoning ordinances (MCL 125.3201) and noxious weed ordinances (MCL 247.70).  Beyond instances of express statutory authorization, however, noncharter counties, such as Ingham County, possess the authority under MCL 46.11(j) to adopt only ordinances that “relate to county affairs.”  OAG, 2001-2002, No. 7117, p 116.  County affairs are those “relating to the county in its organic and corporate capacity and included within its governmental or corporate powers.”  Id.  Therefore, county ordinances must relate to, and are restricted to, affairs of the county and may not interfere with the local affairs of cities, villages, or townships.  Id. (citing OAG, 1989-1990, No. 6665, pp 401, 403 (November 15, 1990); OAG, 1969-1970, No. 4696, pp 197, 200 (November 25, 1970)). 

For instance, OAG, 1989-1990, No. 6665, p 401, concluded that, although a county lacked authority to regulate or prohibit the placement of cigarette vending machines within their respective borders, it could regulate the placement of cigarette machines on county property.

Similarly, OAG, 2001-2002, No. 7096, p 66 (December 26, 2001) addressed a county’s authority to adopt a countywide noise control ordinance.  In evaluating whether a county had such authority, the opinion recognized that the proposed countywide noise control ordinance described in the request, if adopted, would apply beyond the affairs of a county.  Id., p 67.  The opinion went on to state, however, that “it is possible that a noise control ordinance could be adopted by a county board of commissioners, provided that the ordinance was limited to the regulation of noise on property owned or occupied by the county government or its boards, commissions, or agencies.”  Id. (citing OAG, 1989-1990, No. 6665, pp 401, 403).  Because the proposed countywide noise control ordinance was not limited to county affairs, i.e., the regulation of noise on property owned or occupied by the county government or its boards, commissions, or agencies, the county lacked authority to adopt it. 

Most recently, OAG, 2001-2002, No. 7117, p 116 concluded that a county board of commissioners lacks the authority to adopt a countywide ordinance limiting the amount of well water that may be withdrawn.  The Attorney General opined that a countywide well water supply ordinance, if adopted, would apply beyond the affairs of a county since the ordinance does not relate to the county in its organic and corporate capacity.  Id.  On the other hand, a county could enact a narrow well water supply ordinance provided that the ordinance is limited to the regulation of water wells on property owned or occupied by the county government or its boards, commissions, or agencies.  Id.  Additional support for a county’s limited authority to regulate its own property is found in MCL 46.11(l) and MCL 46.11(m), which, respectively, authorize a county board to manage the county’s property and manage the interests and business concerns of the county. OAG, 2001-2002, No. 7117, p 116.

Applying this framework to your question of whether a county board of commissioners has the statutory authority under MCL 46.11(j) to regulate the keeping of livestock and poultry on residential land, the text of the statute, court precedents, and Attorney General opinions indicate that such statutory authority does not exist.   The keeping of livestock and poultry on residential land is not limited to “county affairs” as such activity does not relate to the county in its organic and corporate capacity and included within its governmental or corporate powers.  Nor is residential land, which is the subject of your request, owned or occupied by the county government or its boards, commissions, or agencies. 

It is my opinion, therefore, that MCL 46.11(j) does not authorize a county board of commissioners to adopt a countywide ordinance regulating the keeping of livestock or poultry on residential land.

Sincerely,

DANA NESSEL
Attorney General